time limitation bar in Florida

2026P. 3.850(b)(1)–(3) (setting forth limited exceptions to 2-year time bar); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[R]ule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions.”); State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Where a defendant has already served his sentence and he has reaped the benefit of an illegal sentence, he is estopped from challenging the sentence, especially in the context of a negotiated plea.”); Bartz v. State, 740 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (barring m

2024See Beiro v. State, 289 So. 3d 511 , 511–12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (noting the “extremely limited concept of manifest injustice” and that “[t]he mere incantation of the words ‘manifest injustice’ does not make it so”); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (explaining that “rule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule's time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions”); see also Austin v. State, 336 So. 2d 480 , 481–82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (“The question of whether a particular weapon involved is to be classed as ‘deadly’ is a factual ques

2009See, e.g., Galindez, 909 So.2d at 598 (stating “that the triggering event for the two-year period in which to file a rule 3.850 motion is not the date of the judgment in the criminal proceeding in which the prisoner pleaded, but the date on which the [Department of Corrections] informed the prisoner of the gain time forfeiture and that the DOC determination of gain time constituted newly discovered information within the meaning of rule 3.850(b)(1)”).

2008See, e.g., Galindez, 909 So.2d at 598 (stating "that the triggering event for the two-year period in which to file a rule 3.850 motion is not the date of the judgment in the criminal proceeding in which the prisoner pleaded, but the date on which the [Department of Corrections] informed the prisoner of the gain time forfeiture and that the DOC determination of gain time constituted newly discovered information within the meaning of rule 3.850(b)(1)").

2026P. 3.850(b)(1)–(3) (setting forth limited exceptions to 2-year time bar); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[R]ule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions.”); State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Where a defendant has already served his sentence and he has reaped the benefit of an illegal sentence, he is estopped from challenging the sentence, especially in the context of a negotiated plea.”); Bartz v. State, 740 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (barring m

2026P. 3.850(b)(1)–(3) (setting forth limited exceptions to 2-year time bar); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[R]ule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions.”); State v. Ortiz, 79 So. 3d 177, 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Where a defendant has already served his sentence and he has reaped the benefit of an illegal sentence, he is estopped from challenging the sentence, especially in the context of a negotiated plea.”); Bartz v. State, 740 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (barring m

2025(Rule 3.850), 460 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1984); see also Johnson v. State, 536 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 1988) (“The time limitation of rule 3.850 . . . serves to reduce piecemeal litigation and the assertion of stale claims while at the same time preserves the right to unlimited access to the courts where there is newly discovered evidence or where there have been fundamental constitutional changes in the law with retroactive application.”).

2024See Beiro v. State, 289 So. 3d 511 , 511–12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (noting the “extremely limited concept of manifest injustice” and that “[t]he mere incantation of the words ‘manifest injustice’ does not make it so”); Cuffy v. State, 190 So. 3d 86, 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (explaining that “rule 3.850 contains no ‘manifest injustice’ exception to the rule's time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions”); see also Austin v. State, 336 So. 2d 480 , 481–82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (“The question of whether a particular weapon involved is to be classed as ‘deadly’ is a factual ques

2010See Marrero v. State, 967 So.2d 934, 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

2005See Verysell-Holding LLC v. Tsukanov, 866 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3rd DCA), rev. denied, 874 So.2d 1194 (2004) (holding that the sixty-day time limit imposed by rule of civil procedure governing service of a party’s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens does not apply to a trial court’s inherent power to raise the issue of forum non conveniens sua sponte.).

2003In Foster v. State, 614 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla.1992), the court held: A successive motion may be dismissed if it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the failure to raise those issues in a prior motion constitutes an abuse of process.