unsubstantiated claim in California

2002Plaintiffs as well as defendants may recover fees: defendants, as *516 discussed, only when the plaintiff burdens free speech with an unsubstantiated claim ( Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ); plaintiffs whenever a defendant's motion to strike is "frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay" (§ 425.16, subd. (c)).

2002Plaintiffs as well as defendants may recover fees: defendants, as *516 discussed, only when the plaintiff burdens free speech with an unsubstantiated claim ( Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 412, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875 , 926 P.2d 1061 ); plaintiffs whenever a defendant's motion to strike is "frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay" (§ 425.16, subd. (c)).

2023(See Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2 [appellate court considers only matters that were part of the record at the time court entered the judgment].) Finally, we note that the brief makes various unsubstantiated representations, including, for instance, that Judge Evans ignored “years of . . . criminal threats, intimidation, and vandalism.” No evidence was presented of criminal threats, intimidation, or vandalism (except perhaps the unsubstantiated claim about nails in their tires, as to which appellants admitted they had no evidence of respondents’ involvement.) The

2022He does not go into any evidentiary 25 Defendant relies on People v. Howard (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 41, 48 (Howard), stating that, “[i]n statistical terms, Strickland requires a something less than 50 percent likelihood of a more favorable verdict.” No published case has cited or followed Howard for this premise, and based on the more current statements describing prejudice by the United States Supreme Court and other courts of review, we decline to employ Howard’s mathematical formulation. 39 detail in making his prejudice argument, though he does make the unsubstantiated claim that the cell ph

2021(See Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310 [“under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ‘[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise’ ”].) But because Gary cites nothing in the record showing that he and his brothers actually refrained from objecting to George’s alleged “lack of active participation” for this reason, w

2021(See ibid. [to trigger promissory estoppel, the promise must actually induce “action or forbearance”]; see also Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 362, 364 [“if it is not in the record, it did not happen”].) Gary also argues that, should we find that the trust acquired George’s partnership interest, then our decision would conflict with the court’s decision in Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909 .

2021(See ibid. [to trigger promissory estoppel, the promise must actually induce “action or forbearance”]; see also Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 362, 364 [“if it is not in the record, it did not happen”].) Gary also argues that, should we find that the trust acquired George’s partnership interest, then our decision would conflict with the court’s decision in Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909 .

2021(See ibid. [to trigger promissory estoppel, the promise must actually induce “action or forbearance”]; see also Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 362, 364 [“if it is not in the record, it did not happen”].) Gary also argues that, should we find that the trust acquired George’s partnership interest, then our decision would conflict with the court’s decision in Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909 .

2021(See People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1018 [reviewing “ ‘ “court cannot evaluate alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on defendant’s unsubstantiated speculation” ’ ”].) Trial counsel very well may have investigated the facts and concluded there was insufficient evidence to support a prima facie showing that Hill was eligible for diversion.

2021(See In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403-1404 (C.M.); In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463 [dismissing concerns that a father “‘appeared to have an unresolved problem with alcohol and a history of substance abuse’” where alcohol abuse allegations in the dependency petition were dismissed and the father passed the only drug and alcohol test he was given].) The only evidence 13 indicating Father’s drinking even rose to the level of intoxication, much less alcohol abuse, was a statement from Maternal Aunt describing Father’s behavior from two or three years prior.2 It did not s

2021(See In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403-1404 (C.M.); In re Abram L. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, 463 [dismissing concerns that a father “‘appeared to have an unresolved problem with alcohol and a history of substance abuse’” where alcohol abuse allegations in the dependency petition were dismissed and the father passed the only drug and alcohol test he was given].) The only evidence 13 indicating Father’s drinking even rose to the level of intoxication, much less alcohol abuse, was a statement from Maternal Aunt describing Father’s behavior from two or three years prior.2 It did not s

2003(See People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 868 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ] [method of calculating statistical probabilities generally accepted in scientific community]; People v. Barney (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 820-821 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ] [debate in scientific community following Axell undermined the statistical method]; People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 82-90 [defining a statistical method that has become generally accepted]; People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515-516 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 , 981 P.2d 958 ] [addressing a variation on that method].) As stated in People v. Barney,

2003(See People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 868 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ] [method of calculating statistical probabilities generally accepted in scientific community]; People v. Barney (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 820-821 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ] [debate in scientific community following Axell undermined the statistical method]; People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 82-90 [defining a statistical method that has become generally accepted]; People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515-516 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 , 981 P.2d 958 ] [addressing a variation on that method].) As stated in People v. Barney,

2003(See People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 868 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ] [method of calculating statistical probabilities generally accepted in scientific community]; People v. Barney (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 820-821 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ] [debate in scientific community following Axell undermined the statistical method]; People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 82-90 [defining a statistical method that has become generally accepted]; People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515-516 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 , 981 P.2d 958 ] [addressing a variation on that method].) As stated in People v. Barney,

2003(See People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 868 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ] [method of calculating statistical probabilities generally accepted in scientific community]; People v. Barney (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 820-821 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ] [debate in scientific community following Axell undermined the statistical method]; People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 82-90 [defining a statistical method that has become generally accepted]; People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515-516 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 , 981 P.2d 958 ] [addressing a variation on that method].) As stated in People v. Barney,

2003(See People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 868 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ] [method of calculating statistical probabilities generally accepted in scientific community]; People v. Barney (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 820-821 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ] [debate in scientific community following Axell undermined the statistical method]; People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 82-90 [defining a statistical method that has become generally accepted]; People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515-516 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 , 981 P.2d 958 ] [addressing a variation on that method].) As stated in People v. Barney,

2003(See People v. Axell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 868 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411 ] [method of calculating statistical probabilities generally accepted in scientific community]; People v. Barney (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 798, 820-821 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ] [debate in scientific community following Axell undermined the statistical method]; People v. Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 82-90 [defining a statistical method that has become generally accepted]; People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 515-516 [ 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 , 981 P.2d 958 ] [addressing a variation on that method].) As stated in People v. Barney,

2001MICRA was adopted in 1975 to address a medical malpractice crisis by controlling the costs of malpractice insurance. ( Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 112 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 .) Section 425.13 was adopted in 1987 to "require greater certainty of the propriety of imposing punitive damages by requiring clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or oppression," and to make it more difficult to assert an unsubstantiated claim for punitive damages against a health care provider. ( Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc

2001MICRA was adopted in 1975 to address a medical malpractice crisis by controlling the costs of malpractice insurance. ( Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 112 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 .) Section 425.13 was adopted in 1987 to "require greater certainty of the propriety of imposing punitive damages by requiring clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or oppression," and to make it more difficult to assert an unsubstantiated claim for punitive damages against a health care provider. ( Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc

1991(See Nelson v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 25, 31 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 305 ].) In short, the unsubstantiated claim that “some” unidentified number of persons using the homeless shelters were nonindigent or nonresidents provides a grossly inadequate basis for rejecting the considered and eminently sensible determination of the trial court that the shelters benefitted indigent persons legally entitled to such relief under section 17000.

1991(See Nelson v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 25, 31 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 305 ].) In short, the unsubstantiated claim that “some” unidentified number of persons using the homeless shelters were nonindigent or nonresidents provides a grossly inadequate basis for rejecting the considered and eminently sensible determination of the trial court that the shelters benefitted indigent persons legally entitled to such relief under section 17000.

1981(People v. Penrod (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d, 738, 745 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 533 ]; People v. Culton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 113, 116 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 672 ].) There is manifest no abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of the motion which also was untimely and based upon an unsubstantiated claim that Jones was willing to take defendant’s case. *873 In appellant’s reply brief and for the first time, he raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict quoting at length from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 ].

1981(People v. Penrod (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d, 738, 745 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 533 ]; People v. Culton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 113, 116 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 672 ].) There is manifest no abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of the motion which also was untimely and based upon an unsubstantiated claim that Jones was willing to take defendant’s case. *873 In appellant’s reply brief and for the first time, he raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict quoting at length from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 ].

1981(People v. Penrod (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d, 738, 745 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 533 ]; People v. Culton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 113, 116 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 672 ].) There is manifest no abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of the motion which also was untimely and based upon an unsubstantiated claim that Jones was willing to take defendant’s case. *873 In appellant’s reply brief and for the first time, he raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict quoting at length from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 ].

1981(People v. Penrod (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d, 738, 745 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 533 ]; People v. Culton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 113, 116 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 672 ].) There is manifest no abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of the motion which also was untimely and based upon an unsubstantiated claim that Jones was willing to take defendant’s case. *873 In appellant’s reply brief and for the first time, he raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict quoting at length from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 ].

1981Points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered (6 Witkin, California Procedure (1971) Appeal, section 442, page 4405; see also In re Marriage of Millet (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 729, 732 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 390 ]).

1981Points raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered (6 Witkin, California Procedure (1971) Appeal, section 442, page 4405; see also In re Marriage of Millet (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 729, 732 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 390 ]).

1981(People v. Penrod (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d, 738, 745 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 533 ]; People v. Culton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 113, 116 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 672 ].) There is manifest no abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of the motion which also was untimely and based upon an unsubstantiated claim that Jones was willing to take defendant’s case. *873 In appellant’s reply brief and for the first time, he raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict quoting at length from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 ].

1981(People v. Penrod (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d, 738, 745 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 533 ]; People v. Culton (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 113, 116 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 672 ].) There is manifest no abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of the motion which also was untimely and based upon an unsubstantiated claim that Jones was willing to take defendant’s case. *873 In appellant’s reply brief and for the first time, he raises the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict quoting at length from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 447 P.2d 942 ].

1978(See Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 146, 154-155 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 145 , 520 P.2d 961 , 64 A.L.R.3d 803 ].) Under these circumstances, the trial court’s order constitutes a clear taking of defendant’s property without due process.

1978(See Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 146, 154-155 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 145 , 520 P.2d 961 , 64 A.L.R.3d 803 ].) Under these circumstances, the trial court’s order constitutes a clear taking of defendant’s property without due process.