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13 California opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Boydgreen2 sentences1991Under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 700 P.2d 782 ], all this evidence, because it does not fall under any of the statutory aggravating factors, would be inadmissible in the prosecution’s penalty case-in-chief. 1991Under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 700 P.2d 782 ], all this evidence, because it does not fall under any of the statutory aggravating factors, would be inadmissible in the prosecution’s penalty case-in-chief. | 4 | 6 |
Gregg v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1980Upon further analysis, I now conclude that the 1977 legislation suffers from some, but not all, of the infirmities itemized by the Chief Justice in her dissenting opinion herein. *337 First, our statute does not require the sentencing authority to find that at least one of the statutory aggravating factors is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as in Georgia ( Gregg v. Georgia (1976) supra, 428 U.S. 153, 166, fn. 9 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 870 ] (plur. opn.)). 1980Upon further analysis, I now conclude that the 1977 legislation suffers from some, but not all, of the infirmities itemized by the Chief Justice in her dissenting opinion herein. *337 First, our statute does not require the sentencing authority to find that at least one of the statutory aggravating factors is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as in Georgia ( Gregg v. Georgia (1976) supra, 428 U.S. 153, 166, fn. 9 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 870 ] (plur. opn.)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Samuelsgreen2 sentences2006Let the chips fall where they may and do the right thing." "`"[T]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may `diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and . . . imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.] [І] Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. [Citation.] The prosecutor's biblical argument was only a small part of [his] argument, the bulk of which focused on arguing to the jury why it shoul 2006Let the chips fall where they may and do the right thing." "`"[T]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may `diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and . . . imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.] [І] Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. [Citation.] The prosecutor's biblical argument was only a small part of [his] argument, the bulk of which focused on arguing to the jury why it shoul | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hawthornegreen2 sentences2012The prosecutor may, however, present evidence not within the statutory aggravating factors to rebut the defendant’s mitigating evidence and is permitted to argue to the jury that the defendant’s mitigating evidence “fails to carry extenuating weight when evaluated in a broader factual context.” (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 92 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 330 , 205 P.3d 245 ].) Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly commented that although defendant had experienced a “rotten, lousy, abusive childhood,” the testimony at trial showed that “the bottom line is ... he knows right from wrong, a 2012The prosecutor may, however, present evidence not within the statutory aggravating factors to rebut the defendant’s mitigating evidence and is permitted to argue to the jury that the defendant’s mitigating evidence “fails to carry extenuating weight when evaluated in a broader factual context.” (People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 92 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 330 , 205 P.3d 245 ].) Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly commented that although defendant had experienced a “rotten, lousy, abusive childhood,” the testimony at trial showed that “the bottom line is ... he knows right from wrong, a | 1 | 1 |
People v. Murtishawgreen2 sentences2012(People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1034 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 773 P.2d 172 ].) In any event, these statements were not improper. 2012(People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1034 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 821 , 773 P.2d 172 ].) In any event, these statements were not improper. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fierrogreen2 sentences2009(People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 237 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ].) Here, the challenged cross-examination was not offered as evidence in aggravation, but to impeach the evidence presented in mitigation. 2009(People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 237 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 , 821 P.2d 1302 ].) Here, the challenged cross-examination was not offered as evidence in aggravation, but to impeach the evidence presented in mitigation. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vieiragreen2 sentences2006Let the chips fall where they may and do the right thing." "`"[T]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may `diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and . . . imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.] [І] Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. [Citation.] The prosecutor's biblical argument was only a small part of [his] argument, the bulk of which focused on arguing to the jury why it shoul 2006Let the chips fall where they may and do the right thing." "`"[T]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may `diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and . . . imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions.'" [Citations.]' [Citation.] [І] Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. [Citation.] The prosecutor's biblical argument was only a small part of [his] argument, the bulk of which focused on arguing to the jury why it shoul | 1 | 1 |
People v. Slaughtergreen2 sentences2005We have previously stated, "`[t]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may "diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and ... imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions."' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 389 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 .) Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1211 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 .) The prosecutor's biblical 2005We have previously stated, "`[t]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may "diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and ... imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions."' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 389 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 .) Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1211 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 .) The prosecutor's biblical | 1 | 1 |
California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Districtgreen2 sentences1991We think it generally is. (33) In construing statutes, we apply the usual, ordinary import of the language used. ( California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698 [ 170 Cal. Rptr. 817 , 621 P.2d 856 ].) (32b) The word "circumstances" as used in factor (a) of section 190.3 does not mean merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime. 1991We think it generally is. (33) In construing statutes, we apply the usual, ordinary import of the language used. ( California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698 [ 170 Cal. Rptr. 817 , 621 P.2d 856 ].) (32b) The word "circumstances" as used in factor (a) of section 190.3 does not mean merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Boyde
green
1 sentence2016When describing the circumstances of those incidents, the witnesses mentioned how the crimes had affected their lives. ( Boyde, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 247, 249.) The court in Boyde agreed with the defendant that the ―testimony by victims of other offenses about the impact that the event had on their lives‖ was improperly admitted because it 58 was unrelated to any of the statutory aggravating factors. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2006If it was, it certainly was harmless, whether viewed through the prism of federal constitutional law ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ) or state law *623 ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 ). 2006If it was, it certainly was harmless, whether viewed through the prism of federal constitutional law ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ) or state law *623 ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2006If it was, it certainly was harmless, whether viewed through the prism of federal constitutional law ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ) or state law *623 ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 ). 2006If it was, it certainly was harmless, whether viewed through the prism of federal constitutional law ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ) or state law *623 ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , 299 P.2d 243 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Hughes
green
2 sentences2005We have previously stated, "`[t]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may "diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and ... imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions."' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 389 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 .) Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1211 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 .) The prosecutor's biblical 2005We have previously stated, "`[t]he primary vice in referring to the Bible and other religious authority is that such argument may "diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and ... imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions."' [Citations.]" ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 389 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401 , 39 P.3d 432 .) Even if the prosecutor's argument was error, such error was harmless. ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1211 , 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477 , 47 P.3d 262 .) The prosecutor's biblical | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Payne v. Tennessee
green
2 sentences1991(See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 .) One of the statutory aggravating factors is the "circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding...." (§ 190.3, factor (a).) The issue is thus whether "evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant" ( Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. ___ [ 115 L.Ed.2d at p. 735 , 111 S.Ct. at p. 2608 ]) is a circumstance of the crime admissible under factor (a). 1991(See People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 .) One of the statutory aggravating factors is the "circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding...." (§ 190.3, factor (a).) The issue is thus whether "evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant" ( Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. ___ [ 115 L.Ed.2d at p. 735 , 111 S.Ct. at p. 2608 ]) is a circumstance of the crime admissible under factor (a). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Ghent
green
1 sentence1988Because remorse is universally accepted as a possibly mitigating factor, however, the prosecutor may call to the attention of the jury an apparent absence of remorse in a defendant who has admitted that he has killed another human being. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 771 .) The prosecutor's argument here went no further than that. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.