tcpa motion in Texas

2026Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019). • The words “clear and specific” are defined to mean, for the former, “‘unambiguous,’ ‘sure,’ or ‘free from doubt’” and, for the latter, “‘explicit’ or ‘relating to a particular named thing.’” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). • “The [party responding to a TCPA motion to dismiss] may rely on circumstantial evidence—indirect evidence that creates an inference to establish a central fact—unless ‘the connection between the fact and the inference is too weak to be of help in deciding the case.’” Dall.

2025In a defamation case that implicates the TCPA, like this one, “pleadings and evidence that establishes the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff should be sufficient to resist a TCPA motion to dismiss.” Id.

2024TCPA framework The TCPA “protects citizens who [associate,] petition or speak on matters of public concern from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them.” Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015)); see also Tex. Civ.

2021A. TCPA Applies Elaine contends that the TCPA applies to Preston’s claims seeking Elaine’s disinheritance based on the in terrorem clause because the claims implicate Elaine’s right to petition. 8 Just as the TCPA applies to a claim related to the making of a statement in open court, see Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tex. 2018), it also applies if the claim relates to the defendant’s affidavit testimony submitted to a court.

2023Accordingly, the TCPA does not require courts to “cabin[] our TCPA analysis to the precise legal arguments or record references a moving party made to the trial court regarding the TCPA’s applicability.” Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2018). 13 From the face of de Rochemont’s pleadings, we conclude that his counterclaim of tortious interference is based on and in response to the Firm’s exercise of its right to petition. 20 Throughout the pleadings, de Rochemont states that the Firm’s original petition “should readily be considered among [Appellees’] numerous

2023See Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890 , 896–97 (Tex. 2018) (concluding argument was preserved for appellate review where party addressed concerns at TCPA hearing); see also Greene v. Farmers Ins.

2026Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019). • The words “clear and specific” are defined to mean, for the former, “‘unambiguous,’ ‘sure,’ or ‘free from doubt’” and, for the latter, “‘explicit’ or ‘relating to a particular named thing.’” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). • “The [party responding to a TCPA motion to dismiss] may rely on circumstantial evidence—indirect evidence that creates an inference to establish a central fact—unless ‘the connection between the fact and the inference is too weak to be of help in deciding the case.’” Dall.

2025Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019). -8- 04-24-00360-CV In our review under the proper standard, we are mindful that “a TCPA motion to dismiss is not a trial on the merits and is not intended to replace either a trial or the summary judgment proceeding established by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” Stallion Oilfield Servs.

2025However, “[w]hen it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is covered by the Act, the defendant need show no more.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017). 4 Further references to provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code will be by reference to “section __” or “§ __.” 4 We review a trial court’s determination of a TCPA motion to dismiss de novo.

2025LLC v. Fuentes, No. 08-23-00017-CV, 2023 WL 5808849 , at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding amendment of plaintiff’s claims did not moot pending TCPA motion); Rauhauser v. McGibney, 508 S.W.3d 377 , 381–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff’s nonsuit did not moot pending TCPA motion), disapproved of on other grounds by Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467 .

2024“When a legal action is in response to both expression protected by the TCPA and other unprotected activity, the legal action is subject to dismissal only to the extent that it is in response to the protected conduct, as opposed to being subject to dismissal in its entirety.” Walker v. Hartman, 516 S.W.3d 71, 81 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet. denied). “[A] TCPA motion to dismiss is not a trial on the merits and is not intended to replace either a trial or the summary judgment proceeding established by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” Stallion Oilfield Servs.

2023In 2016, which is when Judge Walker filed his TCPA motion to dismiss, the TCPA 17Walker I, 516 S.W.3d at 84 . 13 statute limited the trial court to deciding such motions to the pleadings and affidavits filed in support of or in opposition to the TCPA motion.18 The version of the TCPA that applies to the TCPA motion Judge Walker filed in 2016 (and our review of the trial court’s ruling on it) provided: In determining whether the legal action should be dismissed under this chapter, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liabil

2026See Long Canyon Phase II & III Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cashion, 517 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (stating that “[w]e review de novo whether each party carried its assigned burden”); see also Dolcefino v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 26 2017, no pet.) (“We review de novo the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss.”).

2023See Long Canyon Phase II & III Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cashion, 517 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (stating that “[w]e review de novo whether each party carried its assigned burden”); see also Dolcefino v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“We review de novo the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss.”).

2022Cf., e.g., LMP Austin English Aire, LLC through Lafayette English Partner, LLC v. Lafayette English Apartments, LP, No. 03-21-00219-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2022 WL 36 4594495, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 30, 2022, no pet. h.) (reviewing pleadings and affidavit when analyzing partial grant of TCPA motion that had occurred before final summary judgment); Beving v. Beadles, 563 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (“In our review, we consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based.”).

2021We have also determined that “when the pleadings, evidence, and parties’ arguments are based on a mix of protected and unprotected activity, and they do not distinguish between the two, a defendant–movant’s motion to dismiss under the TCPA should be denied.” White Nile Software, 2020 WL 5104966 , at *5 (rejecting right-of-petition and association-based TCPA claim in case involving legal malpractice and other causes of action); accord Weller v. MonoCoque Diversified Interests, LLC, No. 03-19-00127-CV, 2020 WL 3582885 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin July 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Beving v. Beadles

2022Patriot and Friedman contend that Mid-Main’s Eighth Amended Counterclaim triggered a new sixty-day deadline, and thus their TCPA motion to dismiss was timely, for two reasons: first, any pleading amendment resets the TCPA’s sixty-day deadline; and second, Mid-Main’s Eighth Amended Counterclaim asserted new essential factual allegations. 8 The supreme court has rejected appellants’ first argument,4 as have all Texas intermediate appellate courts considering the question, including ours.5 “Construing the [TCPA] to permit a defendant to file a dismissal motion after the claimant files a new plead

2021A supplemental petition that asserts new factual allegations, however, may reset the 60-day deadline for filing a TCPA motion to dismiss “as to the newly added substance.” Jordan v. Hall, 510 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)).

2025Partners, 529 S.W.3d at 434, 439 (holding that plaintiff need not show actual damages to survive TCPA motion to dismiss because article’s gist could be construed as accusing her of committing crime, which is defamatory per se); see also Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878 , 886 n.3 (Tex. 2017) (noting that nominal damages may be presumed without evidence of 14 actual injury).

2024See D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429 , 441–42 (Tex. 2017) (addressing, in interest of judicial economy, challenge to trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees as to partial grant of TCPA motion in interlocutory appeal from partial denial of TCPA motion); SSCP Mgmt.

2020PRAC. & REM. § 27.008(a) (authorizing a party to appeal when the party’s TCPA motion to dismiss “is considered to have been denied by operation of law”); Avila v Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 , 655–56 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (holding that an appellate court had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from denial—by operation of law—of a TCPA motion to dismiss).

2020See Clinton v. Araguz, No. 13-18-00526-CV, 2019 WL 5793127 , at *4–5 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 7, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that TCPA motion was not denied by operation of law thirty days after an August 9, 2018 hearing when the record established that the trial court intended to postpone the hearing); cf. In re Neely, No. 14-19-01018-CV, 2020 WL 1434569 , at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 24, 2020, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that TCPA motion was overruled by operation of law thirty days after a July 19, 2019 hearing when, at that

2020Because we must analyze the substance of a plaintiff’s claims irrespective of the labels used in the pleadings, see Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 302 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied); Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 383 , we construe Quantum Materials’s petition as pleading breach of fiduciary duty and DTPA violations. 3 In its briefing and argument to this Court, Quantum Materials complains vaguely of “negotiations” that K&L Gates might have undertaken on its behalf with the very Lenders that ultimately intervened in the underlying suit, but Quantum Materials did not include tha

2020Because we must analyze the substance of a plaintiff’s claims irrespective of the labels used in the pleadings, see Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 302 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied); Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 383 , we construe Quantum Materials’s petition as pleading breach of fiduciary duty and DTPA violations. 3 In its briefing and argument to this Court, Quantum Materials complains vaguely of “negotiations” that K&L Gates might have undertaken on its behalf with the very Lenders that ultimately intervened in the underlying suit, but Quantum Materials did not include tha

2023We have already determined in the executives’ favor as to their jurisdictional defense of the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute and Panda’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and nothing in Section 27.005(b)’s text precludes the assertion of jurisdictional defenses to support a TCPA motion.4 See id.; de la Torre, 613 S.W.3d at 314–15; Holcomb v. Waller County, 546 S.W.3d 833, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (determining that, because county lacked standing to bring suit against defendant, it lacked cognizable claim for which it could establish prima

2020Ctr., Inc. v. Barette, No. 01-19-00129-CV, 2019 WL 5792194 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“However, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the TCPA motion to dismiss a claim over which it lacked jurisdiction, we conclude that the order denying the motion to dismiss was void.”); Shankles v. Gordon, No. 05-16-00863-CV, 2018 WL 4100030 , at *14 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that “section 27.009(a)(1) does not provide for an award of attorneys’ fees . . . when Shankles’s claims . . . are dismissed for la

2024“The party seeking dismissal must demonstrate that the legal action is ‘factually predicated’ on conduct that falls within the scope of the right of free speech, right of association, or right to petition as statutorily defined.” Jetall Cos., 2022 WL 17684340 , at *15 (quoting Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418 , 428–29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied)); see Porter-Garcia v. Travis Law 15 Firm, P.C., 564 S.W.3d 75, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).4 We review de novo the applicability of the TCPA and the trial court’s ruling denying a TCPA motion to dismis

2022See Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (stating that we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss).

2026See Long Canyon Phase II & III Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cashion, 517 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (stating that “[w]e review de novo whether each party carried its assigned burden”); see also Dolcefino v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 26 2017, no pet.) (“We review de novo the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss.”).

2023See Long Canyon Phase II & III Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cashion, 517 S.W.3d 212, 217 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (stating that “[w]e review de novo whether each party carried its assigned burden”); see also Dolcefino v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“We review de novo the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss.”).

2023Compare Batra v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 707 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied) (“In addition to consideration of the pleadings and affidavits, a trial court may, but is not required to, hear live testimony and receive the submission of documentary evidence.”), with Quintanilla 19 v. West, 534 S.W.3d 34, 42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 573 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that “[t]he trial court does not hear live testimony” when considering a TCPA motion to dismiss); see also Heavenly Homes of S. Tex., LLC v. Infinity Custom Constr., LLC, No. 13-21

2023Compare Batra v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 707 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied) (“In addition to consideration of the pleadings and affidavits, a trial court may, but is not required to, hear live testimony and receive the submission of documentary evidence.”), with Quintanilla v. West, 534 S.W.3d 34, 42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 573 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that “[t]he trial court does not hear live testimony” when considering a TCPA motion to dismiss), ; see also Heavenly Homes of S. Tex., LLC v. Infinity Custom Constr., LLC, No. 13-21-

2023See Tervita, LLC, v. Sutterfied, 482 S.W.3d 280, 287 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (concluding that because appellant failed to meet its burden of showing TCPA applied to appellees’ claim, appellate court need not address other prongs of TCPA analysis).

2022In Tervita, we considered a trial court’s denial of an employer’s TCPA motion in response to various claims brought by an injured employee, including claims for conspiracy and labor code violations for allegedly false statements made about the employee during testimony in the employee’s worker’s compensation benefit –4– proceedings.3 Tervita, LLC v. Sutterfield, 482 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).

2025See Schlumberger Ltd. v. Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881, 890 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction appeal from partial grant of TCPA motion to dismiss).

2024Although the Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes the immediate appeal of an order denying a TCPA motion to 9 dismiss, it does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from “all other ancillary rulings contained within the same written ‘interlocutory order.’” Schlumberger Ltd. v. Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

2021See, e.g., Sullivan v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 551 S.W.3d 848 , 856 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied) (“Because we hold that the TCPA does not apply, we do not reach the second 10 step in the TCPA analysis of whether [the nonmovant] met its burden to prove a prima facie case.”); see also TEX.

2021See, e.g., Sullivan v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 551 S.W.3d 848 , 856 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied) (“Because we hold that the TCPA does not apply, we do not reach the second 10 step in the TCPA analysis of whether [the nonmovant] met its burden to prove a prima facie case.”); see also TEX.

2019S & S, 564 S.W.3d at 847 ; Herrera v. Stahl, 441 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (appellate court reviews each step of the TCPA analysis de novo).

2019S & S, 564 S.W.3d at 847 ; Herrera v. Stahl, 441 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (appellate court reviews each step of the TCPA analysis de novo).

2021A supplemental petition that asserts new factual allegations, however, may reset the 60-day deadline for filing a TCPA motion to dismiss “as to the newly added substance.” Jordan v. Hall, 510 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)).

2020See Hicks v. Group & Pension Adm’rs, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 518, 527 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.) (TCPA motion was timely as to new claims when plaintiff in amended petition added “new claims . . . for conspiracy and joint enterprise and coercion of a public servant”); James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“[T]he amended petition . . . included substantively different factual allegations, and all of the causes of action alleged in the amended petition were new causes of action.”). 49 Petrobras’s pursuit of arbitration should be barred by

2024See Trane US, Inc. v. Sublett, 501 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2016, no pet.) (dismissing appeal from order granting TCPA motion to dismiss where trial court had not yet ruled on request for mandatory attorney’s fees); see also Fleming & Assocs., L.L.P. v. Kirklin, 479 S.W.3d 458, 460 (Tex. App.— 2 Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“[T]he courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss under chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”).

2024See Trane US, Inc. v. Sublett, 501 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, no pet.) (per curiam); Britton v. Azzouz, No. 02-24-00206- CV, 2024 WL 3365246 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appeal of an order granting a TCPA motion to dismiss is only properly taken from a final judgment that disposes of all claims and parties).

2023Compare Batra v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 707 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied) (“In addition to consideration of the pleadings and affidavits, a trial court may, but is not required to, hear live testimony and receive the submission of documentary evidence.”), with Quintanilla 19 v. West, 534 S.W.3d 34, 42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 573 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that “[t]he trial court does not hear live testimony” when considering a TCPA motion to dismiss); see also Heavenly Homes of S. Tex., LLC v. Infinity Custom Constr., LLC, No. 13-21

2023Compare Batra v. Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 707 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. denied) (“In addition to consideration of the pleadings and affidavits, a trial court may, but is not required to, hear live testimony and receive the submission of documentary evidence.”), with Quintanilla v. West, 534 S.W.3d 34, 42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017), rev’d on other grounds, 573 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that “[t]he trial court does not hear live testimony” when considering a TCPA motion to dismiss), ; see also Heavenly Homes of S. Tex., LLC v. Infinity Custom Constr., LLC, No. 13-21-

2023See Paulsen v. Yarrell, 455 S.W.3d 192 , 195–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (court lacked interlocutory jurisdiction over denial of TCPA attorneys’ fees because even though jurisdiction would otherwise exist for denial of related TCPA motion, denial of fees “was a distinct interlocutory ruling” on “a request . . . authorized by a separate provision” of the TCPA), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of May 24, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1042, § 4, 7 sec. 51.014(a)(12), 2013 Tex. Gen.

2022Patriot and Friedman contend that Mid-Main’s Eighth Amended Counterclaim triggered a new sixty-day deadline, and thus their TCPA motion to dismiss was timely, for two reasons: first, any pleading amendment resets the TCPA’s sixty-day deadline; and second, Mid-Main’s Eighth Amended Counterclaim asserted new essential factual allegations. 8 The supreme court has rejected appellants’ first argument,4 as have all Texas intermediate appellate courts considering the question, including ours.5 “Construing the [TCPA] to permit a defendant to file a dismissal motion after the claimant files a new plead

2025LLC v. Fuentes, No. 08-23-00017-CV, 2023 WL 5808849 , at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding amendment of plaintiff’s claims did not moot pending TCPA motion); Rauhauser v. McGibney, 508 S.W.3d 377 , 381–83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (holding plaintiff’s nonsuit did not moot pending TCPA motion), disapproved of on other grounds by Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467 .

2022See Rauhauser v. McGibney, 508 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.), overruled on other grounds by Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (“The law is well-settled that a defendant’s motion to dismiss that may afford more relief than nonsuit affords constitutes a claim for affirmative relief . . . .”). 21 necessary to establish the court’s jurisdiction to decide her TCPA motion.

2025In response to the defendant’s TCPA motion to dismiss, the plaintiff in Paulsen filed his own TCPA motion. 537 S.W.3d at 230 .

2024See Paulsen v. Yarrell, 537 S.W.3d 224 , 233–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (holding TCPA dismissal motion is not itself TCPA “legal action” subject to cross TCPA motion).

2023On this record, it is not reasonable to infer that Restore and Welch’s allegedly defamatory statements caused any other employer to discontinue her employment or to not hire her. 13 See, e.g., In re 13 On motion for rehearing, See urges that her evidence of damages here is more like the evidence of damages that the Texas Supreme Court found sufficient to survive a TCPA motion in USA Lending Group, Inc. v. Winstead PC, 669 S.W.3d 195 , 202 (Tex. 2023), and in S & S Emergency Training Solutions, Inc. v. Elliott, 564 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Tex. 2018), than the evidence it found insufficient in In re Li

2021Nealon also filed a grievance against Weber with the State Bar of Texas, but the State Bar dismissed her complaint. -2- 04-21-00064-CV “We review a trial court’s denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss de novo.” Segundo Navarro Drilling, Ltd. v. San Roman Ranch Mineral Partners, Ltd., 612 S.W.3d 489 , 492 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied); accord S & S Emergency Training Sols., Inc. v. Elliott, 564 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tex. 2018) (“Appellate review of issues regarding interpretation of the TCPA is de novo.”).

2025See Fleming & Assocs. v. Kirklin, 479 S.W.3d 458 , 460–61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (dismissing interlocutory appeal of order granting TCPA motion to dismiss because there was no final judgment); WIKD, LLC v. Gomez, No. 05-24-00710-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5600 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 6, 2024, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing interlocutory appeal of order granting TCPA motion to dismiss where the issue of attorney’s fees remained pending); Garcia v. Semler, No. 05-20-00761-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2788 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 13, 3 2021, no pet.) (mem.

2024See Trane US, Inc. v. Sublett, 501 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2016, no pet.) (dismissing appeal from order granting TCPA motion to dismiss where trial court had not yet ruled on request for mandatory attorney’s fees); see also Fleming & Assocs., L.L.P. v. Kirklin, 479 S.W.3d 458, 460 (Tex. App.— 2 Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“[T]he courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss under chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”).