conflict of interest claim in Georgia

2026As to the merits of Gibson’s conflict-of-interest claim, the habeas court considered the evidence presented at the 2003 hearing on Gibson’s second habeas petition, 5 as well as the remainder of the record, and denied Gibson’s claim on the merits, concluding that Gibson failed “to show that an actual conflict of interest existed which significantly and adversely affected his trial counsel’s representation of Gibson,” citing Cuyler, 446 US at 348–50, and Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714, 720 (2021).

2026As to the merits of Gibson’s conflict-of-interest claim, the habeas court considered the evidence presented at the 2003 hearing on Gibson’s second habeas petition, 5 as well as the remainder of the record, and denied Gibson’s claim on the merits, concluding that Gibson failed “to show that an actual conflict of interest existed which significantly and adversely affected his trial counsel’s representation of Gibson,” citing Cuyler, 446 US at 348–50, and Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714, 720 (2021).

2026When we review a habeas court’s decision on a petitioner’s conflict-of-interest claim, “we accept the court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the law to those facts de novo.” Dills v. Weaver, ___ Ga. ___ (2026), S25A1367, slip op. at 17 (Ga. Jan. 5, 2026) (citing Hall, 310 Ga. at 719–20 (quotation marks omitted)).

2026As to the merits of Gibson’s conflict-of-interest claim, the habeas court considered the evidence presented at the 2003 hearing on Gibson’s second habeas petition, 5 as well as the remainder of the record, and denied Gibson’s claim on the merits, concluding that Gibson failed “to show that an actual conflict of interest existed which significantly and adversely affected his trial counsel’s representation of Gibson,” citing Cuyler, 446 US at 348–50, and Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714, 720 (2021).

2026Gibson also contends that the habeas court erroneously based its denial of Gibson’s habeas petition on the conflict-of-interest standard set forth in Cuyler and that the appropriate standard to apply in evaluating Mullis’s conflict of interest is the standard set forth in Sallie v. State, 269 Ga. 446, 448 (1998) (providing that, when counsel is laboring under an obvious and impermissible conflict and the penalty is of vast enormity, there is no need to analyze the 19 adverse effect).

2026Gibson also contends that the habeas court erroneously based its denial of Gibson’s habeas petition on the conflict-of-interest standard set forth in Cuyler and that the appropriate standard to apply in evaluating Mullis’s conflict of interest is the standard set forth in Sallie v. State, 269 Ga. 446, 448 (1998) (providing that, when counsel is laboring under an obvious and impermissible conflict and the penalty is of vast enormity, there is no need to analyze the 19 adverse effect).

2010Compare White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 ( 401 SE2d 733 ) (1991) (a convicted defendant pursuing habeas relief was procedurally barred from raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel because appellate counsel who did not serve as trial counsel had not raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel “at the first possible stage of post-conviction review”).

2010Compare White v. Kelso, 261 Ga. 32 ( 401 SE2d 733 ) (1991) (a convicted defendant pursuing habeas relief was procedurally barred from raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel because appellate counsel who did not serve as trial counsel had not raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel “at the first possible stage of post-conviction review”).

2024Significantly, in determining the implications of applying a conflict-of- interest rule nearly identical to the Georgia rule at issue here,5 those courts have held that a “[trial] court must rule on a motion for disqualification of counsel prior to 3 Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 186 (3) ( 850 SE2d 110 ) (2020) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”). 4 See Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 286 G

2024Significantly, in determining the implications of applying a conflict-of- interest rule nearly identical to the Georgia rule at issue here,5 those courts have held that a “[trial] court must rule on a motion for disqualification of counsel prior to 3 Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 186 (3) ( 850 SE2d 110 ) (2020) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”). 4 See Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 286 G

2024Bank of Georgia, 220 Ga. App. 821, 822 ( 470 SE2d 246 ) (1996). 5 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9 (a) (2011) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in . . . a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”). 5 ruling on a dispositive motion because the success of a disqualification motion has the potential to change the proceedings entirely.”6 And importantly, the federal

2024Bank of Georgia, 220 Ga. App. 821, 822 ( 470 SE2d 246 ) (1996). 5 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9 (a) (2011) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in . . . a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”). 5 ruling on a dispositive motion because the success of a disqualification motion has the potential to change the proceedings entirely.”6 And importantly, the federal

2024Significantly, in determining the implications of applying a conflict-of- interest rule nearly identical to the Georgia rule at issue here,5 those courts have held that a “[trial] court must rule on a motion for disqualification of counsel prior to 3 Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 186 (3) ( 850 SE2d 110 ) (2020) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”). 4 See Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 286 G

2024Significantly, in determining the implications of applying a conflict-of- interest rule nearly identical to the Georgia rule at issue here,5 those courts have held that a “[trial] court must rule on a motion for disqualification of counsel prior to 3 Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 186 (3) ( 850 SE2d 110 ) (2020) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”). 4 See Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 286 G

2024Significantly, in determining the implications of applying a conflict-of- interest rule nearly identical to the Georgia rule at issue here,5 those courts have held that a “[trial] court must rule on a motion for disqualification of counsel prior to 3 Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 186 (3) ( 850 SE2d 110 ) (2020) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”). 4 See Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 286 G

2024Significantly, in determining the implications of applying a conflict-of- interest rule nearly identical to the Georgia rule at issue here,5 those courts have held that a “[trial] court must rule on a motion for disqualification of counsel prior to 3 Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 186 (3) ( 850 SE2d 110 ) (2020) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”). 4 See Southstar Energy Servs., LLC v. Ellison, 286 G

2021See Tolbert, 298 Ga. at 157 n.11 (2) (d) (noting that reasonable strategic defense choices are “virtually unassailable” in the context of a conflict-of-interest claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 643 (2) (d) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (reasonable to forgo cross-examination of State witnesses where defense counsel determined that witnesses were “complete failures who destroyed themselves when they got on the stand[.]” (punctuation omitted)); Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 24 (2) (785 SE2d 869) (2016) (“Decisions about what questions to ask 22 on cross-

2021See Tolbert, 298 Ga. at 157 n.11 (2) (d) (noting that reasonable strategic defense choices are “virtually unassailable” in the context of a conflict-of-interest claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 643 (2) (d) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (reasonable to forgo cross-examination of State witnesses where defense counsel determined that witnesses were “complete failures who destroyed themselves when they got on the stand[.]” (punctuation omitted)); Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 24 (2) (785 SE2d 869) (2016) (“Decisions about what questions to ask 22 on cross-

2021See Tolbert, 298 Ga. at 157 n.11 (2) (d) (noting that reasonable strategic defense choices are “virtually unassailable” in the context of a conflict-of-interest claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 643 (2) (d) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (reasonable to forgo cross-examination of State witnesses where defense counsel determined that witnesses were “complete failures who destroyed themselves when they got on the stand[.]” (punctuation omitted)); Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 24 (2) (785 SE2d 869) (2016) (“Decisions about what questions to ask 22 on cross-

2021See Tolbert, 298 Ga. at 157 (2) (d) n.11 (noting that reasonable strategic defense choices are “virtually unassailable” in the context of a conflict-of-interest claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 643 (2) (d) ( 837 SE2d 808 ) (2020) (reasonable to forgo cross-examination of State witnesses where defense counsel determined that witnesses were “complete failures who destroyed themselves when they got on the stand.” (punctuation omitted)); Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 24 (2) ( 785 SE2d 869 ) (2016) (“[D]ecisions about what questions to ask on cross

2021See Tolbert, 298 Ga. at 157 n.11 (2) (d) (noting that reasonable strategic defense choices are “virtually unassailable” in the context of a conflict-of-interest claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 643 (2) (d) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (reasonable to forgo cross-examination of State witnesses where defense counsel determined that witnesses were “complete failures who destroyed themselves when they got on the stand[.]” (punctuation omitted)); Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 24 (2) (785 SE2d 869) (2016) (“Decisions about what questions to ask 22 on cross-

2021See Tolbert, 298 Ga. at 157 n.11 (2) (d) (noting that reasonable strategic defense choices are “virtually unassailable” in the context of a conflict-of-interest claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 643 (2) (d) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (reasonable to forgo cross-examination of State witnesses where defense counsel determined that witnesses were “complete failures who destroyed themselves when they got on the stand[.]” (punctuation omitted)); Edwards v. State, 299 Ga. 20, 24 (2) (785 SE2d 869) (2016) (“Decisions about what questions to ask 22 on cross-

2015Appellant has abandoned those complaints on appeal, and his motion did not raise and preserve for appeal the conflict of interest claim he now asks us to decide. “ ‘It is a general principle that a party cannot assert one ground in support of a plea, motion, or objection in the trial court and then expect the appellate court to review an entirely new ground to which he has switched on appeal.’ ” Coleman v. State, 163 Ga. App. 173, 175 ( 293 SE2d 395 ) (1982) (citation omitted).

2015Appellant has abandoned those complaints on appeal, and his motion did not raise and preserve for appeal the conflict of interest claim he now asks us to decide. “ ‘It is a general principle that a party cannot assert one ground in support of a plea, motion, or objection in the trial court and then expect the appellate court to review an entirely new ground to which he has switched on appeal.’ ” Coleman v. State, 163 Ga. App. 173, 175 ( 293 SE2d 395 ) (1982) (citation omitted).

2015See also *111 Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 58 ( 766 SE2d 1 ) (2014) (“[A]n appellant is ‘limited on appeal to the grounds which he properly presented in the trial court.’ ” (citation omitted)).

2015See also *111 Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 58 ( 766 SE2d 1 ) (2014) (“[A]n appellant is ‘limited on appeal to the grounds which he properly presented in the trial court.’ ” (citation omitted)).

2010See Arthur v. Walker, 285 Ga. 578, n. 1 ( 679 SE2d 13 ) (2009) (where appellate counsel served as trial counsel, convicted defendant’s claims in habeas petition of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were not barred); Gibson v. Head, 282 Ga. 156 (2) ( 646 SE2d 257 ) (2007) (where trial counsel serves as appellate counsel the conflict of interest claim supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is exempt from the procedural *667 default rule of habeas corpus).

2010See Arthur v. Walker, 285 Ga. 578, n. 1 ( 679 SE2d 13 ) (2009) (where appellate counsel served as trial counsel, convicted defendant’s claims in habeas petition of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were not barred); Gibson v. Head, 282 Ga. 156 (2) ( 646 SE2d 257 ) (2007) (where trial counsel serves as appellate counsel the conflict of interest claim supporting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is exempt from the procedural *667 default rule of habeas corpus).

2001In Dunaway v. City of Marietta, 251 Ga. 727, 729 (3) ( 308 SE2d 823 ) (1983), however, the Supreme Court indicated that a conflict of interest may influence a zoning proceeding even if the conflicted commissioner does not vote. 17 In addition, the residents assert that two other members of the Authority had ties to financing banks and helped inflate the property’s purchase price, benefitting these banks.

2001In Dunaway v. City of Marietta, 251 Ga. 727, 729 (3) ( 308 SE2d 823 ) (1983), however, the Supreme Court indicated that a conflict of interest may influence a zoning proceeding even if the conflicted commissioner does not vote. 17 In addition, the residents assert that two other members of the Authority had ties to financing banks and helped inflate the property’s purchase price, benefitting these banks.

1999Strickland v. Washington, supra at 692(III)(B), 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

1999Strickland v. Washington, supra at 692 (III) (B).

1999See Howard v. State, 220 Ga. App. 267, 271-272 (4) ( 469 SE2d 396 ) (1996). *124 7.

1999See Howard v. State, 220 Ga. App. 267, 271-272 (4) ( 469 SE2d 396 ) (1996). *124 7.