capital sentencing hearing in Colorado

13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2005 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Tennesongreen colo · 1990 · cited in 4 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1990–1994 2 sentences 1994Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1254 (Colo.1988) (recognizing the need to ensure certainty and reliability in a criminal verdict); People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (stating that the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing is enhanced by the severity and finality of the punishment of death); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). 11 The third step of the process, we held, requires “each juror to make a judgment based on an assessment and comparison of the weightiness of 1994Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1254 (Colo.1988) (recognizing the need to ensure certainty and reliability in a criminal verdict); People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (stating that the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing is enhanced by the severity and finality of the punishment of death); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] The third step of the process, we held, requires "each juror to make a judgment based on an assessment and comparison of the weightiness o	3	4
People v. Durregreen colo · 1984 · cited in 3 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1994 2 sentences 1994Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1254 (Colo.1988) (recognizing the need to ensure certainty and reliability in a criminal verdict); People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (stating that the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing is enhanced by the severity and finality of the punishment of death); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] The third step of the process, we held, requires "each juror to make a judgment based on an assessment and comparison of the weightiness o 1994Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 , 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1196 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (relying on Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 , 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2331 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion)); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2749 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] In People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165 (Colo.1984), for example, we stated that, [i]nasmuch as death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability, the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing conducted under section 16-11-103 takes on added significance.	2	3
Zant v. Stephensgreen scotus · 1983 · cited in 3 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1984–1994 2 sentences 1994Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1254 (Colo.1988) (recognizing the need to ensure certainty and reliability in a criminal verdict); People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (stating that the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing is enhanced by the severity and finality of the punishment of death); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] The third step of the process, we held, requires "each juror to make a judgment based on an assessment and comparison of the weightiness o 1994Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1254 (Colo.1988) (recognizing the need to ensure certainty and reliability in a criminal verdict); People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (stating that the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing is enhanced by the severity and finality of the punishment of death); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] The third step of the process, we held, requires "each juror to make a judgment based on an assessment and comparison of the weightiness o	1	3
Hill v. Lockhartgreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 2 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1991 2 sentences 1991In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), for example, the issue was whether a defendant's guilty pleas to first degree murder and theft were constitutionally infirm due to defense counsel's incorrect advice that the defendant, although a second offender, would be eligible for parole after serving one-third rather than one-half of his prison sentence. 1991In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), for example, the issue was whether a defendant's guilty pleas to first degree murder and theft were constitutionally infirm due to defense counsel's incorrect advice that the defendant, although a second offender, would be eligible for parole after serving one-third rather than one-half of his prison sentence.	1	2
People v. Martinezgreen colo · 1998 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 1 sentence 2005See People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 477 (Colo.1998) (“Quite simply, a capital sentencing hearing is qualitatively different from any other kind of sentencing proceeding: only in a capital case is the death penalty an issue.”).	1	1
People v. Drakegreen colo · 1988 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1254 (Colo.1988) (recognizing the need to ensure certainty and reliability in a criminal verdict); People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (stating that the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing is enhanced by the severity and finality of the punishment of death); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). 11 The third step of the process, we held, requires “each juror to make a judgment based on an assessment and comparison of the weightiness of 1994Id. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted); see People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1254 (Colo.1988) (recognizing the need to ensure certainty and reliability in a criminal verdict); People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165, 173 (Colo.1984) (stating that the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing is enhanced by the severity and finality of the punishment of death); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2746-47 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] The third step of the process, we held, requires "each juror to make a judgment based on an assessment and comparison of the weightiness o	1	1
People v. Borregogreen colo · 1989 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 2 sentences 1990See People v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854, 855-56 (Colo. 1989). 1990See People v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854, 855-56 (Colo.1989).	1	1
People v. Davisgreen colo · 1990 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990 2 sentences 1990I would simply repeat here, as I did in Davis, 794 P.2d at 218-219 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting), that I continue to adhere to the view that the formulation of the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in terms of mitigating factors not outweighing any proven aggravating factors is incompatible with federal and state constitutional standards applicable to a capital sentencing hearing. 1990I would simply repeat here, as I did in Davis, 794 P.2d at 218-219 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting), that I continue to adhere to the view that the formulation of the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in terms of mitigating factors not outweighing any proven aggravating factors is incompatible with federal and state constitutional standards applicable to a capital sentencing hearing.	1	1
Strickland v. Washingtongreen scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P	1	1
Hutchinson v. Peoplegreen colo · 1987 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel’s errors, defendant must show that “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt”); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo.1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P. 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P	1	1
People v. Walfordgreen colo · 1987 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel’s errors, defendant must show that “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt”); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo.1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P. 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P	1	1
People v. Pozogreen colo · 1987 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel’s errors, defendant must show that “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt”); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo.1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P. 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P	1	1
People v. Olivergreen colo · 1987 · cited in 1 Colorado opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 2 sentences 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel’s errors, defendant must show that “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt”); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo.1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P. 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
People v. Dunlap green colo · 1999 1 sentence 2000In Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 740 , we held that evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors is admissible in a capital sentencing hearing, but the jury may only consider it in the final step of their deliberations.	1	2000–2000
Boyde v. California green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 1994Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 , 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1196 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (relying on Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 , 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2331 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion)); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2749 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] In People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165 (Colo.1984), for example, we stated that, [i]nasmuch as death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability, the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing conducted under section 16-11-103 takes on added significance. 1994Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 , 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1196 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (relying on Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 , 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2331 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion)); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2749 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] In People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165 (Colo.1984), for example, we stated that, [i]nasmuch as death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability, the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing conducted under section 16-11-103 takes on added significance.	1	1994–1994
Franklin v. Lynaugh green scotus · 1988 2 sentences 1994Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 , 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1196 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (relying on Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 , 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2331 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion)); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2749 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] In People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165 (Colo.1984), for example, we stated that, [i]nasmuch as death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability, the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing conducted under section 16-11-103 takes on added significance. 1994Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 , 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1196 , 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (relying on Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 , 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2331 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion)); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2749 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). [11] In People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165 (Colo.1984), for example, we stated that, [i]nasmuch as death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability, the need for reliability in a capital sentencing hearing conducted under section 16-11-103 takes on added significance.	1	1994–1994
Deutsch v. Whitley green ca9 · 1989 2 sentences 1993Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir.1989), vacated, other reasons, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1678 , 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991). 1993Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir.1989), vacated, other reasons, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1678 , 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991).	1	1993–1993
California v. Salgado green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 1993Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir.1989), vacated, other reasons, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1678 , 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991). 1993Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir.1989), vacated, other reasons, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1678 , 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991).	1	1993–1993
Buchanan v. Kentucky green scotus · 1987 2 sentences 1991Subsequent to its decision in Smith, the Supreme Court held in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 , 107 S.Ct. 2906 , 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), that neither the defendant’s Fifth nor Sixth Amendment right was violated when the trial court permitted the prosecution at a capital sentencing hearing to rebut the defendant’s evidence of extreme emotional disturbance by presenting excerpts from a psychiatric report of a competency examination previously .requested by defense counsel. 1991Subsequent to its decision in Smith, the Supreme Court held in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 , 107 S.Ct. 2906 , 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), that neither the defendant’s Fifth nor Sixth Amendment right was violated when the trial court permitted the prosecution at a capital sentencing hearing to rebut the defendant’s evidence of extreme emotional disturbance by presenting excerpts from a psychiatric report of a competency examination previously .requested by defense counsel.	1	1991–1991
Caldwell v. Mississippi green scotus · 1985 2 sentences 1990In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), the United States Supreme Court vacated a death sentence because the prosecutor's summation led the jury to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death sentence rested not with the jury but with an appellate court which would later review the case. 1990In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), the United States Supreme Court vacated a death sentence because the prosecutor's summation led the jury to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death sentence rested not with the jury but with an appellate court which would later review the case.	1	1990–1990
Banks v. People green colo · 1985 2 sentences 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel’s errors, defendant must show that “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt”); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo.1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P. 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P	1	1988–1988
Perez v. People green colo · 1987 2 sentences 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel’s errors, defendant must show that “but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (“[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt”); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo.1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P. 1988See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (in seeking to withdraw plea based on counsel's errors, defendant must show that "but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial"); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 ("[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"); People v. Walford, 746 P.2d 945, 946 (Colo. 1987); People v. Pozo, 746 P	1	1988–1988
Yeager v. People green · 1969 2 sentences 1984We hold that, in order to eliminate any uncertainty on the part of jurors regarding the effect of their verdicts on the issue of punishment, trial courts at the conclusion of the evidentiary stage of a capital sentencing hearing must inform the jury by an appropriate instruction that verdicts of no mitigating and no additional mitigating circumstances and a verdict of one or more aggravating circumstances necessarily require the imposition of a death sentence; that a verdict of mitigating or additional mitigating circumstances, or a verdict of no aggravating circumstances, necessarily requires 1984We hold that, in order to eliminate any uncertainty on the part of jurors regarding the effect of their verdicts on the issue of punishment, trial courts at the conclusion of the evidentiary stage of a capital sentencing hearing must inform the jury by an appropriate instruction that verdicts of no mitigating and no additional mitigating circumstances and a verdict of one or more aggravating circumstances necessarily require the imposition of a death sentence; that a verdict of mitigating or additional mitigating circumstances, or a verdict of no aggravating circumstances, necessarily requires	1	1984–1984
Woodson v. North Carolina green scotus · 1976 2 sentences 1984By virtue of the qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, “there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 1984By virtue of the qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, “there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 , 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion)).	1	1984–1984

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103 (9) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102 (7) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309 (5) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-8-106 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-302 (3) CO § Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-402 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 242 (1983–2024) TN 138 (1991–2026) LA 43 (1978–2018) MD 24 (1983–2018) NC 24 (1990–2024) OH 16 (1985–2023) AL 13 (1995–2024) PA 13 (1987–2019) CO 13 (1984–2005) MS 12 (1984–2023) NJ 11 (1984–1999) TX 11 (1979–2018) OK 10 (1995–2018) CA 9 (1988–2023) CT 9 (1994–2016) FL 8 (1982–2020) IN 6 (1980–2024) SC 4 (1993–2018) NV 4 (1987–2015) UT 4 (2010–2014) ID 4 (1998–2015) AZ 4 (1991–2016) KS 3 (1998–2017) WI 3 (2002–2026) VA 3 (2024–2024) DE 3 (1992–2000) NE 3 (1990–2003) WA 2 (1984–2000) KY 2 (2004–2008) NM 2 (2019–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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