use of the peremptory challenge in California

2026The court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” An objection under this subdivision shall be sustained “[i]f the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view” a protected characteristic “as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) Additionally, the trial court is to “explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.” (Ibid.) We review de novo a trial court’s determination

2026(Id. at p. 804.) 7 Once these two requirements have been fulfilled, “the proffered reason that falls under section 231.7, subdivision (g)(1) is no longer presumptively invalid and can be considered as a valid reason when the court ultimately determines if ‘there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race … as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.’ ” (People v. Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 804.) Here, the confirmation requirement was fulfilled.

2026(See People v. Aguilar (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1 , 11 [rejecting forfeiture argument grounded in defense counsel’s failure to make targeted objection specifically referring to presumptively invalid category]; Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [after party objects under § 237.1, it is trial court’s responsibility to apply correct procedure to decide whether to sustain objection].) Stated differently, the presumptively invalid categories embody circumstances in which the Legislature has declared the court must presume an objectively reasonable person would view membership or perceived

2026(See People v. Aguilar (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1 , 11 [rejecting forfeiture argument grounded in defense counsel’s failure to make targeted objection specifically referring to presumptively invalid category]; Caparrotta, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [after party objects under § 237.1, it is trial court’s responsibility to apply correct procedure to decide whether to sustain objection].) Stated differently, the presumptively invalid categories embody circumstances in which the Legislature has declared the court must presume an objectively reasonable person would view membership or perceived

2026(People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941 , 943.) Rather, “upon objection . . . , the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.” (§ 231.7, subd. (c), italics added.) The trial court “shall evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) In doing so, “[t]he court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Ibid.;

2026Instead, the prosecutor must state reasons for exercising the challenge. (§ 231.7, subd. (c); People v. Jaime, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.) The trial court must then “evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances,” considering “only the reasons actually given” and not any “other possible justifications.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) If the court finds “a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, gender, . . . or perceived membership 5 in any of those groups, as a factor in the use of

2026(Cf. People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 [“ ‘ “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [striking party’s] explanation,” ’ the reason will be deemed neutral”]; see also People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1052 (Mai) [“the prosecutor’s demeanor observations, even if not explicitly confirmed by the record, are a permissible race-neutral ground for peremptory excusal, especially when they were not disputed in the trial court”].) The first category is set out in section 231.7, subdivision (e) (section 231.7(e)), which provides: “A peremptory challenge for any of the followi

2025(See Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1156, fn. 2 .) But as we now explain, based on our de novo review of the totality of the circumstances pertaining to Prospective Juror No. 79, we conclude on the record before us that “an objectively reasonable person would” not “view race . . . or perceived [race] . . . as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).) Several circumstances support this conclusion.

2025Because this case does not involve a presumptively invalid reason under section 231.7, subdivision (e), we do not discuss that portion of the procedural framework. 17 to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) In doing so, “[t]he court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Ibid.) Unlike in the Batson/Wheeler analysis, the ultimate question for the trial court is not whether the party exercising th

2025Because this case does not involve a presumptively invalid reason under section 231.7, subdivision (e), we do not discuss that portion of the procedural framework. 17 to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) In doing so, “[t]he court shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Ibid.) Unlike in the Batson/Wheeler analysis, the ultimate question for the trial court is not whether the party exercising th

2026(Uriostegui, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 280.) 27 witnesses are not.13 It is undisputed that PJ10 was the only African- American man in the venire.14 On this record, given the totality of the circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that there is more than a mere possibility that an objectively reasonable person would view race as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge against PJ10.

2025(People v. Uriostegui (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 271 , 277-278, 281 (Uriostegui).) When, as here, a defendant challenges a prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge under section 231.7, the prosecutor must “state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.” (§ 231.7, subd. (c).) The trial court must then evaluate “the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances,” considering “only the reasons actually given” and not any “other possible justifications . . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) If the court finds “a substantial likelihood that an

2026(Cf. People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 [“ ‘ “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [striking party’s] explanation,” ’ the reason will be deemed neutral”]; see also People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1052 (Mai) [“the prosecutor’s demeanor observations, even if not explicitly confirmed by the record, are a permissible race-neutral ground for peremptory excusal, especially when they were not disputed in the trial court”].) The first category is set out in section 231.7, subdivision (e) (section 231.7(e)), which provides: “A peremptory challenge for any of the followi

2025(See People v. Coley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 964, 972 [appellant has the burden of demonstrating both error and resulting prejudice]; see also Cal. Const., art.

2024(Id., subd. (e)(1) [peremptory challenge based on a prospective juror expressing “a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system” is presumptively invalid]; see, e.g., People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 614 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [a prosecutorial practice of striking jurors based on their views of the O.J.

2023Notably, as a result of a legislative change that took effect in 2022, a peremptory challenge is now considered to be statutorily improper if the trial court determines there is a substantial likelihood that “an objectively reasonable person” would view prohibited group bias such as race “as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subds (d)(1) & (i); see Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 318, §§ 1-3).) Watson makes no claim that this new statutory standard applies in this case or otherwise affects the proper analysis of his

2023(See People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363 , 385-391 (Scott) [clarifying appellate review of Batson/Wheeler motions].) The Attorney General argues we should do so under a substantial evidence standard of review (see People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 772 (Battle)).

1994He would never commit completely on that.... [H]e said if he was faced with the issue, he would most likely vote for life rather than death." The prosecutor said that he did "not wish to run the risk of putting somebody on that panel that feels strongly that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would be what they would lean to and probably vote for." The trial court found that the prosecutor's explanations were "adequate and sufficient to justify the use of the peremptory challenge." The court also observed that "just prior to this challenge, the prosecutor did accept the jury p

1994He would never commit completely on that. . . . [H]e said if he was faced with the issue, he would most likely vote for life rather than death.” The prosecutor said that he did “not wish to run the risk of putting somebody on that panel that feels strongly that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would be what they would lean to and probably vote for.” The trial court found that the prosecutor’s explanations were “adequate and sufficient to justify the use of the peremptory challenge.” The court also observed that “just prior to this challenge, the prosecutor did accept the jur

1994He would never commit completely on that.... [H]e said if he was faced with the issue, he would most likely vote for life rather than death." The prosecutor said that he did "not wish to run the risk of putting somebody on that panel that feels strongly that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would be what they would lean to and probably vote for." The trial court found that the prosecutor's explanations were "adequate and sufficient to justify the use of the peremptory challenge." The court also observed that "just prior to this challenge, the prosecutor did accept the jury p

1994He would never commit completely on that.... [H]e said if he was faced with the issue, he would most likely vote for life rather than death." The prosecutor said that he did "not wish to run the risk of putting somebody on that panel that feels strongly that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would be what they would lean to and probably vote for." The trial court found that the prosecutor's explanations were "adequate and sufficient to justify the use of the peremptory challenge." The court also observed that "just prior to this challenge, the prosecutor did accept the jury p