capital sentencing hearing in Connecticut

2004The heightened reliability demanded by the [e]ighth [a]mendment in the determination whether the death penalty is appropriate ... convinces us that jury unanimity is an especially important safeguard at a capital sentencing hearing." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2004Furthermore, this court has stated that "[t]he heightened reliability demanded by the [e]ighth [a]mendment in the determination whether the death penalty is appropriate; Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72 , 107 S.Ct. 2716 , 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); convinces us that jury unanimity is an especially important safeguard at a capital sentencing hearing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniels, supra, 207 Conn. at 389 , 542 A.2d 306 . [71] Although the Daniels court did not explicitly address the issue of whether ง 53a-46a (b) authorizes a retrial of the penalty phase of a capital case be

2015Id.

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011Ed. 2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill. 2d 117 (“[d] espite the different origins of a defendant’s [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a jury must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”); Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 597 , 530 A.2d 743 (1987) (to be effective, waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring, to capital sentencing jury must be knowing and voluntary), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1050 , 108 S. Ct. 2815 , 100 L.

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011Ed. 2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill. 2d 117 (“[d] espite the different origins of a defendant’s [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a jury must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”); Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 597 , 530 A.2d 743 (1987) (to be effective, waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring, to capital sentencing jury must be knowing and voluntary), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1050 , 108 S. Ct. 2815 , 100 L.

2011See People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 36 , 767 P.2d 1109 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 631 (applying knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard to waiver of statutory right, prior to Ring , to capital penalty phase jury), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879 , 110 S.Ct. 216 , 107 L.Ed.2d 169 (1989); People v. Maxwell, supra, 173 Ill.2d at 117 , 219 Ill.Dec. 1 , 670 N.E.2d 679 ("[d]espite the different origins of a defendant's [constitutional] right to a jury at the guilt phase of the proceedings and his [statutory] right [prior to Ring ] to a jury at the capital sentencing hearing, the waiver of either right to a j

2011Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (“evidence of a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights”); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. 372 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 227 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it “significant,” for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital sentencing hearing, that “defendant had originally been convicted of murder and sentenced to de

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (“evidence of a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights”); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. 372 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 227 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it “significant,” for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital sentencing hearing, that “defendant had originally been convicted of murder and sentenced to de

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2011Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (“evidence of a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights”); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. 372 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 227 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it “significant,” for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital sentencing hearing, that “defendant had originally been convicted of murder and sentenced to de

2011See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 37 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("evidence of a defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights"); see also State v. Cobb, supra, 251 Conn. at 372 , 743 A.2d 1 (upholding validity of jury waiver where, inter alia, defendant had been advised of right to jury trial in connection with other charges); People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 227 , 223 Ill.Dec. 558 , 680 N.E.2d 291 (finding it "significant," for purposes of finding valid jury waiver in second capital se

2004Although the majority does not point to any clear expression of legislative intent to abrogate or preempt the common-law right of allocution in capital sentencing hearings, it nonetheless concludes that “there is no right of allocution within the structured setting of a capital sentencing hearing.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority notes its approval of Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 211-13 , 555 A.2d 846 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 , 111 S. Ct. 215 , 112 L.

2004Although the majority does not point to any clear expression of legislative intent to abrogate or preempt the common-law right of allocution in capital sentencing hearings, it nonetheless concludes that “there is no right of allocution within the structured setting of a capital sentencing hearing.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority notes its approval of Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 211-13 , 555 A.2d 846 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 , 111 S. Ct. 215 , 112 L.

2004State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289 , 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837 , 118 S. Ct. 111 , 139 L.

2004State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289 , 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837 , 118 S. Ct. 111 , 139 L.

2004In United States v. Hall, supra, 152 F.3d 381 , the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that former rule 32 (c) (3) (C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which required a federal district court, before imposing sentence, to “address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence,” had been satisfied when “the district court allow[ed] the defendant to make a statement to the court after the jury retum[ed] its [sentencing] recommendation but before the district court impose[d] sen

2004Furthermore, this court has stated that "[t]he heightened reliability demanded by the [e]ighth [a]mendment in the determination whether the death penalty is appropriate; Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72 , 107 S.Ct. 2716 , 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); convinces us that jury unanimity is an especially important safeguard at a capital sentencing hearing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniels, supra, 207 Conn. at 389 , 542 A.2d 306 . [71] Although the Daniels court did not explicitly address the issue of whether ง 53a-46a (b) authorizes a retrial of the penalty phase of a capital case be

2004Furthermore, this court has stated that "[t]he heightened reliability demanded by the [e]ighth [a]mendment in the determination whether the death penalty is appropriate; Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72 , 107 S.Ct. 2716 , 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987); convinces us that jury unanimity is an especially important safeguard at a capital sentencing hearing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniels, supra, 207 Conn. at 389 , 542 A.2d 306 . [71] Although the Daniels court did not explicitly address the issue of whether ง 53a-46a (b) authorizes a retrial of the penalty phase of a capital case be

2004Although the majority does not point to any clear expression of legislative intent to abrogate or preempt the common-law right of allocution in capital sentencing hearings, it nonetheless concludes that “there is no right of allocution within the structured setting of a capital sentencing hearing.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority notes its approval of Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 211-13 , 555 A.2d 846 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 , 111 S. Ct. 215 , 112 L.

2004State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289 , 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837 , 118 S. Ct. 111 , 139 L.

2004Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court’s denial of his opportunity to make an allocution before the jury deprived him of his right to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and his right to present a defense under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, which is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 121 See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S. Ct. 2528 , 81 L.

2004Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court’s denial of his opportunity to make an allocution before the jury deprived him of his right to due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and his right to present a defense under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, which is made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 121 See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 , 104 S. Ct. 2528 , 81 L.

2004State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 289 , 481 S.E.2d 25 (“a defendant does not have a . . . statutory . . . or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837 , 118 S. Ct. 111 , 139 L.