policies behind rule in California

2008“The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Given this general rule that the validity of legislation does not turn on legislative motive, the mental processes of individual legislators become irrelevant to the judicial task; hence, we do not peer into these subjective realms.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 727-728, fn. omitted.) “Chief Just

2008“The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Given this general rule that the validity of legislation does not turn on legislative motive, the mental processes of individual legislators become irrelevant to the judicial task; hence, we do not peer into these subjective realms.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 727-728, fn. omitted.) “Chief Just

2016(Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 2428 ].) In holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable, the court explained that under these circumstances, suppression of the evidence would not advance the policies behind the rule.

2016(Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 2428 ].) In holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable, the court explained that under these circumstances, suppression of the evidence would not advance the policies behind the rule.

2014“He does not claim that the company would have experienced still greater prosperity and growth if the salaries had been smaller but rather maintains that the payment of generous executive compensation was a device to distribute a disproportionate share of the profits to the two officer shareholders during a period of business success.” (Jara, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258 ) The court held that the particular circumstances before it did not implicate the policies behind the rule requiring suits alleging injury to a corporation to be brought by the corporation itself or in a derivate action.

2000(Id. at pp. 916-926.) It provides no authority whatever for the application of collateral estoppel in this matter. *923 In Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1180 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ], a tax case, the court concluded that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata fail[ed] because, . . . the first ruling was not in a former action . . .” (id. at p. 1185, citations omitted, first italics added), but in the same action.

2000(Id. at pp. 916-926.) It provides no authority whatever for the application of collateral estoppel in this matter. *923 In Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1180 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ], a tax case, the court concluded that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata fail[ed] because, . . . the first ruling was not in a former action . . .” (id. at p. 1185, citations omitted, first italics added), but in the same action.

1995As we have explained above, Knight [v. Jewett (1992)] 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ], requires a closer analysis, focusing not on the foreseeability of the hazard or the plaintiff’s subjective awareness of risk, but on the defendant’s duty of care and the relationship of the parties.” (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 545, fn. 4 .) Thus, in this case, we decline to follow the reasoning of Holland v. Crumb, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 1844 , although we believe that decision arrived at the correct result.

1995As we have explained above, Knight [v. Jewett (1992)] 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ], requires a closer analysis, focusing not on the foreseeability of the hazard or the plaintiff’s subjective awareness of risk, but on the defendant’s duty of care and the relationship of the parties.” (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 545, fn. 4 .) Thus, in this case, we decline to follow the reasoning of Holland v. Crumb, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 1844 , although we believe that decision arrived at the correct result.

1993(See Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 91 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 ] (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., supra, 39 Cal.3d 354 .) That is not the case here.

1993(See Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 91 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 ] (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., supra, 39 Cal.3d 354 .) That is not the case here.

1993(See Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 91 , 109 S.Ct. 2333 ] (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.); Michelle W. v. Ronald W., supra, 39 Cal.3d 354 .) That is not the case here.

1981In People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ], this court found that the trial court did not have the authority to strike a use finding in order to place an otherwise ineligible defendant on probation, because the Legislature had precluded such an exercise of judicial discretion.

1981In People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 450 , 596 P.2d 328 ], this court found that the trial court did not have the authority to strike a use finding in order to place an otherwise ineligible defendant on probation, because the Legislature had precluded such an exercise of judicial discretion.