negative instruction in California

2009(See People v. Budwiser (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 105, 107 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 296 ].) The device is used to provide urine that does not contain evidence of narcotics use in order to falsely reflect a negative test result.

2009(See People v. Budwiser (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 105, 107 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 296 ].) The device is used to provide urine that does not contain evidence of narcotics use in order to falsely reflect a negative test result.

2021(Cf. In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1007 [drug and alcohol testing order upheld where the parent’s substance abuse posed “a potential risk of interfering with his ability to make a home for and care for” the minor evidenced by three driving under the influence offenses, including one causing injury resulting in the parent’s incarceration, and where the minor had special needs].) We note alcohol is a legal substance, and father was a noncustodial, nonoffending parent who provided a negative test for all substances and had no criminal history related to alcohol.

2009This is so because a similar explanation of a denial of parole was approved in Rosenkrantz , where a Governor’s decision stated without specificity that the inmate’s “ ‘institutional behavior does not outweigh the circumstances of the crime in assessing his suitability for parole’ ” and that the gravity of the inmate’s offense and other circumstances “ ‘outweigh the arguments advanced for release, such as . . . his prison record or his parole prospects.’ ” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 682.) However, after the Governor’s denial of parole in this case, Lawrence found wanting an earlier

2009However, Lawrence leads us to conclude the Governor’s written decision is flawed because it does not contain a more explicit “articulation of a rational nexus between th[e] facts and current dangerousness.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1227.) Following a summary of facts tending to show unsuitability for parole and those tending to show suitability, the decision simply states: “[A]fter carefully considering the very same factors the Board must consider, I find that the negative factors weighing against [defendant’s] parole suitability presently outweigh the positive ones.” We cannot faul

2004(See In re Ramirez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 549, 572 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 ] (Ramirez) [every factor considered need not be stated, especially if found unpersuasive, but failure to acknowledge significant factor may indicate an unreasonable decision].) 10 In this case these factors were not particularly persuasive or important compared to Van Houten’s other positive factors (good institutional behavior, psychological reports, and parole plans) and the negative factors (the heinousness of the crime, need for further counseling, and unstable social history).

2004(See In re Ramirez (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 549, 572 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 ] (Ramirez) [every factor considered need not be stated, especially if found unpersuasive, but failure to acknowledge significant factor may indicate an unreasonable decision].) 10 In this case these factors were not particularly persuasive or important compared to Van Houten’s other positive factors (good institutional behavior, psychological reports, and parole plans) and the negative factors (the heinousness of the crime, need for further counseling, and unstable social history).

1969(See also People v. Polk, supra, 63 Cal.2d 443 , 451.) However, "[t]o hold a negative instruction improper is not to require that the same instruction be tendered in the affirmative." ( People v. Hillery (1967) 65 Cal.2d 795 , 807 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 280 , 423 P.2d 208 ].) The jury was properly instructed that the law "commits the whole matter of determining which of the two penalties shall be fixed to the judgment, conscience and absolute discretion of the jury." [37a] The court also refused to instruct that if the jury "have any doubt at all of the guilt of the defendant of first degree murder [t

1969(See also People v. Polk, supra, 63 Cal.2d 443 , 451.) However, "[t]o hold a negative instruction improper is not to require that the same instruction be tendered in the affirmative." ( People v. Hillery (1967) 65 Cal.2d 795 , 807 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 280 , 423 P.2d 208 ].) The jury was properly instructed that the law "commits the whole matter of determining which of the two penalties shall be fixed to the judgment, conscience and absolute discretion of the jury." [37a] The court also refused to instruct that if the jury "have any doubt at all of the guilt of the defendant of first degree murder [t

1969(See also People v. Polk, supra, 63 Cal.2d 443 , 451.) However, "[t]o hold a negative instruction improper is not to require that the same instruction be tendered in the affirmative." ( People v. Hillery (1967) 65 Cal.2d 795 , 807 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 280 , 423 P.2d 208 ].) The jury was properly instructed that the law "commits the whole matter of determining which of the two penalties shall be fixed to the judgment, conscience and absolute discretion of the jury." [37a] The court also refused to instruct that if the jury "have any doubt at all of the guilt of the defendant of first degree murder [t

1969(See also People v. Polk, supra, 63 Cal.2d 443 , 451.) However, "[t]o hold a negative instruction improper is not to require that the same instruction be tendered in the affirmative." ( People v. Hillery (1967) 65 Cal.2d 795 , 807 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 280 , 423 P.2d 208 ].) The jury was properly instructed that the law "commits the whole matter of determining which of the two penalties shall be fixed to the judgment, conscience and absolute discretion of the jury." [37a] The court also refused to instruct that if the jury "have any doubt at all of the guilt of the defendant of first degree murder [t

1967The negative of this principle appears in Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal.App.2d 399, 405 [ 270 P.2d 885 ] : . . where actual or practical access to the courts is prevented the distinction between so-called substantive and procedural statutes of limitation may be disregarded.” The principle of access is a helpful guidepost but it is no more than that, and to decide specific eases a court must still act inductively on each statute.

1967The negative of this principle appears in Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal.App.2d 399, 405 [ 270 P.2d 885 ] : . . where actual or practical access to the courts is prevented the distinction between so-called substantive and procedural statutes of limitation may be disregarded.” The principle of access is a helpful guidepost but it is no more than that, and to decide specific eases a court must still act inductively on each statute.

1965They have thus required the prosecution to prove the negative of a test which concludes such a will-o-the-wisp as “all other relevant circumstances. ’ ’ Supplementing what has been said by Justice Tobriner in People v. Stewart, supra, about the “silent record” is the discussion of Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion in People v. Campbell, 233 Cal.App.2d 38, 50-51 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 237 ], He points out Dorado has simply added to the “foundational proof” which California courts have long required preliminary to the introduction of a confession (viz: that the confession was freely and voluntaril

1965They have thus required the prosecution to prove the negative of a test which concludes such a will-o-the-wisp as “all other relevant circumstances. ’ ’ Supplementing what has been said by Justice Tobriner in People v. Stewart, supra, about the “silent record” is the discussion of Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion in People v. Campbell, 233 Cal.App.2d 38, 50-51 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 237 ], He points out Dorado has simply added to the “foundational proof” which California courts have long required preliminary to the introduction of a confession (viz: that the confession was freely and voluntaril

1956Corp., 25 Cal.2d 165, 169 [ 153 P.2d 338 ]) but respondent does not cite any authority for his contention that a failure of appellant to give in his opening brief a negative analysis of all points which ingeniousness might detect as possible grounds for a new trial must be punished by affirmance and we will not follow it.

1956Corp., 25 Cal.2d 165, 169 [ 153 P.2d 338 ]) but respondent does not cite any authority for his contention that a failure of appellant to give in his opening brief a negative analysis of all points which ingeniousness might detect as possible grounds for a new trial must be punished by affirmance and we will not follow it.

1949Without a request of respondent to that effect there was no necessity to include a specific negative instruction that threats alone did not justify a deadly assault where the requirements for justification of a deadly assault were in general sufficiently covered so as to leave no doubt as to their application to this specific point. *153 The failure to give this instruction may have been prejudicial, particularly in connection with the giving of the following instruction: “. . . if, after a consideration of all of the testimony in the case there is a reasonable doubt in your minds whether the

1949Without a request of respondent to that effect there was no necessity to include a specific negative instruction that threats alone did not justify a deadly assault where the requirements for justification of a deadly assault were in general sufficiently covered so as to leave no doubt as to their application to this specific point. *153 The failure to give this instruction may have been prejudicial, particularly in connection with the giving of the following instruction: “. . . if, after a consideration of all of the testimony in the case there is a reasonable doubt in your minds whether the