opponent of a peremptory challenge in California

2015If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 384 (Silva).) The court’s evaluation, at step three, of the genuineness of the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation is generally entitled to “great deference” (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720 ), but only if “the trial court has made a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each challenged juror.” (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p

2015If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 384 (Silva).) The court’s evaluation, at step three, of the genuineness of the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation is generally entitled to “great deference” (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720 ), but only if “the trial court has made a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each challenged juror.” (Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p

2020If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. [Citations.]” (Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767 ; Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1158.) The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike, who, in this case, was the prosecution.

2020(Willis, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 813 .) As thus applied to this case, the prosecutor, as the opponent of the defense’s challenges, had the burden of making a prima facie case of racial discrimination. “[O]nce 9 We grant defendant’s request, filed on July 15, 2020, to take judicial notice of the California Supreme Court’s statement entitled, “Statement of Equality and Inclusion,” pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c). 24. the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out of a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponen

2014If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767 .) The defendant satisfies his or her prima facie burden in step one by producing facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. 162, 170 .) The determinations required by steps two and three are more complex: “In determining whether the defendant ultimately has carried his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination, ‘th

2014If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767 .) The defendant satisfies his or her prima facie burden in step one by producing facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. 162, 170 .) The determinations required by steps two and three are more complex: “In determining whether the defendant ultimately has carried his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination, ‘th

2014If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767 .) The defendant satisfies his or her prima facie burden in step one by producing facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. 162, 170 .) The determinations required by steps two and three are more complex: “In determining whether the defendant ultimately has carried his burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination, ‘th

2007Although the trial court cited Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. 231 , its reliance on that case was misplaced.

2003Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ] (Batson) requires a three-step process when a party claims an opponent has discriminatorily exercised a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or other cognizable group bias; “[Ojnce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two).

2003Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 69 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ] (Batson) requires a three-step process when a party claims an opponent has discriminatorily exercised a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or other cognizable group bias; “[Ojnce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two).

2002(See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165, 171 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 , 878 P.2d 521 .) For example, in Turner the court upheld a peremptory challenge where the juror's body language seemed angry and hostile. ( Id. at p. 170, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 , 878 P.2d 521 .) Similarly, in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1217-1218 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 , the court found no impropriety *38 where the prosecutor excused prospective jurors who looked nervous, who looked tired, who looked weird, who seemed unable to relate to the prosecutor, who had a very defensive body position, who

2002(See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165, 171 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 , 878 P.2d 521 .) For example, in Turner the court upheld a peremptory challenge where the juror's body language seemed angry and hostile. ( Id. at p. 170, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762 , 878 P.2d 521 .) Similarly, in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1217-1218 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 , the court found no impropriety *38 where the prosecutor excused prospective jurors who looked nervous, who looked tired, who looked weird, who seemed unable to relate to the prosecutor, who had a very defensive body position, who

2002A court initially presumes that a party exercising peremptory challenges does so on a constitutionally permissible ground. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 278 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 .) A defendant who claims impermissible use has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 663-664 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 .) "`[O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination ..., the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come

2002A court initially presumes that a party exercising peremptory challenges does so on a constitutionally permissible ground. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 278 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 .) A defendant who claims impermissible use has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 663-664 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 .) "`[O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination ..., the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come