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8 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1989–1997 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Howard v. Stategreen1 sentence1995See Howard v. State (1993), Ind.App., 626 N.E.2d 574, 576-77 , trans. denied (when the trial court exercises its discretion to enhance a presumptive sentence, the record must identify the relevant factors underlying its decision). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stringer v. Black
green
2 sentences1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . 1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . | 2 | 1992–1995 |
Sochor v. Florida
green
2 sentences1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . 1995Sochor v. Florida (1992), 504 U.S. 527 , -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119 , 119 L.Ed.2d 826 ; Stringer v. Black (1992), 508 U.S. 222 , -, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136 , 117 L.Ed.2d 367 . | 2 | 1992–1995 |
Bivins v. State
green
1 sentence1997Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind.1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
McCoy v. State
green
1 sentence1995McCoy v. State (1991), Ind., 574 N.E.2d 304 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hardebeck v. State
green
1 sentence1995Hardebeck, 656 N.E.2d at 491 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Parrish v. State
green
1 sentence1991We first note that the trial court retains wide discretion to enhance a presumptive sentence, Shippen v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 903, 905 , can use the same aggravating factors to both enhance sentences and impose them consecutively, Parrish v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 516, 521 , and is not limited to using only the statutory aggravating factors to enhance a sentence. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Shippen v. State
green
1 sentence1991We first note that the trial court retains wide discretion to enhance a presumptive sentence, Shippen v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 903, 905 , can use the same aggravating factors to both enhance sentences and impose them consecutively, Parrish v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 516, 521 , and is not limited to using only the statutory aggravating factors to enhance a sentence. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Johnson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1991Johnson v. State (1989), Ind., 537 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Furman v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1989He cites Furman v. Georgia, (1972), 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 and Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 for the proposition that the statutory aggravating factors must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. 1989He cites Furman v. Georgia, (1972), 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 and Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 for the proposition that the statutory aggravating factors must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Zant v. Stephens
green
2 sentences1989He cites Furman v. Georgia, (1972), 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 and Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 for the proposition that the statutory aggravating factors must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. 1989He cites Furman v. Georgia, (1972), 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 and Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 for the proposition that the statutory aggravating factors must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.