capital sentencing hearing in Ohio

2008"The Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering `victim impact' evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim's family, or precluding a prosecutor from arguing such evidence at a capital sentencing hearing." Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808 .

1994In Payne , the court held that “[t]he Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar prohibiting a capital sentencing jury from considering ‘victim impact’ evidence relating to the victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim’s family, or precluding a prosecutor from arguing such evidence at a capital sentencing hearing.” Id., 501 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2599-2600, 115 L.Ed.2d at 724 .

2000“Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected.” Turner, 476 U.S. at 35 , 106 S.Ct. at 1687 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 35 .

2000“Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected.” Turner, 476 U.S. at 35 , 106 S.Ct. at 1687 , 90 L.Ed.2d at 35 .

2023There is no support in the record of this matter to analyze it for death-penalty mitigation. {¶ 17} Appellant also urges us to employ the analyses set forth in the following United States Supreme Court cases: Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1 , 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) (“The trial attorney’s failure to request additional funding in order to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he mistakenly believed that he had received all he could get under Alabama law constituted deficient performance.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 , 120 S.Ct. 1495

2023There is no support in the record of this matter to analyze it for death-penalty mitigation. {¶ 17} Appellant also urges us to employ the analyses set forth in the following United States Supreme Court cases: Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 , 188 L.Ed.2d 1 , 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) (“The trial attorney’s failure to request additional funding in order to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he mistakenly believed that he had received all he could get under Alabama law constituted deficient performance.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 , 120 S.Ct. 1495

2021Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2007-Ohio-4836 , 873 N.E.2d 828, at ¶ 65 . {¶ 103} Reasonable professional assistance may also include a decision by defense counsel not to object to the court’s use of a hypothetical situation involving a capital sentencing hearing.

2021Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2007-Ohio-4836 , 873 N.E.2d 828, at ¶ 65 . {¶ 103} Reasonable professional assistance may also include a decision by defense counsel not to object to the court’s use of a hypothetical situation involving a capital sentencing hearing.

2021See State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300 , 2006-Ohio- 1, 839 N.E.2d 362 , ¶ 132; State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404 , 2008-Ohio-2 , 880 N.E.2d 31 , ¶ 70.

2020A sentencing hearing fails to satisfy a criminal defendant’s right to due process when the trial court imposes a sentence “on the basis of assumptions concerning [the defendant’s] criminal record which were materially untrue.” Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 , 68 S.Ct. 1252 , 93 L.Ed. 1690 (1948).

2020A sentencing hearing fails to satisfy a criminal defendant’s right to due process when the trial court imposes a sentence “on the basis of assumptions concerning [the defendant’s] criminal record which were materially untrue.” Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 , 68 S.Ct. 1252 , 93 L.Ed. 1690 (1948).

2020Fundamental fairness of the mitigation hearing {¶ 111} In his fifth proposition of law, Hundley argues that the trial court’s comments prior to the mitigation hearing were facetious and rendered the mitigation hearing fundamentally unfair. {¶ 112} A capital sentencing hearing is a critical stage of any criminal proceeding and “must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 , 97 S.Ct. 1197 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).

2020Fundamental fairness of the mitigation hearing {¶ 111} In his fifth proposition of law, Hundley argues that the trial court’s comments prior to the mitigation hearing were facetious and rendered the mitigation hearing fundamentally unfair. {¶ 112} A capital sentencing hearing is a critical stage of any criminal proceeding and “must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 , 97 S.Ct. 1197 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977).

2019State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987). {¶32} Most importantly, there was no “acquittal.” In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is acquitted only when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 97 , citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). {¶33} In Scott, the t

2019State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987). {¶32} Most importantly, there was no “acquittal.” In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is acquitted only when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 97 , citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). {¶33} In Scott, the t

2019State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987). {¶32} Most importantly, there was no “acquittal.” In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is acquitted only when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 97 , citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). {¶33} In Scott, the t

2019State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987). {¶32} Most importantly, there was no “acquittal.” In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is acquitted only when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 97 , citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). {¶33} In Scott, the t

2019State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987). {¶32} Most importantly, there was no “acquittal.” In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is acquitted only when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 97 , citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). {¶33} In Scott, the t

2019State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 , 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987). {¶32} Most importantly, there was no “acquittal.” In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated that a defendant is acquitted only when “the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. at 97 , citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). {¶33} In Scott, the t

2018Moreover, State v. Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165 , 2016-Ohio-1581 , 74 N.E.3d 319 , presents a factual scenario similar to the one in the capital case underlying this original action and stands for the proposition that neither Hurst nor the Sixth Amendment requires a jury for a capital sentencing hearing when a defendant has waived his right to a jury for the trial phase .

2018Moreover, State v. Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165 , 2016-Ohio-1581 , 74 N.E.3d 319 , presents a factual scenario similar to the one in the capital case underlying this original action and stands for the proposition that neither Hurst nor the Sixth Amendment requires a jury for a capital sentencing hearing when a defendant has waived his right to a jury for the trial phase .

2017Wogenstahl, 134 Ohio St.3d 1437 , 2013-Ohio-164 , 981 N.E.2d 900 (O’Neill, J. dissenting); State v. Broom, 146 Ohio St.3d 60 , 2016-Ohio-1028 , 51 N.E.3d 620, ¶ 92 (O’Neill, J. dissenting); see also In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, S.D.Ohio No. 2:11-cv-1016, 2017 WL 378690 (Jan. 26, 2017).

2015The state agreed that R.C. 2929.06(B) was inapplicable because no error was found to have occurred in the sentencing phase, but insisted that death could still be reimposed and that the appropriate remedy was for the trial court to independently reweigh the remaining aggravating factors against the mitigating factors established during Steffen’s 1982 trial, without holding a new sentencing hearing. {¶ 8} The trial court disagreed with both parties, and in an August 1, 2013 decision, held that our decision in State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344 , 2012-Ohio-2583 , 972 N.E.2d 534 , applied to Stef

2015The state agreed that R.C. 2929.06(B) was inapplicable because no error was found to have occurred in the sentencing phase, but insisted that death could still be reimposed and that the appropriate remedy was for the trial court to independently reweigh the remaining aggravating factors against the mitigating factors established during Steffen’s 1982 trial, without holding a new sentencing hearing. {¶ 8} The trial court disagreed with both parties, and in an August 1, 2013 decision, held that our decision in State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344 , 2012-Ohio-2583 , 972 N.E.2d 534 , applied to Stef

2012Mr. Bennett has relied on Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), to support his proposition that the trial court’s consideration, for the purposes of sentencing, of evidence that Mr. Bennett was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. {¶20} In Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant’s First Amendment rights were violated by the admission into evidence at a capital sentencing hearing of a narrow stipulation regarding Mr. Dawson’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood.

2012Mr. Bennett has relied on Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), to support his proposition that the trial court’s consideration, for the purposes of sentencing, of evidence that Mr. Bennett was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. {¶20} In Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant’s First Amendment rights were violated by the admission into evidence at a capital sentencing hearing of a narrow stipulation regarding Mr. Dawson’s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood.

2006The sentencer did not have “unbounded discretion,” but instead “was presented both a choice between two alternatives and standards to guide the making of that choice.” Id. at 438 , 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 .

2006The sentencer did not have “unbounded discretion,” but instead “was presented both a choice between two alternatives and standards to guide the making of that choice.” Id. at 438 , 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 .

2004It is here, at such a capital sentencing proceeding, that the holding in State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22 , 553 N.E.2d 1058 , applies — “Expressions of opinion by a witness as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence in a capital case violate the defendant’s constitutional right to have the sentencing decision made by the jury and judge.” Id. at syllabus. {¶ 17} When, however, death may not be imposed as a penalty — as, for example, when a jury finds the defendant guilty of aggravated murder but not guilty of the specifications or when a jury finds a defendant guilty of both th

2004It is here, at such a capital sentencing proceeding, that the holding in State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22 , 553 N.E.2d 1058 , applies — “Expressions of opinion by a witness as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence in a capital case violate the defendant’s constitutional right to have the sentencing decision made by the jury and judge.” Id. at syllabus. {¶ 17} When, however, death may not be imposed as a penalty — as, for example, when a jury finds the defendant guilty of aggravated murder but not guilty of the specifications or when a jury finds a defendant guilty of both th

2000Further, the “risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence.” Id. at 35 , 106 S.Ct. at 1688, 90 L.Ed.2d at 36 . {¶ 91} The standard is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 698 .

2000Further, the “risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence.” Id. at 35 , 106 S.Ct. at 1688, 90 L.Ed.2d at 36 . {¶ 91} The standard is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 698 .

1992We presume that the judge knew the law (particularly as appellant pointed out that Booth v. Maryland, [1987], 482 U.S. 496 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 , prohibited such evidence from being admitted at a capital sentencing hearing), and he considered the victim’s daughters’ statements only as to the sentence for aggravated robbery.

1992We presume that the judge knew the law (particularly as appellant pointed out that Booth v. Maryland, [1987], 482 U.S. 496 , 107 S.Ct. 2529 , 96 L.Ed.2d 440 , prohibited such evidence from being admitted at a capital sentencing hearing), and he considered the victim’s daughters’ statements only as to the sentence for aggravated robbery.

1985The applicability of our holding in Lynn to such remarks made during a capital sentencing hearing was recently considered in State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 164 .