time limitation rule in Pennsylvania

2014Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 , 202- 03 (Pa. 2000), abrogated on other grounds, Murray, 943 A.2d 264 (Pa. requirements] in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA Murray, 753 A.2d at 203 ; see Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). -3- J-S47031-14 In order to be timely, a petition under the PCRA must be filed within one year of the date that the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Cour

2014Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 , 202- 03 (Pa. 2000), abrogated on other grounds, Murray, 943 A.2d 264 (Pa. requirements] in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA Murray, 753 A.2d at 203 ; see Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). -3- J-S47031-14 In order to be timely, a petition under the PCRA must be filed within one year of the date that the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Cour

2014Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 , 202- 03 (Pa. 2000), abrogated on other grounds, Murray, 943 A.2d 264 (Pa. requirements] in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA Murray, 753 A.2d at 203 ; see Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). -3- J-S47031-14 In order to be timely, a petition under the PCRA must be filed within one year of the date that the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Cour

2010Jones, 952 A.2d at 712-713 .

2008We also agree with the Board that because its regulations do not specify a time limitation for a violation hearing if no preliminary hearing is required or held, the applicable standard is that the Board hold the violation hearing within a “reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

2008We also agree with the Board that because its regulations do not specify a time limitation for a violation hearing if no preliminary hearing is required or held, the applicable standard is that the Board hold the violation hearing within a “reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).

1991The SEPTA court stated: Section 1 of the Estates Act defines a conveyance as ". . . an act by which it is intended to create an interest in real or personal property whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation." If the 1957 agreement is a conveyance under that definition, the Estates Act of 1947 applies, and the "wait and see" rule was complied with, for the option was in fact exercised within the time limitation of the rule against perpetuities dating from July 1, 1957. 426 Pa. at 386 , 233 A.2d at 20 . [11] The language in the Barton deed read as follows: And in

1991The SEPTA court stated: Section 1 of the Estates Act defines a conveyance as "... an act by which it is intended to create an interest in real or personal property whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation.” If the 1957 agreement is a conveyance under that definition, the Estates Act of 1947 applies, and the "wait and see” rule was complied with, for the option was in fact exercised within the time limitation of the rule against perpetuities dating from July 1, 1957. 426 Pa. at 386 , 233 A.2d at 20 . .

1991The SEPTA court stated: Section 1 of the Estates Act defines a conveyance as ". . . an act by which it is intended to create an interest in real or personal property whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation." If the 1957 agreement is a conveyance under that definition, the Estates Act of 1947 applies, and the "wait and see" rule was complied with, for the option was in fact exercised within the time limitation of the rule against perpetuities dating from July 1, 1957. 426 Pa. at 386 , 233 A.2d at 20 . [11] The language in the Barton deed read as follows: And in

1991The SEPTA court stated: Section 1 of the Estates Act defines a conveyance as "... an act by which it is intended to create an interest in real or personal property whether the act is intended to have inter vivos or testamentary operation.” If the 1957 agreement is a conveyance under that definition, the Estates Act of 1947 applies, and the "wait and see” rule was complied with, for the option was in fact exercised within the time limitation of the rule against perpetuities dating from July 1, 1957. 426 Pa. at 386 , 233 A.2d at 20 . .

1968There is authority for defendant’s contention that the physician who treats the injuries suffered in an automobile accident and the driver who allegedly caused them may be treated as joint tortfeasors: Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111 , 166 A. 2d 892 (1961).

1968There is authority for defendant’s contention that the physician who treats the injuries suffered in an automobile accident and the driver who allegedly caused them may be treated as joint tortfeasors: Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111 , 166 A. 2d 892 (1961).

1966It may be that, on a proper petition, a court could see fit to exercise its discretion in favor of defendant, whose reasons for failing to act more expeditiously could hardly be termed capricious in the light of the Supreme Court’s sharply divided opinion: 412 Pa. 47 , supra. Of course, we do not rule on this point; nor do we wish to have our statements herein construed as in any way suggesting the validity of any proceedings under rule 2253 at this time, since we now rule, and rule only, that the procedural relief in the form in which it is requested by petitioner must be denied.

1938Cf. American Building & Loan Association v. Farmers’ Insurance Co., 11 Wash. 619 , 40 Pac. 125 ; Richards on the Law of Insurance ,(4th Ed.) § 304. ......So in this case both the owner and the plaintiff as mortgagee, by becoming parties to their respective contracts of insurance with the defendant, have agreed to the time limitation clause affecting suits upon the policy.......It is broad in scope, and so far as the rights of the plaintiff mortgagee are concerned, it is not contingent upon nor does it relate itself to any personal default or omission by the owner”: Howe v. Mill Owners’ Mut.

1938Cf. American Building & Loan Association v. Farmers’ Insurance Co., 11 Wash. 619 , 40 Pac. 125 ; Richards on the Law of Insurance ,(4th Ed.) § 304. ......So in this case both the owner and the plaintiff as mortgagee, by becoming parties to their respective contracts of insurance with the defendant, have agreed to the time limitation clause affecting suits upon the policy.......It is broad in scope, and so far as the rights of the plaintiff mortgagee are concerned, it is not contingent upon nor does it relate itself to any personal default or omission by the owner”: Howe v. Mill Owners’ Mut.