capital sentencing hearing in Tennessee

2021The relevant pool of cases consists of “those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing was held, and the jury determined whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death.” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 679 (citing State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 783 (Tenn. 2001); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 ).

2019The pool of cases into which we peer consists of "those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing was held, and the jury determined whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death." State v. Rice , 184 S.W.3d 646 , 679 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Godsey , 60 S.W.3d 759 , 783 (Tenn. 2001) ; Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 666 ).

2017In conducting this review, ―‗we select from the pool of cases in which a capital sentencing hearing was actually conducted [and a jury] determin[ed] whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death.‘‖ State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 866 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 2000)).

2017In conducting this review, “ ‘we select from the pool of cases in which a capital sentencing hearing was actually conducted [and a jury] deter-min[ed] whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death.’” State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845, 866 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 2000)).

2021The relevant pool of cases consists of “those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing was held, and the jury determined whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death.” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 679 (citing State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 783 (Tenn. 2001); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 ).

2019The pool of cases into which we peer consists of "those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing was held, and the jury determined whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death." State v. Rice , 184 S.W.3d 646 , 679 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Godsey , 60 S.W.3d 759 , 783 (Tenn. 2001) ; Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 666 ).

2022The majority opinion reaffirmed the analysis set out in State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997), which compared the case at bar to other first degree murder cases in which a capital sentencing hearing had been conducted.

2021The relevant pool of cases consists of “those first degree murder cases in which the State sought the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing was held, and the jury determined whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or death.” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 679 (citing State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 783 (Tenn. 2001); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 ).

2005In State v. Sims this Court analyzed the relationship between Rule 405 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c), focusing on the precise issue of whether section 39-13-204(c) precluded application of Rule 405 during a capital sentencing hearing. 45 S.W.3d at 13 .

2005In State v. Sims this Court analyzed the relationship between Rule 405 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c), focusing on the precise issue of whether section 39-13-204(c) precluded application of Rule 405 during a capital sentencing hearing. 45 S.W.3d at 13 .

2000See State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 881-82 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn. 1988).

1999See State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 881-82 (Tenn. 1991) (issue of specific or general deterrence should be avoided by the prosecution in closing argument at a capital sentencing hearing).

2000State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn. 1988).

1991Generally, in Tennessee the issue of specific deterrence should be avoided by the State in closing argument at a capital sentencing hearing. *882 State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn. 1988).

2011Given the seriousness of a death sentence, “[c]ourts are particularly cautious in preserving a defendant’s right to counsel at a capital sentencing hearing.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 532 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992).

2002As a result, courts are “particularly cautious in preserving a defendant’s right to counsel at a capital sentencing hearing.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.1996) (quoting Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir.1989)).

2010Our supreme court has consistently ruled that proof of residual doubt is relevant in a capital sentencing hearing as a “non-statutory mitigating circumstance.” State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 23 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 459 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tenn. 2001)).

2008Also, this Court has consistently ruled that proof of residual doubt is relevant in a capital sentencing hearing as a “non-statutory mitigating circumstance.” Austin, 87 S.W.3d at 459 ; State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tenn.2001).

2005See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 , 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 783 .

2004See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 , 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 783 .

2005See Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813-14 (Tenn. 1994); Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 269 n.6.

2005See Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813-14 (Tenn.1994); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 , 269 n. 6 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743 , 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995). 10.

2005See Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813-14 (Tenn. 1994); Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 269 n.6.

2005See Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d at 749 ; State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813-14 (Tenn.1994); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 , 269 n. 6 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743 , 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995). 10.

2002As a result, courts are “particularly cautious in preserving a defendant’s right to counsel at a capital sentencing hearing.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.1996) (quoting Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir.1989)).

2002As a result, courts are "particularly cautious in preserving a defendant's right to counsel at a capital sentencing hearing." Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.1996) (quoting Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir.1989)).

2006Evidence relevant to the issue of punishment and therefore admissible at a capital sentencing hearing includes “any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c). “ ‘Rebutting evidence’ is that which tends to explain or controvert evidence produced by an adverse party.” Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d at 765, 768 (Tenn.1979) (citing State v. Anderson, 159 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa' 1968); Hutchinson v. Shaheen, 55 A.D.2d 833 , 390 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1976)).

2002The defendant argues that under the law in effect in 1997, when these offenses were committed, victim impact evidence was not admissible because this Court had held in Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tenn.1979), that evidence was admissible at a capital sentencing hearing only if it was relevant to an aggravating circumstance or to a mitigating circumstance raised by the defendant.

2006See State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 459 (Tenn. 2002) (citing State v. Teague, 897 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tenn. 1995)).

2001He also notes that Tenn.Code Ann. § 39 — 2404(c) (Supp.1980)[now § 39-13-204(c)] provides that the trial court at a capital sentencing hearing may admit any evidence that the court deems relevant to punishment and that such evidence extends beyond the nature and circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s character. 9 He also says that this Court’s opinion in State v. Teague, 897 S.W.2d 248, 256 (Tenn.1995), fully supports his argument that any evidence admissible at the prior trial should be admissible at re-sentencing.

2005See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 , 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 783 .

2004See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953 , 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Godsey, 60 S.W.3d at 783 .

2010Our supreme court, acknowledging the interplay between the Fifth and Eighth Amendment implications raised in a decision whether to permit only limited cross-examination of a defendant at a capital sentencing hearing, determined that “only in the limited sphere of a death penalty sentencing hearing, a capital defendant’s testimony regarding mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the merits of the charges against him does not operate as a complete waiver of the privilege against self- incrimination.” Id. at 266 .

2007However, cross-examination of a defendant during a capital sentencing hearing may be restricted due to “the gravity of [the] proceeding and the constitutional mandate to ensure that all relevant mitigating circumstances be presented to a sentencing body.” Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 266 . [I]n the limited sphere of a death penalty sentencing hearing, a capital defendant’s testimony regarding mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the merits of the charges against him does not operate as a complete waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.

2006The admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing is controlled by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c), which allows the admission of any evidence “the court deems relevant to the punishment . . . regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence.” See Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d at 67 ; Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 602 .

2005Additionally, the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing is controlled by section 39-13-204(c), Tennessee Code Annotated, which allows the admission of any evidence “the court deems relevant to the punishment ... regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence.” See Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 601 .

2019He argues that the majority’s conclusion on direct appeal that the argument did not “prejudicially affect[] the jury’s sentencing determination,” Nichols, 877 S.W.2d at 733 , was wrong based on affidavits from jurors indicating that they voted for death based on the belief that “the State of Tennessee would never actually execute anyone sentenced to death” and that “a death sentence served as a de facto life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence.” In a closely related argument, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the improper ar

2000Further, in State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1994), the Supreme Court held that the admissibility of prior convictions in a capital sentencing hearing is governed by Rule 404(b); however, the Court made no mention of section 39-13-204(c).

2010See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (holding that the failure of capital counsel, who did not represent the defendant on his prior felony charges, to examine the public files pertaining to the prior felony convictions intended to be used by the prosecution against the defendant at the capital sentencing hearing, was objectively unreasonable and therefore constituted deficient performance under Strickland).

2010See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (holding that the failure of capital counsel, who did not represent the defendant on his prior felony charges, to examine the public files pertaining to the prior felony convictions intended to be used by the prosecution against the defendant at the capital sentencing hearing, was objectively unreasonable and therefore constituted deficient performance under Strickland).

2006Austin, 87 S.W.3d at 459 ; State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 28 (Tenn. 1996).

2002See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 28 (Tenn.1996).

2001Rule 12; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 , we select similar cases for comparative proportionality 17 from a pool that includes only those first degree murder cases in which the State seeks the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing is held, 18 and the sentencing jury determines whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death, regardless of the sentence actually imposed. 19 “[B]ecause the aim of proportionality review is to ascertain what other capital sentencing authorities have done with similar capital murder offenses, the only c

2001While we receive Rule 12 reports from trial judges in "all cases in which the defendant is convicted of first degree murder," Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 12; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 , we select similar cases for comparative proportionality [17] from a pool that includes only those first degree murder cases in which the State seeks the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing is held, [18] and the sentencing jury determines whether the sentence should be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death, regardless of the sentence actually imposed. [19] "[B]ecause the

2026See State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d 12, 28 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that a criminal defendant does not have “to acknowledge his awareness of a limited cross-examination rule” if he chooses to testify to collateral mitigating factors in a capital sentencing hearing).

2011Although decided after this sentencing hearing, our opinion in Rimmer held that a criminal defendant does not have to be informed that he will not waive his privilege against self-incrimination if he testifies to collateral mitigating factors in a capital sentencing hearing. 250 S.W.3d at 28 .

2016Our supreme court has concluded that victim impact evidence is admissible in a capital sentencing hearing subject to the limitation that it “should be excluded if it ‘threatens to render the trial fundamentally unfair or [if it] poses a danger of unfair prejudice.’” Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 56 (quoting State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998)).

2015Our supreme court has concluded that victim impact evidence is admissible in a capital sentencing hearing subject to the limitation that it “should be excluded if it ‘threatens to render the trial fundamentally unfair or [if it] poses a danger of unfair prejudice.’” Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 56 (quoting State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn. 1998)).

2012This court “employs the precedent-seeking method of comparative proportionality review, in which we compare a case with cases involving similar defendants and similar crimes. . . . -67- [A] death sentence is disproportionate if a case is ‘plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in cases where the death penalty has been imposed.’” State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 619-20 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 668 ). “[T]he pool of cases considered . . . includes those first degree murder cases in which the State seeks the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing is held, and

2011This Court’s proportionality review begins with a presumption that the sentence “is- not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense;” however, we must inquire as to whether “the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime.” Reid, 213 S.W.3d at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 163 . “ ‘[T]he pool of cases considered by this Court ... includes those first degree murder cases in which the State seeks the death penalty, a capital sentencing hearing i

2012Because “‘the proportionality requirement on review is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the [death] penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy does not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a system that does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice.’” State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 699 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203 ).

2011State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 679 (Tenn. 2006). “[W]e begin with the presumption that the sentence of death is proportionate to the crime of first degree murder.” State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 699 (Tenn. 1997)).

2011Given the seriousness of a death sentence, “[c]ourts are particularly cautious in preserving a defendant’s right to counsel at a capital sentencing hearing.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 532 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992).

1996Courts are “particularly cautious in preserving a defendant’s right to counsel at a capital sentencing hearing.” Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir.1989); Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d at 529 .