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19 California opinions name it 1 courts 2020–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Frahsgreen2 sentences2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24.) In context, “‘“[p]retrial diversion” means the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, . . . to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment,’ subject to certain conditions.” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801.) Among the express purposes of the program is to “[i]ncrease[] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).) Under section 1001.36, with the exception of defendants charged with 2025We deny the motion and instead consider the Attorney General’s actions as a concession that the forfeiture argument is without merit. 10 conditions.” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801.) Among the express purposes of the program is to “increase[] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).) Under section 1001.36, with the exception of defendants charged with certain crimes, a trial court “may, in its discretion, and after considering the position | 3 | 4 |
People v. Moinegreen2 sentences2026(Id., subd. (b).) They are suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to 13 public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) If “the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements,” and “the court determines that th 2026(Id., subd. (b).) They are suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the 14 defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) If “the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements,” and “the court determines that th | 2 | 6 |
People v. Jefferson CA4/2green2 sentences2026Applicable law and standard of review A “court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion … if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive 2025It stated: “On an accusatory pleading alleging the commission of a misdemeanor or felony offense, the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant pursuant to this section if the defendant meets all of the requirements specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).” The “requirements” listed in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of the statute were: (1) the defendant “suffers from a mental disorder” identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; (2) the defendant’s mental di | 2 | 3 |
Sarmiento v. Super. Ct.green2 sentences2026(Id., subd. (b).) They are suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the 14 defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) If “the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements,” and “the court determines that th 2026(Id., subd. (b).) They are suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the 14 defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) If “the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements,” and “the court determines that th | 2 | 3 |
People v. Raybongreen2 sentences2022Banner’s interpretation would also call into question the Legislature’s mandate that “[e]vidence of the defendant’s mental disorder shall be provided by the defense ….” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A).) For this reason, “ ‘like all ... interpretive canons, the canon 5. against surplusage is a guide to statutory interpretation and is not invariably controlling.’ ” (People v. Raybon (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1056, 1070, fn. 10 .) Next, Banner argues “[t]he only way to harmonize the phrases ‘the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution’ [citation] and ‘[t]he defendant consent 2022Banner’s interpretation would also call into question the Legislature’s mandate that “[e]vidence of the defendant’s mental disorder shall be provided by the defense ….” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A).) For this reason, “ ‘like all ... interpretive canons, the canon against surplusage is a guide to statutory interpretation and is not invariably controlling.’ ” (People v. Raybon (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1056, 1070, fn. 10 .) Next, Banner argues “[t]he only way to harmonize the phrases ‘the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution’ [citation] and ‘[t]he defendant consents t | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bradengreen2 sentences2022(E.g., § 1385 [court may dismiss action on its own or on application of prosecutor]; see People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 [“no sua sponte duty” arises under section 1385].) 15 Whether Banner’s request for diversion at sentencing would be timely is currently under review by the Supreme Court in People v. Braden (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 330 , review granted July 14, 2021, S268925. 2022(E.g., § 1385 [court may dismiss action on its own or on application of prosecutor]; see People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 [“no sua sponte duty” arises under section 1385].) 16 Whether Banner’s request for diversion at sentencing would be timely is currently under review by the Supreme Court in People v. Braden (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 330 , review granted July 14, 2021, S268925. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Leegreen2 sentences2022(E.g., § 1385 [court may dismiss action on its own or on application of prosecutor]; see People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 [“no sua sponte duty” arises under section 1385].) 15 Whether Banner’s request for diversion at sentencing would be timely is currently under review by the Supreme Court in People v. Braden (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 330 , review granted July 14, 2021, S268925. 2022(E.g., § 1385 [court may dismiss action on its own or on application of prosecutor]; see People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 [“no sua sponte duty” arises under section 1385].) 16 Whether Banner’s request for diversion at sentencing would be timely is currently under review by the Supreme Court in People v. Braden (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 330 , review granted July 14, 2021, S268925. | 2 | 2 |
Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fardgreen2 sentences2021(California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143 [the word “may” is ordinarily deemed permissive]; Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 129 , 165 [use of word “may” gave trial court discretion to award royalties, but did not require such an award]; Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 946 [when the Legislature uses both the terms “shall” and “may” in the same statute, the word “shall” is construed as mandatory, not permissive].) We observe that the Legislature here used the word “shall” when 2020Godoy argues that the language of section 1001.36, subdivision (a), puts the court in the driver’s seat: “On an accusatory pleading . . . , the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . .” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) He argues that interpreting this language as requiring a defendant to request diversion would render superfluous one of the criteria for eligibility, that the defendant consents to diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B).) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the L | 2 | 2 |
California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n. v. State Personnel Boardgreen2 sentences2021(California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143 [the word “may” is ordinarily deemed permissive]; Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 129 , 165 [use of word “may” gave trial court discretion to award royalties, but did not require such an award]; Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 946 [when the Legislature uses both the terms “shall” and “may” in the same statute, the word “shall” is construed as mandatory, not permissive].) We observe that the Legislature here used the word “shall” when 2020Godoy argues that the language of section 1001.36, subdivision (a), puts the court in the driver’s seat: “On an accusatory pleading . . . , the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . .” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) He argues that interpreting this language as requiring a defendant to request diversion would render superfluous one of the criteria for eligibility, that the defendant consents to diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B).) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the L | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gersongreen2 sentences2026Applicable law and standard of review A “court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion … if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive 2026Applicable law and standard of review A “court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion … if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive | 1 | 2 |
People v. Whitmillgreen1 sentence2026Unreasonable risk of danger to public safety means “a likelihood that if the defendant is granted diversion, [he or] she will commit one of the ‘super strike’ violent felonies enumerated in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 895; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 449- 450.) “Those super strikes are murder, attempted murder, 15 solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually violent offe | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2021(See Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 708 [applying abuse of discretion standard to section 1001.80 pretrial diversion].) The trial court’s factual findings in support of its exercise of discretion are reviewed for substantial evidence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)green2 sentences2020Godoy argues that the language of section 1001.36, subdivision (a), puts the court in the driver’s seat: “On an accusatory pleading . . . , the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . .” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) He argues that interpreting this language as requiring a defendant to request diversion would render superfluous one of the criteria for eligibility, that the defendant consents to diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B).) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the L 2020Godoy argues that the language of section 1001.36, subdivision (a), puts the court in the driver’s seat: “On an accusatory pleading . . . , the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . .” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) He argues that interpreting this language as requiring a defendant to request diversion would render superfluous one of the criteria for eligibility, that the defendant consents to diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B).) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the L | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Braden
green
2 sentences2026(Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24.) In context, “‘“[p]retrial diversion” means the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, . . . to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment,’ subject to certain conditions.” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801.) Among the express purposes of the program is to “[i]ncrease[] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).) Under section 1001.36, with the exception of defendants charged with 2025We deny the motion and instead consider the Attorney General’s actions as a concession that the forfeiture argument is without merit. 10 conditions.” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791 , 801.) Among the express purposes of the program is to “increase[] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).) Under section 1001.36, with the exception of defendants charged with certain crimes, a trial court “may, in its discretion, and after considering the position | 2 | 2025–2026 |
People v. Stowell
green
1 sentence2026Applicable law and standard of review A “court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion … if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2026Applicable law and standard of review A “court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion … if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) A defendant is “suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency
green
1 sentence2025(See § 1001.36, subd. (a) [“court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant”].) However, while “[m]andate is not available to compel the exercise of discretion on the part of a public official, . . . it is available to correct an abuse of discretion.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1326 , italics added.) That is because an abuse of discretion is not an exercise of discretion, but rather “ ‘ “is action beyond the limits of discretion, and it is settled t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Superior Court of Tulare County
green
1 sentence2025(See § 1001.36, subd. (a) [“court may, in its discretion, and after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant”].) However, while “[m]andate is not available to compel the exercise of discretion on the part of a public official, . . . it is available to correct an abuse of discretion.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1326 , italics added.) That is because an abuse of discretion is not an exercise of discretion, but rather “ ‘ “is action beyond the limits of discretion, and it is settled t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Oneal
green
1 sentence2023The court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) A trial court’s factual findings under section 1001.36 must be supported by substantial evidence (Negron v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 1007 , 1016; People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581 , 589), and the court’s ultimate decision whether to grant mental health diversi | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Gonzalez
green
1 sentence2022Defendant’s second argument in support of the sua sponte duty of inquiry is based on section 1001.36, subdivision (a), which states in pertinent part: “On an accusatory pleading . . . , the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . .” He asserts the interpretive rule that “ ‘[w]e consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141 ), supports finding a sua sponte duty to inquire from the use of the term “may” in subdi | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2022Indeed, Banner’s interpretation injects disharmony into the statute by ignoring the paragraph describing a “request for 7 This point is based on the canon courts “ ‘ “must harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment … by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 .) 5. diversion” and requiring the defendant to prove eligibility for diversion. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Weaver
green
1 sentence2020If a prima facie showing is not made, the court may summarily deny the request for diversion or grant any other relief as may be deemed appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(3).) But if the court is satisfied that the defendant meets the six minimum eligibility requirements (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)), and that the defendant and the offense are suitable for diversion (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(3)), the court may divert the defendant into an approved mental health treatment program and suspend the criminal proceedings for a period of no more than two years. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1), (c)(3).) The statute | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. H.W. (In Re H.W.)
green
1 sentence2020Godoy argues that the language of section 1001.36, subdivision (a), puts the court in the driver’s seat: “On an accusatory pleading . . . , the court may, after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial diversion to a defendant . . . .” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) He argues that interpreting this language as requiring a defendant to request diversion would render superfluous one of the criteria for eligibility, that the defendant consents to diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B).) “When we interpret statutes, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the L | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.