undeveloped claim in California

2025(Paterno, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 106 ; Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545 .) Even if the claim were not forfeited, it fails on the merits.

2021(See Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 975, 984-985 ; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 .) IV.

2021(See Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 975, 984-985 ; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 .) IV.

2020(See Maral v. City of Live Oak (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 975, 984-985 ; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 .) Defendant also contends the imposition of the restitution fund fine without consideration of ability to pay violates equal protection.

2015But they do not explain why; they merely cite City of Chicago v. Morales (1999) 527 U.S. 41 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 67 ], and Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach (2009) 574 F.3d 1011 , without further argument or explanation.5 Accordingly, the undeveloped claim is forfeited.

2015But they do not explain why; they merely cite Chicago v. Morales (1999) 527 U.S. 41 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 67 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 ], and Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach (2009) 574 F.3d 1011 , without further argument or explanation. 5 Accordingly, the undeveloped claim is forfeited.

2015But they do not explain why; they merely cite Chicago v. Morales (1999) 527 U.S. 41 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 67 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 ], and Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach (2009) 574 F.3d 1011 , without further argument or explanation. 5 Accordingly, the undeveloped claim is forfeited.

2015But they do not explain why; they merely cite Chicago v. Morales (1999) 527 U.S. 41 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 67 , 119 S.Ct. 1849 ], and Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach (2009) 574 F.3d 1011 , without further argument or explanation. 5 Accordingly, the undeveloped claim is forfeited.

2025(Paterno, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 106 ; Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545 .) Even if the claim were not forfeited, it fails on the merits.

2024(People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 240 .) 10 Monroe also makes an undeveloped claim that exclusion of the evidence undermined the “ ‘ “integrity of the fact-finding process.” ’ ” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295 [cross-examination and impeachment of witness denied].) But the Supreme Court has “never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted.” (Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 690 .) Th

2024(See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 .) 19 On this court’s own motion, we augmented the record to include the formal order denying appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction. 20 It does not appear that a notice of entry of the order denying preliminary injunction was filed by the clerk or any party, and therefore, the 60-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal was not triggered.

2024(People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 240 .) 10 Monroe also makes an undeveloped claim that exclusion of the evidence undermined the “ ‘ “integrity of the fact-finding process.” ’ ” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295 [cross-examination and impeachment of witness denied].) But the Supreme Court has “never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted.” (Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 690 .) Th

2024(People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 240 .) 10 Monroe also makes an undeveloped claim that exclusion of the evidence undermined the “ ‘ “integrity of the fact-finding process.” ’ ” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295 [cross-examination and impeachment of witness denied].) But the Supreme Court has “never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted.” (Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 690 .) Th

2021(See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396 , 408 [“appellant’s brief ‘must’ ‘[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .’ [Citations.] This is not a mere technical requirement; it is ‘designed to lighten the labors of the appellate tribunals by requiring the litigants to present their cause systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass’ ”].) 7 DISPOSITION The

2020(Berkley v. Dowds, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 526-527.) But we note the unlawful detainer court made no findings that Gough knew, or should have known, the proof of service had been falsified or otherwise engaged in any wrongdoing.

2015Code, § 7611.)1 He claims that he received L.P. into his home and openly held her out as his own, which meets the requirements of presumed father designation pursuant to section 7611, subdivision (d).2 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 2 He adds an undeveloped claim that he is entitled to designation as a “Kelsey S. presumed father” (see Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 ), and briefly argues 3 The record does not reflect that father ever asked the juvenile court, formally or informally, to be so designated.

2015Nor at any point did he object to his designation as L.P.’s biological father (rather than her presumed father) in the juvenile court, despite multiple hearings at which he was openly classified as such. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.] [¶] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule. [Citations.]” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4t

2006Although Cormicle attempted to present a duress defense at trial, he, like defense counsel in People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 , presented an undeveloped defense theory and offered no expert testimony and insufficient or no other evidence to support that theory. ( Id. at pp. 159, 163, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 .) In this case, because Nourn's counsel did not present substantial evidence to support a duress defense and yet attempted to essentially argue that theory in closing, the trial court granted the prosecutor's request for an admonition to

2006Although Cormicle attempted to present a duress defense at trial, he, like defense counsel in People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142 , 158 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 , presented an undeveloped defense theory and offered no expert testimony and insufficient or no other evidence to support that theory. ( Id. at pp. 159, 163, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 .) In this case, because Nourn's counsel did not present substantial evidence to support a duress defense and yet attempted to essentially argue that theory in closing, the trial court granted the prosecutor's request for an admonition to