costs defense in New Jersey

2007This is not to free the carrier from its covenant to defend, but rather *757 to translate its obligation into one to reimburse the insured if it is later adjudged that the claim was one within the policy covenant to pay. [ Id. at 388-90 , 267 A. 2d 7 (citations omitted).] As noted in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 98 N.J. 18 , 24 n. 3, 483 A. 2d 402 (1984), if there is a factual question as to whether a policy provides coverage which cannot be decided before trial, "[t]he practical effect of Burd is that an insured must initially assume the costs of d

2007This is not to free the carrier from its covenant to defend, but rather *757 to translate its obligation into one to reimburse the insured if it is later adjudged that the claim was one within the policy covenant to pay. [ Id. at 388-90 , 267 A. 2d 7 (citations omitted).] As noted in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 98 N.J. 18 , 24 n. 3, 483 A. 2d 402 (1984), if there is a factual question as to whether a policy provides coverage which cannot be decided before trial, "[t]he practical effect of Burd is that an insured must initially assume the costs of d

2021The Court's opinion in Azurak, 175 N.J. at 111-12 , reinforced the principles set forth in Mantilla, and eliminated all doubt, holding a "broad form" indemnification clause, which attempted "to include an indemnitee's negligence within an indemnification agreement[,] without explicitly referring to th e indemnitee's 'negligence' or 'fault,' . . . is no longer good law." Citing this court's opinion, the Court affirmed per curiam, adopting the rationale expressed by Judge Carchman, which stated: Significantly, the Court's analysis in Mantilla, by omission, eschewed the consideration of a "broad"

2020It is well-established that "a contract will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligence unless such an intention is expressed in unequivocal terms." Ramos, 103 N.J. at 191 ; see also Mantilla, 167 N.J. at 275 ("absent explicit contractual language to the contrary, an indemnitee who has defended against allegations of its own independent fault may not recover the costs of its defense from an indemnitor.").

2012In Marshall v. Raritan Valley Disposal, 398 N.J.Super. 168, 177 , 940 A. 2d 315 (App.Div.2008), we held that an insurer that has provided coverage to its insured may pursue an action against a nonparticipating co-primary insurer for contribution for the costs of defense and indemnification of their common insured.

2012In Marshall v. Raritan Valley Disposal, 398 N.J.Super. 168, 177 , 940 A. 2d 315 (App.Div.2008), we held that an insurer that has provided coverage to its insured may pursue an action against a nonparticipating co-primary insurer for contribution for the costs of defense and indemnification of their common insured.

2007This is not to free the carrier from its covenant to defend, but rather *757 to translate its obligation into one to reimburse the insured if it is later adjudged that the claim was one within the policy covenant to pay. [ Id. at 388-90 , 267 A. 2d 7 (citations omitted).] As noted in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 98 N.J. 18 , 24 n. 3, 483 A. 2d 402 (1984), if there is a factual question as to whether a policy provides coverage which cannot be decided before trial, "[t]he practical effect of Burd is that an insured must initially assume the costs of d

2007This is not to free the carrier from its covenant to defend, but rather *757 to translate its obligation into one to reimburse the insured if it is later adjudged that the claim was one within the policy covenant to pay. [ Id. at 388-90 , 267 A. 2d 7 (citations omitted).] As noted in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 98 N.J. 18 , 24 n. 3, 483 A. 2d 402 (1984), if there is a factual question as to whether a policy provides coverage which cannot be decided before trial, "[t]he practical effect of Burd is that an insured must initially assume the costs of d

2007Id. at 344-45, 629 A. 2d 895 .

2005Exclusions This insurance does not cover: . . . . 5. [B]odily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you; . . . . 7. [D]amages arising out of coercion, criticism, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination against or termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions[.] [5] We also recognize that Charles Beseler and Delta Plastics are arguably close cases because traditional workers' compensation coverage would have been available for the employee for their bodily injuries. [6] While not cited in C

2001Co., 128 N.J. 188, 214-15 , 607 A. 2d 1266 (1992), it was established that "when the insurer has wrongfully refused to defend an action and is then required to reimburse the insured for its defense costs, its duty to reimburse is limited to allegations covered under the policy, provided that the defense costs can be apportioned between covered and non-covered claims." If the defense costs cannot be apportioned, the insurer bears the costs of defense in their entirety.

2001Co., 128 N.J. 188, 214-15 , 607 A. 2d 1266 (1992), it was established that "when the insurer has wrongfully refused to defend an action and is then required to reimburse the insured for its defense costs, its duty to reimburse is limited to allegations covered under the policy, provided that the defense costs can be apportioned between covered and non-covered claims." If the defense costs cannot be apportioned, the insurer bears the costs of defense in their entirety.

2001“The County also appealed] from the denial of its motion for summary judgment on its third-party complaint against the State for the costs of defense and indemnification____” Id. at 35 , 740 A.2d 648 .

2001“The County also appealed] from the denial of its motion for summary judgment on its third-party complaint against the State for the costs of defense and indemnification____” Id. at 35 , 740 A.2d 648 .

1999Co., 200 N.J.Super. 94, 100 , 490 A. 2d 362 (App.Div.1985)(rule generally requires that prevailing party receive costs.) On its motion for reconsideration, the Board sought relaxation of the costs rule, citing its limited resources as a governmental entity and the novelty of the legal issues involved.

1999Co., 200 N.J.Super. 94, 100 , 490 A. 2d 362 (App.Div.1985)(rule generally requires that prevailing party receive costs.) On its motion for reconsideration, the Board sought relaxation of the costs rule, citing its limited resources as a governmental entity and the novelty of the legal issues involved.

1994Co., supra, have recently been reinforced by the Supreme Court in Morton Intern. v. General Acc. Ins., 134 N.J. 1, 95 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 (1994).

1994Co., supra, have recently been reinforced by the Supreme Court in Morton Intern. v. General Acc. Ins., 134 N.J. 1, 95 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 (1994).

1994Co., supra, have recently been reinforced by the Supreme Court in Morton Intern. v. General Acc. Ins., 134 N.J. 1, 95 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 (1994).

1994Co., supra, have recently been reinforced by the Supreme Court in Morton Intern. v. General Acc. Ins., 134 N.J. 1, 95 , 629 A. 2d 831 (1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2764 , 129 L.Ed. 2d 878 (1994).

1941L. 34, 36; 74 Atl.