conflict of interest claim in Connecticut

2021In State v. Navarro, 172 Conn. App. 472, 474 , 160 A.3d 1116 , cert. denied, 326 Conn. 910 , 164 A.3d 681 (2017), this court examined a conflict of interest claim predicated on dual representation.

2021In State v. Navarro, 172 Conn. App. 472, 474 , 160 A.3d 1116 , cert. denied, 326 Conn. 910 , 164 A.3d 681 (2017), this court examined a conflict of interest claim predicated on dual representation.

2021In State v. Navarro, 172 Conn. App. 472, 474 , 160 A.3d 1116 , cert. denied, 326 Conn. 910 , 164 A.3d 681 (2017), this court examined a conflict of interest claim predicated on dual representation.

2021In State v. Navarro, 172 Conn. App. 472, 474 , 160 A.3d 1116 , cert. denied, 326 Conn. 910 , 164 A.3d 681 (2017), this court examined a conflict of interest claim predicated on dual representation.

2017Nevertheless, we need not decide whether Sherman was burdened by a conflict because, even if he was, it is clear that the petitioner has not shown any prejudice. 37 The respondent argues that the habeas court applied an incorrect stan- dard for determining prejudice in connection with a conflict of interest claim of this kind in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 , 122 S. Ct. 1237 , 152 L.

2017Nevertheless, we need not decide whether Sherman was burdened by a conflict because, even if he was, it is clear that the petitioner has not shown any prejudice. 37 The respondent argues that the habeas court applied an incorrect stan- dard for determining prejudice in connection with a conflict of interest claim of this kind in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 , 122 S. Ct. 1237 , 152 L.

2021C The petitioner also made a claim in a separate count of his habeas petition that Attorney Daly’s conflict of interest ‘‘prevented him from subjecting the state’s wit- nesses to any meaningful cross-examination,’’ and, thus, prejudice should have been presumed under United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. 648 .

2021In Crespo, our Supreme Court analyzed whether a defendant could seek review, in a direct criminal appeal, of a conflict of interest claim not raised at trial under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and concluded that the record was inadequate for a reviewing court to determine whether counsel’s actions were the result of a legitimate trial strategy or a possible conflict: ‘‘We cannot know for certain from the record, however, whether [counsel’s actions consti- tuted a legitimate trial strategy], nor can we determine from the record whether [counsel] adequately expl

2021In Crespo, our Supreme Court analyzed whether a defendant could seek review, in a direct criminal appeal, of a conflict of interest claim not raised at trial under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and concluded that the record was inadequate for a reviewing court to determine whether counsel’s actions were the result of a legitimate trial strategy or a possible conflict: ‘‘We cannot know for certain from the record, however, whether [counsel’s actions consti- tuted a legitimate trial strategy], nor can we determine from the record whether [counsel] adequately expl

2021In Collins v. Commissioner of Cor- rection, 202 Conn. App. 789, 796 , 799–800, 246 A.3d 1047 , cert. denied, 336 Conn. 931 , 248 A.3d 1 (2021), this court held that a habeas court improperly found that a conflict of interest claim was defaulted where ‘‘[counsel] never raised the potential for a conflict of interest with the court, nor did the court raise the issue on its own.

2017Id., at 15-16 , 82 A.3d 630 .

2017Id., at 15-16 , 82 A.3d 630 .

2017Although our appellate courts have not had occasion to consider whether de facto termination based on the filing of a grievance extends beyond the continuous representation doctrine, recently, this court in Straw Pond Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C. , supra, 167 Conn.App. at 719 , 145 A.3d 292 , described the DeLeo framework as "instructive in that it defines what is meant by legal representation." Moreover, although not binding on our analysis, we note that the Superior Court has cited to DeLeo 's formal and de facto methods of termination in the context of determining

2017Although our appellate courts have not had occasion to consider whether de facto termination based on the filing of a grievance extends beyond the continuous representation doctrine, recently, this court in Straw Pond Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C. , supra, 167 Conn.App. at 719 , 145 A.3d 292 , described the DeLeo framework as "instructive in that it defines what is meant by legal representation." Moreover, although not binding on our analysis, we note that the Superior Court has cited to DeLeo 's formal and de facto methods of termination in the context of determining

2016The habeas court applied a less demanding prejudice standard from Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), but the respondent argues that, in light of Mickens , the standard set forth in Cuyler applies only to cases in which counsel represents more than one defendant and not to other types of conflicts, including when counsel has a personal conflict that burdens his representation of a client.

2016The habeas court applied a less demanding prejudice standard from Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), but the respondent argues that, in light of Mickens , the standard set forth in Cuyler applies only to cases in which counsel represents more than one defendant and not to other types of conflicts, including when counsel has a personal conflict that burdens his representation of a client.

2012See Danzig v. PDPA, Inc., 125 Conn. App. 242 , 252 n.7, 9 A.3d 382 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 920 , 14 A.3d 1005 (2011); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Book, 97 Conn. App. 822, 828 , 908 A.2d 547 (2006).

2012See Danzig v. PDPA, Inc., 125 Conn. App. 242 , 252 n.7, 9 A.3d 382 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 920 , 14 A.3d 1005 (2011); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Book, 97 Conn. App. 822, 828 , 908 A.2d 547 (2006).

2009Before the *588 trial court is charged with a duty to inquire, the evidence of a specific conflict must be sufficient to alert a reasonable trial judge that the defendant’s [constitutional] right to effective assistance of counsel is in jeopardy. . . .’ Accordingly, it is a high threshold that must be satisfied before the trial court affirmatively must inquire as to whether a conflict exists.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 489-90 , quoting State v. Gaines, 257 Conn. 695, 706-709 , 778 A.2d 919 (2001).

2009Before the *588 trial court is charged with a duty to inquire, the evidence of a specific conflict must be sufficient to alert a reasonable trial judge that the defendant’s [constitutional] right to effective assistance of counsel is in jeopardy. . . .’ Accordingly, it is a high threshold that must be satisfied before the trial court affirmatively must inquire as to whether a conflict exists.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 489-90 , quoting State v. Gaines, 257 Conn. 695, 706-709 , 778 A.2d 919 (2001).

2009Before the *588 trial court is charged with a duty to inquire, the evidence of a specific conflict must be sufficient to alert a reasonable trial judge that the defendant’s [constitutional] right to effective assistance of counsel is in jeopardy. . . .’ Accordingly, it is a high threshold that must be satisfied before the trial court affirmatively must inquire as to whether a conflict exists.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 489-90 , quoting State v. Gaines, 257 Conn. 695, 706-709 , 778 A.2d 919 (2001).

2006He maintains that, pursuant to our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), the in camera inquiry into the conflict of interest of defense counsel constituted a “critical stage of the prosecution” and that the exclusion of the defendant amounted to a structural error mandating reversal of the defendant’s conviction. 7 In response, the state asserts that State v. Lopez, supra, 271 Conn. 724 , is distinguishable from the present case because (1) in Lopez the meeting occurred during the testimonial phase of trial, whereas, in the present case, the jury had n

2006He maintains that, pursuant to our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724 , 859 A.2d 898 (2004), the in camera inquiry into the conflict of interest of defense counsel constituted a “critical stage of the prosecution” and that the exclusion of the defendant amounted to a structural error mandating reversal of the defendant’s conviction. 7 In response, the state asserts that State v. Lopez, supra, 271 Conn. 724 , is distinguishable from the present case because (1) in Lopez the meeting occurred during the testimonial phase of trial, whereas, in the present case, the jury had n

1999United States v. O'Neil , 118 F.3d 65 m 71 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub. nom.

1997Respondent cites Johnson v. Commissioner, CT Page 8531 218 Conn. 403 , 417 (1991) to the effect that the court "adopted the federal `cause and prejudice' standard from Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)." "The Wainwright standard requires that the Petitioner show good cause for the failure to preserve a claim at trial and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." See Giannotti v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 125 , 129 (1991).

1997Respondent cites Johnson v. Commissioner, CT Page 8531 218 Conn. 403 , 417 (1991) to the effect that the court "adopted the federal `cause and prejudice' standard from Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)." "The Wainwright standard requires that the Petitioner show good cause for the failure to preserve a claim at trial and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." See Giannotti v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 125 , 129 (1991).

1997Respondent cites Johnson v. Commissioner, CT Page 8531 218 Conn. 403 , 417 (1991) to the effect that the court "adopted the federal `cause and prejudice' standard from Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)." "The Wainwright standard requires that the Petitioner show good cause for the failure to preserve a claim at trial and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." See Giannotti v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 125 , 129 (1991).

1994Given our traditional liberal policy as to amendments, it is not surprising that Connecticut in effect decided to follow the liberal relation back doctrine set forth in Rule 15c the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see generally Federal Practice and Procedure , Wright, Miller Kane, Vol. 6A, see Giglio v. Conn. Light Power , 180 Conn. 230 , 237 (1980), Sharp v. Mitchell , 209 Conn. 59 , 72 (1988) § 1497 pp 70-103.

1994Given our traditional liberal policy as to amendments, it is not surprising that Connecticut in effect decided to follow the liberal relation back doctrine set forth in Rule 15c the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see generally Federal Practice and Procedure , Wright, Miller Kane, Vol. 6A, see Giglio v. Conn. Light Power , 180 Conn. 230 , 237 (1980), Sharp v. Mitchell , 209 Conn. 59 , 72 (1988) § 1497 pp 70-103.

1993Id., 655 ; State v. Jones, supra. Unlike the previously cited disqualification cases, here the conflict of interest claim was presented to the trial court after the conclusion of the trial.

1991An actual conflict of interest occurs upon proof, as opposed to hypothesis, that counsel’s behavior is motivated out of a “desire to diminish the jury’s perception of a codefendant’s guilt . . . [so that] . . . counsel’s ‘struggle to serve two masters [could not] seriously be doubted.’ ” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 , 62 S. Ct. 457 , 86 L.

1991An actual conflict of interest occurs upon proof, as opposed to hypothesis, that counsel’s behavior is motivated out of a “desire to diminish the jury’s perception of a codefendant’s guilt . . . [so that] . . . counsel’s ‘struggle to serve two masters [could not] seriously be doubted.’ ” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 , 62 S. Ct. 457 , 86 L.