universally accepted rule in California

1986Code, §§ 10130, 10131.) Business and Professions Code section 10133, subdivision (a), specifically exempts from the definition of a real estate broker “Anyone who directly performs any of the acts within the scope of this chapter with reference to his own property . . . .” This statutory provision “codifies a universally accepted rule that a person dealing with his or her own property is not acting as a broker.” (Garcia v. Wetzel, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at p. 1097 .) As principals in a loan transaction, both the lender and the borrower necessarily act on their own behalf and not as agent for an

1984(Accord Froid v. Fox, supra, 132 Cal. App.3d 832, 841-842 .) Recently, in Merrifield v. Edmonds (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 336, 343 [ 194 Cal. Rptr. 104 ], we characterized the taking of personal loans as an activity that does not require a real estate license.

1984(Accord Froid v. Fox, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d 832, 841-842 .) Recently, in Merrifield v. Edmonds (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 336, 343 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 104 ], we characterized the taking of personal loans as an activity that does not require a real estate license.

1966In People v. Scott, 218 Cal.App.2d 249 , the court stated at pages 253, 254 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 225 ] : “Where the identity of the defendant is in issue, evidence that he committed other crimes or attempts under circumstances which were remarkably similar to the one charged may be admitted for the purpose of showing that the defendant did in fact commit the crime charged.

1966In People v. Scott, 218 Cal.App.2d 249 , the court stated at pages 253, 254 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 225 ] : “Where the identity of the defendant is in issue, evidence that he committed other crimes or attempts under circumstances which were remarkably similar to the one charged may be admitted for the purpose of showing that the defendant did in fact commit the crime charged.

1966But whenever the case is such that proof of one crime tends to prove any fact material in the trial of another, such proof is admissible, and the fact that it may tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors is no ground for its exclusion.’ People v. Walters, 98 Cal. 138,141 [ 32 P. 864 ].” It is the universally accepted rule that evidence of other crimes may be received to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense for which he is on trial.

1966But whenever the case is such that proof of one crime tends to prove any fact material in the trial of another, such proof is admissible, and the fact that it may tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors is no ground for its exclusion.' People v. Walters, 98 Cal. 138, 141 [ 32 P. 864 ]." [3] It is the universally accepted rule that evidence of other crimes may be received to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense for which he is on trial.

1962In the case of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220 [ 218 P.2d 181 ], a Kansas court was faced with facts comparable to those before us, except that the entire transaction occurred within the State of Kansas.

1962In the case of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220 [ 218 P.2d 181 ], a Kansas court was faced with facts comparable to those before us, except that the entire transaction occurred within the State of Kansas.

1962In Atha v. Bockius, 39 Cal.2d 635 [ 248 P.2d 672 ], the Supreme Court said, at page 642:1 ‘ There is nothing in the comity doctrine, ... to preclude application of the universally accepted principle, incorporated in section 3543 of the Civil Code, that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he by whose negligence it happened must bear the loss.” Even under the rule of comity the doctrine of estoppel obtains in this ease, since the same doctrine has been applied to *261 similar facts by the courts of Kansas.

1952The court in Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, supra, 203 Cal. 483, 492 , referred to this principle as a necessary consideration in the following language: " There may be cases in which the owner of a chattel mortgage has not acted with due diligence in following and reclaiming the property which is the subject of his mortgage, or he may be estopped on account of his acts and conduct in reference to the mortgaged chattels from recovering them after their purchase by persons having no knowledge of the mortgage lien, hut the complaint in this case shows no facts which would indicate that plai

1952The court in Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, supra, 203 Cal. 483, 492 , referred to this principle as a necessary consideration in the following language: " There may be cases in which the owner of a chattel mortgage has not acted with due diligence in following and reclaiming the property which is the subject of his mortgage, or he may be estopped on account of his acts and conduct in reference to the mortgaged chattels from recovering them after their purchase by persons having no knowledge of the mortgage lien, hut the complaint in this case shows no facts which would indicate that plai

1952The court in Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, supra, 203 Cal. 483, 492 , referred to this principle as a necessary consideration in the following language: " There may be cases in which the owner of a chattel mortgage has not acted with due diligence in following and reclaiming the property which is the subject of his mortgage, or he may be estopped on account of his acts and conduct in reference to the mortgaged chattels from recovering them after their purchase by persons having no knowledge of the mortgage lien, hut the complaint in this case shows no facts which would indicate that plai

1952App., 1941), 155 S.W.2d 834 .) There is nothing in the comity doctrine, however, to preclude application of the universally accepted principle, incorporated in section 3543 of the Civil Code, that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he by whose negligence it happened must bear the loss.

1929(Harter v. San Jose, 141 Cal. 659 [ 75 Pac. 344 ]; Archer v. Salinas City, 93 Cal. 43, 51 [16 L.

1929(Harter v. San Jose, 141 Cal. 659 [ 75 Pac. 344 ]; Archer v. Salinas City, 93 Cal. 43, 51 [16 L.

1916Rep. 109 , 6 Pac. 317 ], wherein the court declared that it was the universally accepted rule that in the making of street improvements the city is the agent of the state, and is performing a public duty imposed upon it by law; and that neither it nor its duly authorized agents are answerable for consequential damages as a result of such work when done with proper *346 care and skill.

1909Dec. 498 ]; Pankey v. Howard, 47 Miss. 83 ; Kitchen v. Sheets, 1 Ind. 138 ; Smith v. Pratt, 13 Ohio, 549.) The exception to this rule is one based on the universally accepted doctrine that one cotenant cannot by a conveyance of his interest in a portion of the property held in common, etc., prejudice the rights of his cotenants.

1909Dec. 498 ]; Pankey v. Howard, 47 Miss. 83 ; Kitchen v. Sheets, 1 Ind. 138 ; Smith v. Pratt, 13 Ohio, 549.) The exception to this rule is one based on the universally accepted doctrine that one cotenant cannot by a conveyance of his interest in a portion of the property held in common, etc., prejudice the rights of his cotenants.

1895In some cases it has been decided that twenty years were necessary to raise the presumption of dedication, while in others it has been held that a much shorter period was sufficient.” (San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114 .) The language of Hope v. Barnett, 78 Cal. 9 , cannot be construed as conflicting with this universally accepted rule of the common law.