93 California opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Verduzcogreen2 sentences2017Attorney Fees Section 987.8 "establishes the means for a county to recover some or all of the costs of defense expended on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant. [Citation.] Under subdivisions (b) and (c) of the statute, an order of reimbursement can be *690 made only if the court concludes, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant has 'the present ability ... to pay all or a portion' of the defense costs. [Citations.] If this finding is made, 'the court shall set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay the sum to the county in the manner in which the c 2017Attorney Fees Section 987.8 "establishes the means for a county to recover some or all of the costs of defense expended on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant. [Citation.] Under subdivisions (b) and (c) of the statute, an order of reimbursement can be *690 made only if the court concludes, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant has 'the present ability ... to pay all or a portion' of the defense costs. [Citations.] If this finding is made, 'the court shall set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay the sum to the county in the manner in which the c | 2 | 4 |
People v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2015(Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 .) Under subdivisions (b) and (c) of the statute, an order of reimbursement can be made only if the court concludes, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant has “the present ability . . . to pay all or a portion” of the defense costs. (§ 987.8, subds. (b), (c) & (e); People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 29 ; People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 72-73 .) If this finding is made, “the court shall set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay the sum to the county in the manner in which the c 2014To the extent that no express finding may be required if substantial evidence supports the fee (People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62 , 71- 72), we find the sufficiency of the evidence wanting. | 2 | 4 |
Signal Companies, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co.green2 sentences2001Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 369 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 612 P.2d 889 .) Although insurers must respond in full to a contractual policy holder's tender of defense, their respective obligations for contribution to other insurers for the costs of defense are entirely separate from their obligations to their insured and are adjusted equitably on the basis of all the circumstances of the case. 2001Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 369 , 165 Cal.Rptr. 799 , 612 P.2d 889 .) Although insurers must respond in full to a contractual policy holder's tender of defense, their respective obligations for contribution to other insurers for the costs of defense are entirely separate from their obligations to their insured and are adjusted equitably on the basis of all the circumstances of the case. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Amorgreen2 sentences2015(Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 .) Under subdivisions (b) and (c) of the statute, an order of reimbursement can be made only if the court concludes, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant has “the present ability . . . to pay all or a portion” of the defense costs. (§ 987.8, subds. (b), (c) & (e); People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 29 ; People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 72-73 .) If this finding is made, “the court shall set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay the sum to the county in the manner in which the c 2012(Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ].) Under subdivisions (b) and (c) of the statute, an order of reimbursement can be made only if the court concludes, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant has “the present ability ... to pay all or a portion” of the defense costs. (§ 987.8, subds. (b), (c), (e); see People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 29 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 523 P.2d 1173 ]; People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 72-73 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 321 ].) 8 If this finding is made, “the court shall set the amount to be reimbur | 2 | 3 |
Schaffer v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015(Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 .) Under subdivisions (b) and (c) of the statute, an order of reimbursement can be made only if the court concludes, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant has “the present ability . . . to pay all or a portion” of the defense costs. (§ 987.8, subds. (b), (c) & (e); People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 29 ; People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 72-73 .) If this finding is made, “the court shall set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay the sum to the county in the manner in which the c 2012(Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ].) Under subdivisions (b) and (c) of the statute, an order of reimbursement can be made only if the court concludes, after notice and an evidentiary hearing, that the defendant has “the present ability ... to pay all or a portion” of the defense costs. (§ 987.8, subds. (b), (c), (e); see People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 29 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 765 , 523 P.2d 1173 ]; People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 72-73 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 321 ].) 8 If this finding is made, “the court shall set the amount to be reimbur | 2 | 3 |
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002The Duty to Defend "The insured's desire to secure the right to call on the insurer's superior resources for the defense of third party claims is, in all likelihood, typically as significant a motive for the purchase of insurance as is the wish to obtain indemnity for possible liability." ( Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 295-296 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ( Montrose Chemical ).) The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, so broad that an insurer must defend if there is any potential the claim might be covered. ( Montrose Chemical, supra 1998(Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 300.) But the other side of this coin is that, as and when it provides a defense of partially covered and partially uncovered claims, an insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement from the insured for the costs of defense of those claims which are later determined to be uncovered. | 2 | 3 |
Continental Casualty Co. v. Zurich Insurancegreen2 sentences2002Co., supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 32-33, 17 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 366 P.2d 455 .) Next, it held that the excess clauses were enforceable; therefore, the policy with the pro rata clause "provided primary insurance . . ., and [the other two] policies were excess only and should be prorated after the . . . primary coverage had been exhausted. [Citation.]" ( Id., at p. 35, 17 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 366 P.2d 455 .) Finally, the court upheld the trial court's order "that all three companies share in the costs of defense in the same ratio that they share in paying the . . . judgment ...." ( Continental Cas. 2002Co., supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 32-33, 17 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 366 P.2d 455 .) Next, it held that the excess clauses were enforceable; therefore, the policy with the pro rata clause "provided primary insurance . . ., and [the other two] policies were excess only and should be prorated after the . . . primary coverage had been exhausted. [Citation.]" ( Id., at p. 35, 17 Cal.Rptr. 12 , 366 P.2d 455 .) Finally, the court upheld the trial court's order "that all three companies share in the costs of defense in the same ratio that they share in paying the . . . judgment ...." ( Continental Cas. | 2 | 3 |
Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co.green2 sentences1998“Where an insured mounts a defense at the insured’s own expense following the insurer’s refusal to defend, the usual contract damages are the costs of the defense.” (Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 825, 831 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 ].) Contract damages are based on “the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.” (Civ. 1998“Where an insured mounts a defense at the insured’s own expense following the insurer’s refusal to defend, the usual contract damages are the costs of the defense.” (Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 825, 831 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 ].) Contract damages are based on “the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.” (Civ. | 2 | 3 |
Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co.green2 sentences1997On a prior appeal from that judgment, Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1784 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 ] (Amato I), we held that because the insurer had ultimately prevailed on the coverage issue, the measure of the insured’s damages was not the full amount of the underlying judgment but rather the insured’s costs of defense. 1997On a prior appeal from that judgment, Amato v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1784 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 ] (Amato I), we held that because the insurer had ultimately prevailed on the coverage issue, the measure of the insured’s damages was not the full amount of the underlying judgment but rather the insured’s costs of defense. | 2 | 3 |
Guardado v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen2 sentences2014(See Guardado v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 91, 95, fn. 1 [record augmentation procedure not available in appellate writ proceedings because augmentation is a creature of the proceedings governing appeals, not writs].) Even if rule 8.147 applies, as White points out appellant’s record designation in this case failed to state that she was invoking the rule or, apart from the costs hearing, specify the portions of the reporter’s transcript she intended to use. 2014(See Guardado v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 91, 95, fn. 1 [record augmentation procedure not available in appellate writ proceedings because augmentation is a creature of the proceedings governing appeals, not writs].) Even if rule 8.147 applies, as White points out appellant’s record designation in this case failed to state that she was invoking the rule or, apart from the costs hearing, specify the portions of the reporter’s transcript she intended to use. | 2 | 2 |
CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co.green2 sentences2000“If the insurer is obliged to take up the defense of its insured, it must do so as soon as possible, both to protect the interests of the insured, and. to limit its own exposure to loss. . . . [T]he duty to defend must be assessed at the outset of the case.” (CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) It follows that a belated offer to pay the costs of defense may mitigate damages but will not cure the initial breach of duty; c. 2000“If the insurer is obliged to take up the defense of its insured, it must do so as soon as possible, both to protect the interests of the insured, and. to limit its own exposure to loss. . . . [T]he duty to defend must be assessed at the outset of the case.” (CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 605 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) It follows that a belated offer to pay the costs of defense may mitigate damages but will not cure the initial breach of duty; c. | 2 | 2 |
Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.green2 sentences2025Co. v. Loo (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1797 .) Respondent was entitled to recover as defense costs the attorney fees it incurred in the litigation against Mid- Century. “[A] promise of indemnity against claims, demands, or liability ‘embraces the costs of defense against such claims, demands, or liability’ insofar as such costs are incurred reasonably and in good faith. ([Civil Code,] § 2778, subd. 3, italics added.)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 553 ; see also Myers Building Industries, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 971, fn. 20 [attorney fees incurred in a third party claim “are recoverab 2021Code, § 2778, subds. 3 & 4.) “[Civil Code] section 2778, unchanged since 1872, sets forth general rules for the interpretation of indemnity contracts, ‘unless a contrary intention appears.’ If not forbidden by other, more specific, statutes, the obligations set forth in [Civil Code] section 2778 thus are deemed included in every indemnity agreement unless the parties indicate otherwise.” (Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 553 .) “[T]he statute first provides that a promise of indemnity against claims, demands, or liability ‘embraces the costs of defense against such | 1 | 6 |
Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc.green2 sentences2025Co. v. Loo (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1797 .) Respondent was entitled to recover as defense costs the attorney fees it incurred in the litigation against Mid- Century. “[A] promise of indemnity against claims, demands, or liability ‘embraces the costs of defense against such claims, demands, or liability’ insofar as such costs are incurred reasonably and in good faith. ([Civil Code,] § 2778, subd. 3, italics added.)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 553 ; see also Myers Building Industries, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 971, fn. 20 [attorney fees incurred in a third party claim “are recoverab 2014Code, § 2778, subd. 3.) An indemnitor in an indemnity contract generally undertakes to protect the indemnitee against loss or damage through liability to a third person. [Citation.]” (Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 949, 968 .) 8 “Although indemnity generally relates to third party claims, ‘this general rule does not apply if the parties to a contract use the term “indemnity” to include direct liability as well as third party liability.’ ” (Zalkind v. Ceradyne, Inc. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1024 , citing Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theat | 1 | 3 |
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Superior Ct.green2 sentences2013For example, citing Safeco, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 874 , appellant claims that “all carriers with a duty to defend are obligated to equitably contribute to the defense.” In Safeco, a settling insurer sued a nonparticipating insurer for equitable contribution after the settling insurer paid the costs of defense and settlements of 17 underlying property damage lawsuits. 2013For example, citing Safeco, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 874 , appellant claims that “all carriers with a duty to defend are obligated to equitably contribute to the defense.” In Safeco, a settling insurer sued a nonparticipating insurer for equitable contribution after the settling insurer paid the costs of defense and settlements of 17 underlying property damage lawsuits. | 1 | 2 |
Stonewall Insurance v. City of Palos Verdes Estatesgreen1 sentence2021Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1810, 1861 (Stonewall).) 3 Union to provide a defense.4 At approximately the same time, Mid-Century stopped contributing to the costs of defense and indemnity, claiming that its umbrella policies were subject to aggregate limits and that those limits had exhausted. | 1 | 1 |
| Fuller v. Oregongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Richards v. Sequoia Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pool v. City of Oaklandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ketchum v. Mosesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Centennial Ins. Co. v. US Fire Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Widson v. International Harvester Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Meininger v. Larwin-Northern California, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Herman Christensen & Sons, Inc. v. Paris Plastering Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State of California v. Pacific Indemnity Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Oldham v. California Capital Fund, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Travelers Cas. and Sur. v. Century Sur.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commerce v. Chubbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mathews v. Eldridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brandon & Tibbs v. George Kevorkian Accountancy Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| American International Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kapelus v. United Title Guaranty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fiorito v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Continental Casualty Co. v. Royal Insurance of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| North River Insurance v. American Home Assurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Marini v. Municipal Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Interstate Fire & Casualty Insurance v. Cleveland Wrecking Co.
green
2 sentences2020(Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 40- 41; Valley Crest, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 487-488.) In Interstate Fire, the court reasoned that allegations of negligence in the underlying lawsuit, whether ultimately proven or not, are nevertheless “relevant to the [parties’] respective equities.” (Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 39 .) The court concluded the allegations in the underlying lawsuit that the subcontractor had been negligent “tip[ped]” the equities in the insurer’s favor because those allegations were what “precipitated the lawsuit . . . [and] made it necess 2015The first factor was that Cleveland was alleged to have caused the loss in addition to its alleged liability for the loss under a contractual indemnity provision, and “Cleveland’s alleged negligence toward Frisby is relevant to the respective equities of [the insurer] and Cleveland.” (Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 39 .) “[T]he first amended complaint alleges that *486 Cleveland’s negligence caused Frisby’s lawsuit, and precipitated the lawsuit against Webcor and Cleveland, which made it necessary for Webcor to incur the costs of defense and settlement. | 3 | 2015–2020 |
Carmel Development Co. v. RLI Insurance
green
2 sentences2017Where two (or more) policies are at the same level for the same risk (e.g., both primary or both excess) and contain conflicting "other insurance" provisions purporting to be excess over all other available insurance, courts may refuse to give effect to those provisions and, instead, require each to contribute to the costs of defense or indemnity on a pro rata basis. ( Carmel , supra , 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 508 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 .) Under other circumstances, however, "other insurance" clauses may be relevant to determining whether two policies provide the same level of coverage-and, thus, t 2017Where two (or more) policies are at the same level for the same risk (e.g., both primary or both excess) and contain conflicting "other insurance" provisions purporting to be excess over all other available insurance, courts may refuse to give effect to those provisions and, instead, require each to contribute to the costs of defense or indemnity on a pro rata basis. ( Carmel , supra , 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 508 , 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 .) Under other circumstances, however, "other insurance" clauses may be relevant to determining whether two policies provide the same level of coverage-and, thus, t | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Maryland Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2023Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1293 .) “Equitable contribution permits reimbursement to the [settling] insurer that paid on the loss for the excess it paid over its proportionate share of the obligation, on the theory that the debt it paid was equally and concurrently owed by the other insurers and should be shared by them pro rata in proportion to their respective coverage of the risk.” (Ibid.) In addition, California Capital may not now complain about the costs of defense or indemnity. 2020(Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 40- 41; Valley Crest, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 487-488.) In Interstate Fire, the court reasoned that allegations of negligence in the underlying lawsuit, whether ultimately proven or not, are nevertheless “relevant to the [parties’] respective equities.” (Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 39 .) The court concluded the allegations in the underlying lawsuit that the subcontractor had been negligent “tip[ped]” the equities in the insurer’s favor because those allegations were what “precipitated the lawsuit . . . [and] made it necess | 2 | 2020–2023 |
Pardee Construction Co. v. Insurance of the West
green
2 sentences2017In such cases, the several insurers on the risk may be required to share the costs of defense and indemnification." ( Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation, supra, ¶ 7:1408.7, p. 7E-5; italics added.) It is in this context that Pardee, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pages 1355 to 1359, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 addresses whether "completed operations" coverage under the subcontractor's policy, for its negligence, extends to the vicarious liability of an additional insured developer. 2017In such cases, the several insurers on the risk may be required to share the costs of defense and indemnification." (Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation, supra, ¶ 7:1408.7, p. 7E-5; italics added.) It is in this context that Pardee, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pages 1355 to 1359 addresses whether "completed operations" coverage under the subcontractor's policy, for its 22 negligence, extends to the vicarious liability of an additional insured developer. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance
green
2 sentences2015Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1072 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 445 , 811 P.2d 737 ], the court evaluated whether an insured’s action against its insurer, seeking to recover the costs of defense the insured incurred when the insurer breached its obligation to provide a defense to the underlying action, would be time-barred if the insured waited until the underlying action was terminated — and beyond two years after the insurer initial refusal to defend — before commencing its suit against the insurer. 2015Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1072 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 445 , 811 P.2d 737 ], the court evaluated whether an insured’s action against its insurer, seeking to recover the costs of defense the insured incurred when the insurer breached its obligation to provide a defense to the underlying action, would be time-barred if the insured waited until the underlying action was terminated — and beyond two years after the insurer initial refusal to defend — before commencing its suit against the insurer. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2013(Regan Roofing Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 , disapproved on another point in Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 565 .) An indemnity against claims includes the costs of defense against such claims incurred in good faith. 2006Thus, each of the "approximately 24 subcontractors" had "performed work on a different phase or area of construction" and in the same breath the Regan Roofing court added, "their duty to defend is apparently limited by the clause to the issues concerning the type of work they did," thus the developer was seeking "to have a series of related defenses provided." ( Regan Roofing, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 437 , 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 413 .) And, while such a "fragmented duty to defend" would pose "no particular problems with regard to any ultimate division of the costs of defense, as part of the indemn | 2 | 2006–2013 |
Olympic Insurance v. Employers Surplus Lines Insurance
green
2 sentences1999Co., supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 , 178 Cal. Rptr. 908 .) Because these types of provisions are disfavored, courts have developed a method of overriding them"When two or more applicable policies contain such clauses, both liability and the costs of defense should ordinarily be prorated according to the amount of coverage afforded." ( Argonaut Ins. 1999Co., supra, 126 Cal.App.3d 593, 599 .) Because these types of provisions are disfavored, courts have developed a method of overriding them—“When two or more applicable policies contain such clauses, both liability and the costs of defense should ordinarily be prorated according to the amount of coverage afforded.” (Argonaut Ins. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1997In Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, 279-280 , the insurer who refused to defend argued that although it was required to reimburse the insured’s costs of defense, it should not be required to pay the ensuing judgment, because apparently that judgment did not show whether it was based on a theory within coverage or not within coverage. 1970As was said in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, 271-272 , "[T]he nature of the obligation to defend is itself necessarily uncertain. | 2 | 1970–1997 |
Buchalter v. Levin
green
2 sentences1969Subdivision 3 of section 2778, Civil Code, provides that “An indemnity against claims, or demands, or liability, expressly, or in other equivalent terms, embraces the costs of defense against such claims, demands, or liability incurred in good faith, and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion.” Under subdivision 4 of the *897 same section, ‘ ‘ The person indemnifying is bound, on request of the person indemnified, to defend actions . . . but the person indemnified has the right to conduct such defenses, if he chooses to do so.” Rather recently, in Buchalter v. Levin, 252 Cal.App.2d 367 [ 6 1969Subdivision 3 of section 2778, Civil Code, provides that “An indemnity against claims, or demands, or liability, expressly, or in other equivalent terms, embraces the costs of defense against such claims, demands, or liability incurred in good faith, and in the exercise of a reasonable discretion.” Under subdivision 4 of the *897 same section, ‘ ‘ The person indemnifying is bound, on request of the person indemnified, to defend actions . . . but the person indemnified has the right to conduct such defenses, if he chooses to do so.” Rather recently, in Buchalter v. Levin, 252 Cal.App.2d 367 [ 6 | 2 | 1969–1970 |
Allstate Insurance v. Loo
green
1 sentence2025Co. v. Loo (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1797 .) Respondent was entitled to recover as defense costs the attorney fees it incurred in the litigation against Mid- Century. “[A] promise of indemnity against claims, demands, or liability ‘embraces the costs of defense against such claims, demands, or liability’ insofar as such costs are incurred reasonably and in good faith. ([Civil Code,] § 2778, subd. 3, italics added.)” (Crawford, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 553 ; see also Myers Building Industries, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 971, fn. 20 [attorney fees incurred in a third party claim “are recoverab | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC
green
1 sentence2025(Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 578 .) The fee award here, however, does not violate this rule. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Doolittle v. Exchange Bank
green
1 sentence2024If the rule were otherwise and the beneficiaries named in the amendment were unable to assume the costs of defense, there would be no means to defend implementation of the trustor’s intentions in amending the trust even if the challenger’s attack on the amendment were entirely unfounded.” (Doolittle, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 543 .) We are not persuaded by Campbell’s contention that Koski’s status as a beneficiary under the trust necessitates that she, as the trustee, remain neutral in relation to his petition challenging the validity of the Second Amendment. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People ex rel. Harris v. Shine
green
1 sentence2024Harris v. Shine (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 524, 539 .) We need not and do not decide whether, as the parties dispute, the Trust is silent on interim fees. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Valentino v. Elliott Sav-On Gas, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Code, § 2778, subds. 3 & 4.) “[Civil Code] section 2778, unchanged since 1872, sets forth general rules for the interpretation of indemnity contracts, ‘unless a contrary intention appears.’ If not forbidden by other, more specific, statutes, the obligations set forth in [Civil Code] section 2778 thus are deemed included in every indemnity agreement unless the parties indicate otherwise.” (Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 553 .) “[T]he statute first provides that a promise of indemnity against claims, demands, or liability ‘embraces the costs of defense against such | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Utah v. Strieff
green
1 sentence2021A. The Attenuation Doctrine The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) Although this right was originally enforced through other means, in the 20th century courts increasingly applied the exclusionary rule “to exclude unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal trial.” (Strieff, supra, 136 S.Ct at p. 2061 .) The exclusionary rule applies to “both the ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure’ and . . . ‘evidence later | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Dueñas green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Emerald Bay Community Ass'n v. Golden Eagle Insurance green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Dream Theater, Inc. v. Dream Theater green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Zalkind v. Ceradyne, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV TRANSP. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Brandt v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Truck Insurance Exchange v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Pacific Indem. Co. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Abatti v. Eldridge green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Diamond Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. National American Insurance green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Jacobus v. Krambo Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Heppler v. J.M. Peters Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| New Plumbing Contractors v. Edwards, Sooy & Byron green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Novak v. Low, Ball & Lynch green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Underground Construction Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Whittier Union High School District v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Romadka v. Hoge green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| California Teachers Assn. v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Buss v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Hillman v. Leland E. Burns, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| County of San Joaquin v. Stockton Swim Club green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Northern Insurance Company of New York, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.