capital sentencing hearing in Illinois

1998Addressing a similar statement made by trial counsel about his performance at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing, we recently explained, “Counsel’s own admission of ineffectiveness is not binding on us or determinative of the issues raised here. [Citation.]” People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 490 (1996).

1998Addressing a similar statement made by trial counsel about his performance at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing, we recently explained, “Counsel's own admission of ineffectiveness is not binding on us or determinative of the issues raised here. [Citation.]” People v. Sanchez , 169 Ill. 2d 472, 490 (1996).

1991In Stewart, this court held that a witness' opinion that a defendant should not be sentenced to death is not admissible at a capital sentencing hearing. ( Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 67 , 85 Ill.Dec. 241 , 473 N.E.2d 840 ; see also Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 67-68 , 85 Ill.Dec. 241 , 473 N.E.2d 840 (also rejecting evidence of attitudes generally toward capital punishment); People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill.2d 502, 535 , 75 Ill.Dec. 188 , 456 N.E.2d 1369 (same); People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 300-01 , 73 Ill.Dec. 360 , 454 N.E.2d 220 (same).) We continue to adhere to that view.

1991In Stewart, this court held that a witness' opinion that a defendant should not be sentenced to death is not admissible at a capital sentencing hearing. ( Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 67 , 85 Ill.Dec. 241 , 473 N.E.2d 840 ; see also Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 67-68 , 85 Ill.Dec. 241 , 473 N.E.2d 840 (also rejecting evidence of attitudes generally toward capital punishment); People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill.2d 502, 535 , 75 Ill.Dec. 188 , 456 N.E.2d 1369 (same); People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 300-01 , 73 Ill.Dec. 360 , 454 N.E.2d 220 (same).) We continue to adhere to that view.

1995We note, however, that this court has consistently held that there is no statutory or constitutional right to allocution at a capital sentencing hearing. ( People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 381-82 , 193 Ill.Dec. 105 , 626 N.E.2d 138 ; People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 280-82 , 138 Ill.Dec. 233 , 547 N.E.2d 202 .) Insofar as the defendant has presented no grounds warranting reconsideration of this holding, her allocution argument is without merit.

1995We note, however, that this court has consistently held that there is no statutory or constitutional right to allocution at a capital sentencing hearing. ( People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 381-82 , 193 Ill.Dec. 105 , 626 N.E.2d 138 ; People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 280-82 , 138 Ill.Dec. 233 , 547 N.E.2d 202 .) Insofar as the defendant has presented no grounds warranting reconsideration of this holding, her allocution argument is without merit.

2002People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 541 (1999).

2002People v. Morgan , 187 Ill. 2d 500, 541 (1999).

2010Furthermore, “it is well settled that the introduction of hearsay evidence in a capital sentencing hearing violates neither the due process clause (People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 286 (1982)), nor the confrontation clause (People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1996)).

2010Furthermore, “it is well settled that the introduction of hearsay evidence in a capital sentencing hearing violates neither the due process clause -33- (People v. Jones, 94 Ill. 2d 275, 286 (1982)), nor the confrontation clause (People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1996)).

1997The standard for determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his or her right to effective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing hearing is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L.

1997The standard for determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his or her right to effective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing hearing is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 80 L.

1997We have also held that the statute is not invalid for failing to require the prosecution to provide the defense with pretrial notice of its intent to seek a sentence of death (People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 161-62 (1984); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 369 (1981)) or of pretrial notice of the aggravating evidence to be used at a capital sentencing hearing (People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 547 (1986); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 540 (1984); Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d at 369 ).

1997We have also held that the statute is not invalid for failing to require the prosecution to provide the defense with pretrial notice of its intent to seek a sentence of death ( People v. Silagy, 101 Ill.2d 147, 161-62 , 77 Ill.Dec. 792 , 461 N.E.2d 415 (1984); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill.2d 342, 369 , 58 Ill.Dec. 795 , 430 N.E.2d 1046 (1981)) or of pretrial notice of the aggravating evidence to be used at a capital sentencing hearing ( People v. King, 109 Ill.2d 514, 547 , 94 Ill.Dec. 702 , 488 N.E.2d 949 (1986); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 540 , 85 Ill.Dec. 441 , 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984);

2011Thus, “[wjhen requested to do so, this court reviews the evidence in a capital sentencing hearing to determine whether death is the appropriate penalty, even in the absence of trial error.” People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 36 (2006).

2011Thus, “[w]hen requested to do so, this court reviews the evidence in a capital sentencing hearing to determine whether death is the appropriate penalty, even in the absence of trial error.” People v. Thompson, 222 Ill. 2d 1, 36 (2006).

2001As such, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, absent the errors, the judge “ ‘would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.’ ” People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 145 (1996), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 80 L.

2001As such, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, absent the errors, the judge “ ‘would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.’ ” People v. Henderson , 171 Ill. 2d 124, 145 (1996), quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 695 , 80 L.

2009Dec. 914 , 588 N.E.2d 1044 (1991), this court adopted the view expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), permitting the State to present victim impact evidence in a capital sentencing hearing.

2000Defendant concedes that this court has held that “a witness’ opinion that a defendant should not be sentenced to death is not admissible at a capital sentencing hearing.” People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 162 (1991).

2002Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 510 .

2002Towns , 182 Ill. 2d at 510 .

1997We have also held that the statute is not invalid for failing to require the prosecution to provide the defense with pretrial notice of its intent to seek a sentence of death (People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 161-62 (1984); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 369 (1981)) or of pretrial notice of the aggravating evidence to be used at a capital sentencing hearing (People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 547 (1986); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 540 (1984); Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d at 369 ).

1997We have also held that the statute is not invalid for failing to require the prosecution to provide the defense with pretrial notice of its intent to seek a sentence of death (People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 161-62 (1984); People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 369 (1981)) or of pretrial notice of the aggravating evidence to be used at a capital sentencing hearing (People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 547 (1986); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 540 (1984); Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d at 369 ).

2000The court in Caballero found distinguishable this court’s earlier decisions in People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258 (1993), and People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d 201 (1993), which had held that evidence of a codefendant’s sentence is irrelevant and inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing.

2000The court in Caballero found distinguishable *305 this court's earlier decisions in People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d 258 , 189 Ill.Dec. 371 , 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993), and People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d 201 , 191 Ill.Dec. 84 , 623 N.E.2d 329 (1993), which had held that evidence of a codefendant's sentence is irrelevant and inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing.

1995We note, however, that this court has consistently held that there is no statutory or constitutional right to allocution at a capital sentencing hearing. ( People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 381-82 , 193 Ill.Dec. 105 , 626 N.E.2d 138 ; People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 280-82 , 138 Ill.Dec. 233 , 547 N.E.2d 202 .) Insofar as the defendant has presented no grounds warranting reconsideration of this holding, her allocution argument is without merit.

1995We note, however, that this court has consistently held that there is no statutory or constitutional right to allocution at a capital sentencing hearing. ( People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 381-82 , 193 Ill.Dec. 105 , 626 N.E.2d 138 ; People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 280-82 , 138 Ill.Dec. 233 , 547 N.E.2d 202 .) Insofar as the defendant has presented no grounds warranting reconsideration of this holding, her allocution argument is without merit.

1999In People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 (1992), this court determined that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the defendant’s capital sentencing hearing in failing to investigate and present evidence of the defendant’s mental history and background.

1999In People v. Perez , 148 Ill. 2d 168 (1992), this court determined that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the defendant’s capital sentencing hearing in failing to investigate and present evidence of the defendant’s mental history and background.

1998This court has held that the contents of a prison incident report are admissible during the penalty phase of a sentencing hearing: “ ‘[0]ur death penalty statute allows the introduction of evidence during the sentencing hearing that would not ordinarily be admissible during the guilt phase of a trial. [Citations.] The factors controlling the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing are relevance and reliability, and the determination of admissibility rests in the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] Hearsay testimony will not per se be deemed to be inadmissible at a sen

1998This court has held that the contents of a prison incident report are admissible during the penalty phase of a sentencing hearing: “ `[O]ur death penalty statute allows the introduction of evidence during the sentencing hearing that would not ordinarily be admissible during the guilt phase of a trial. [Citations.] The factors controlling the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing are relevance and reliability, and the determination of admissibility rests in the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] Hearsay testimony will not per se be deemed to be inadmissible at a sen

1989Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(e); People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 422-23 .) That determination "rests in the discretion of the trial court." ( People v. Hall (1986), 114 Ill.2d 376, 416-17 .) Hearsay testimony that does not fit within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule is not automatically rendered inadmissible at the latter stage of a bifurcated capital sentencing hearing, nor does its introduction necessarily deny a defendant the right to confront witnesses. ( People v. Perez (1985), 108 Ill.2d 70, 86 .) Consistent with those principles, this court has held that the introduction

1986Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(e); People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373, 414 ; People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 421-27 .) The factors controlling the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing are relevance and reliability, and the determination of admissibility rests in the discretion of the trial court.

1998Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 520 (1992) (statute sufficiently minimizes the risk against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 522 (1996) (statute is not invalid because it allows the sentencer to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors); People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 377-82 (1988) (fact that prosecutorial discretion may be exercised unevenly by different prosecutors does not render the statute unconstitutional); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 282-83 (1993) (it is not unconstitutional to allow the prosecution both initial and r

1998Pierre , 146 Ill. 2d 494, 520 (1992) (statute sufficiently minimizes the risk against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty); People v. Gilliam , 172 Ill. 2d 484, 522 (1996) (statute is not invalid because it allows the sentencer to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors); People v. Stewart , 123 Ill. 2d 368, 377-82 (1988) (fact that prosecutorial discretion may be exercised unevenly by different prosecutors does not render the statute unconstitutional); People v. Page , 155 Ill. 2d 232, 282-83 (1993) (it is not unconstitutional to allow the prosecution both initial a

2000In People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436 (2000), this court recently considered whether a defendant was entitled to present, at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing, evidence of a codefendant’s sentence.

2000In People v. Emerson, 189 Ill.2d 436 , 245 Ill.Dec. 49 , 727 N.E.2d 302 (2000), this court recently considered whether a defendant was entitled to present, at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing, evidence of a codefendant's sentence.

1998Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 520 (1992) (statute sufficiently minimizes the risk against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty); People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 522 (1996) (statute is not invalid because it allows the sentencer to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors); People v. Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 377-82 (1988) (fact that prosecutorial discretion may be exercised unevenly by different prosecutors does not render the statute unconstitutional); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 282-83 (1993) (it is not unconstitutional to allow the prosecution both initial and r

1998The issue resolved in a capital sentencing hearing is not whether the defendant, in general, is deserving of the death penalty, but whether the defendant may, and should, be sentenced to death for a particular offense of murder.” Page I, 155 Ill. 2d at 272-73 , 614 N.E.2d at 1178 .

1998The defendant accurately observes that the purpose of a capital sentencing hearing is to provide an individualized assessment of the defendant and his offense ( Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 73-76 , 107 S.Ct. 2716, 2721-23 , 97 L.Ed.2d 56, 64-66 (1987); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2990-91 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 960-61 (1976) (plurality opinion); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d 1, 25 , 138 Ill.Dec. 201 , 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989)), and not to raise doubt about the preceding determination of guilt.

1998The defendant accurately observes that the purpose of a capital sentencing hearing is to provide an individualized assessment of the defendant and his offense ( Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 73-76 , 107 S.Ct. 2716, 2721-23 , 97 L.Ed.2d 56, 64-66 (1987); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2990-91 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 960-61 (1976) (plurality opinion); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d 1, 25 , 138 Ill.Dec. 201 , 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989)), and not to raise doubt about the preceding determination of guilt.

1997The court’s holding in Ruiz, that counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform his client that a jury had to reach a unanimous decision, was based primarily on this court’s rejection of "a requirement that a defendant be expressly advised of the nonunanimity rule *** as a condition of a valid jury waiver at a capital sentencing hearing.” Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d at 20 -21 (citing People v. Erickson, 117 Ill. 2d 271 (1987), and People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985)).

1997The court's holding in Ruiz , that counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform his client that a jury had to reach a unanimous decision, was based primarily on this court's rejection of “a requirement that a defendant be expressly advised of the nonunanimity rule *** as a condition of a valid jury waiver at a capital sentencing hearing.” Ruiz , 132 Ill. 2d at 20 -21 (citing People v. Erickson , 117 Ill. 2d 271 (1987), and People v. Madej , 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985)).

1994Williams concerns, among other issues, the admissibility of a 30-page written confession during a capital sentencing hearing. ( Williams, 97 Ill.2d at 291 , 73 Ill.Dec. 360 , 454 N.E.2d 220 .) Franklin addresses the propriety of permitting a jury to review transcripts of testimony during deliberation. ( Franklin, 135 Ill.2d at 104 , 142 Ill.Dec. 152 , 552 N.E.2d 743 .) Clearly, these cases are also inapposite.

1994Williams concerns, among other issues, the admissibility of a 30-page written confession during a capital sentencing hearing. ( Williams, 97 Ill.2d at 291 , 73 Ill.Dec. 360 , 454 N.E.2d 220 .) Franklin addresses the propriety of permitting a jury to review transcripts of testimony during deliberation. ( Franklin, 135 Ill.2d at 104 , 142 Ill.Dec. 152 , 552 N.E.2d 743 .) Clearly, these cases are also inapposite.

2009Ed. 2d 720 , 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), permitting the State to present victim impact evidence in a capital sentencing hearing.

2009Dec. 914 , 588 N.E.2d 1044 (1991), this court adopted the view expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 , 111 S.Ct. 2597 , 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), permitting the State to present victim impact evidence in a capital sentencing hearing.