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15 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mauro v. Yale-New Haven Hospitalgreen2 sentences2022See Mauro v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 31 Conn. App. 584, 592 , 627 A.2d 443 (1993) (reason for taking exceptions to charge is to alert court to possible error at time when court can correct it). 2022See Mauro v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 31 Conn. App. 584, 592 , 627 A.2d 443 (1993) (reason for taking exceptions to charge is to alert court to possible error at time when court can correct it). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Higginsgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35 , 39 n. 9, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (noting that defendant's failure to brief separately claim under Connecticut constitution confines review to United States constitution). [10] The defendant preserved this claim for appellate review by means of a timely exception to the court's charge. [11] Although the defendant did not take exception to the court's instruction on this ground, we conclude that an objection raised in the defendant's written request to charge was broad enough to encompass the issue raised here. 2009See State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35 , 39 n. 9, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (noting that defendant's failure to brief separately claim under Connecticut constitution confines review to United States constitution). [10] The defendant preserved this claim for appellate review by means of a timely exception to the court's charge. [11] Although the defendant did not take exception to the court's instruction on this ground, we conclude that an objection raised in the defendant's written request to charge was broad enough to encompass the issue raised here. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Whitfordgreen2 sentences2006Although taking exception may have allowed the court to cure the defect; see State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610, 631-32 , 799 A.2d 1034 (2002); the issue is renewable because the request to charge was sufficient on its own to preserve the matter for review. 2006Although taking exception may have allowed the court to cure the defect; see State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610, 631-32 , 799 A.2d 1034 (2002); the issue is renewable because the request to charge was sufficient on its own to preserve the matter for review. | 1 | 1 |
Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kurianskygreen2 sentences1995See Practice Book § 315 (“[t]he supreme court shall not be bound to consider error as to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction unless the matter is covered by a written request to charge or exception has been taken by the party appealing immediately after the charge is delivered”); see also Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 231 Conn. 168 ,194 n.23, 646 A.2d 195 (1994). 1995See Practice Book § 315 (“[t]he supreme court shall not be bound to consider error as to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction unless the matter is covered by a written request to charge or exception has been taken by the party appealing immediately after the charge is delivered”); see also Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 231 Conn. 168 ,194 n.23, 646 A.2d 195 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2024Additionally, the court in its preliminary remarks repeatedly3 instructed the jury that the state must prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt, although the court did not provide a definition of ‘‘reasonable doubt.’’ The defendant did not take exception to the court’s preliminary instructions. 3 The court used the term ‘‘reasonable doubt’’ a total of twenty-four times during its preliminary remarks. 10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 State v. Tahir L. The defendant concedes4 that his claims as to the court’s preliminary instructions were not preserved and, therefore, requests review pur 2024Additionally, the court in its preliminary remarks repeatedly3 instructed the jury that the state must prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt, although the court did not provide a definition of ‘‘reasonable doubt.’’ The defendant did not take exception to the court’s preliminary instructions. 3 The court used the term ‘‘reasonable doubt’’ a total of twenty-four times during its preliminary remarks. 10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 State v. Tahir L. The defendant concedes4 that his claims as to the court’s preliminary instructions were not preserved and, therefore, requests review pur | 7 | 1991–2024 |
State v. Evans
green
2 sentences1991The defendant did not take exception to this charge and is seeking review under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973). 1991The defendant did not take exception to this charge and is seeking review under State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973). | 3 | 1986–1991 |
U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Booker
green
1 sentence2024Additionally, the court in its preliminary remarks repeatedly3 instructed the jury that the state must prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt, although the court did not provide a definition of ‘‘reasonable doubt.’’ The defendant did not take exception to the court’s preliminary instructions. 3 The court used the term ‘‘reasonable doubt’’ a total of twenty-four times during its preliminary remarks. 10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 State v. Tahir L. The defendant concedes4 that his claims as to the court’s preliminary instructions were not preserved and, therefore, requests review pur | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Watson
green
2 sentences2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt “ ‘are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.’ ” The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). 2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt “ ‘are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.’ ” The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Delvalle
green
2 sentences2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt “ ‘are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.’ ” The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). 2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt “ ‘are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.’ ” The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt “ ‘are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.’ ” The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). 2009Specifically, the defendant requested therein that the court omit any instruction related to the fact that the rules of law, the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt “ ‘are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty.’ ” The rationale of these decisions was followed, with the same result, in State v. Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 243-45 , 881 A.2d 160 (2005), State v. Watson, 251 Conn. 220, 225-28 , 740 A.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 471-73 , 736 A.2d 125 (1999). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Ramos
red
2 sentences2008The trial court subsequently instructed the jury that in the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, “[t]he word ‘extreme’ refers to the greatest degree of intensity away from the normal state of the defendant.” The defendant again failed to take exception to the charge as given by the trial court. *815 We first address the reviewability under Golding of the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the definition of “extreme” for the purposes of his extreme emotional disturbance defense. “[I]f a defendant fails to preseive a claim for appellate review, we w 2008The trial court subsequently instructed the jury that in the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, “[t]he word ‘extreme’ refers to the greatest degree of intensity away from the normal state of the defendant.” The defendant again failed to take exception to the charge as given by the trial court. *815 We first address the reviewability under Golding of the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the definition of “extreme” for the purposes of his extreme emotional disturbance defense. “[I]f a defendant fails to preseive a claim for appellate review, we w | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Spencer
green
2 sentences2008The trial court subsequently instructed the jury that in the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, “[t]he word ‘extreme’ refers to the greatest degree of intensity away from the normal state of the defendant.” The defendant again failed to take exception to the charge as given by the trial court. *815 We first address the reviewability under Golding of the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the definition of “extreme” for the purposes of his extreme emotional disturbance defense. “[I]f a defendant fails to preseive a claim for appellate review, we w 2008The trial court subsequently instructed the jury that in the defense of extreme emotional disturbance, “[t]he word ‘extreme’ refers to the greatest degree of intensity away from the normal state of the defendant.” The defendant again failed to take exception to the charge as given by the trial court. *815 We first address the reviewability under Golding of the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the definition of “extreme” for the purposes of his extreme emotional disturbance defense. “[I]f a defendant fails to preseive a claim for appellate review, we w | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Washington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2003Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L. 2003Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S. Ct. 1920 , 18 L. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Perez
neutral
2 sentences1991The guidelines governing such review were recently enunciated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), where the court held that an unpreserved claim of an alleged constitutional violation will not be reviewed on the merits if such violation is subject to harmless error analysis and would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘[Hjarmless error’ in this context focuses, not on whether the charge was misleading to the jury, but on whether, notwithstanding the misleading nature of the charge, the evidence on the issue was so strong that the reviewing court concludes beyond a r 1991The guidelines governing such review were recently enunciated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), where the court held that an unpreserved claim of an alleged constitutional violation will not be reviewed on the merits if such violation is subject to harmless error analysis and would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘[Hjarmless error’ in this context focuses, not on whether the charge was misleading to the jury, but on whether, notwithstanding the misleading nature of the charge, the evidence on the issue was so strong that the reviewing court concludes beyond a r | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Perez
green
2 sentences1991The guidelines governing such review were recently enunciated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), where the court held that an unpreserved claim of an alleged constitutional violation will not be reviewed on the merits if such violation is subject to harmless error analysis and would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘[Hjarmless error’ in this context focuses, not on whether the charge was misleading to the jury, but on whether, notwithstanding the misleading nature of the charge, the evidence on the issue was so strong that the reviewing court concludes beyond a r 1991The guidelines governing such review were recently enunciated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), where the court held that an unpreserved claim of an alleged constitutional violation will not be reviewed on the merits if such violation is subject to harmless error analysis and would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘[Hjarmless error’ in this context focuses, not on whether the charge was misleading to the jury, but on whether, notwithstanding the misleading nature of the charge, the evidence on the issue was so strong that the reviewing court concludes beyond a r | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Screws v. United States
green
2 sentences1986Since the record does not reveal that the defendant requested the court to charge the jury on the statutory definition of intent; § 53a-3 (11); and since the defendant did not take exception to the charge at trial, in order to warrant reversal on appeal “the error must consist of a failure to submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the offense on which the conviction rests; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 , 65 S. Ct. 1031 , 89 L. 1986Since the record does not reveal that the defendant requested the court to charge the jury on the statutory definition of intent; § 53a-3 (11); and since the defendant did not take exception to the charge at trial, in order to warrant reversal on appeal “the error must consist of a failure to submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the offense on which the conviction rests; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 , 65 S. Ct. 1031 , 89 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Kurvin
green
2 sentences1986Ed. 1495 (1945) . . . .” State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 561 , 442 A.2d 1327 (1982). 1986Ed. 1495 (1945) . . . .” State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 561 , 442 A.2d 1327 (1982). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.