finding of harmless error in Maryland

2013Even the courts that have looked to the length of deliberations, however, have noted that a lengthy deliberation may result, “not because of indecision, but [from] ‘a diligent and conscientious attempt to evaluate the evidence, and to verify the testimony of different witnesses and to come to a careful and reasoned decision.” Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 126 -27 (quoting Clark v. Moran, 942 F.2d 24, 32-33 (1st Cir.1991)).

2011Even the courts that have looked to the length of deliberations, however, have noted that a lengthy deliberation may result, “not because of indecision, but [from] ‘a diligent and conscientious attempt to evaluate the evidence, and to verify the testimony of different witnesses and to come to a careful and reasoned decision.’ ” Varoudakis, 233 F.3d at 126 -27 (quoting Clark v. Moran, 942 F.2d 24, 32-33 (1st Cir.1991)).

2013Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 , 87 S.Ct. 468, 470 , 17 L.Ed.2d 420, 423 (1966) (noting that “the jury deliberated for 26 hours, indicating a difference among them as to the guilt of petitioner”); United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir.2011) (“Our doubt that the errors were harmless is heightened by the length of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir.2002) (citing fact that “the jury deliberated for some seventeen to eighteen hours” as weighing in favor of finding that error was not harmless); United States v. Velarde-

2013Compare United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 , 1311 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.) (courts should “hesitate to connect the length of deliberations with the strength of the government’s case”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1056 , 121 S.Ct. 666 , 148 L.Ed.2d 568 (2000), with United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (“Longer jury deliberations ‘weigh against a finding of harmless error’ because lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult case.”); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir.2000) (same).

2013Compare United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 , 1311 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.) (courts should “hesitate to connect the length of deliberations with the strength of the government’s case”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1056 , 121 S.Ct. 666 , 148 L.Ed.2d 568 (2000), with United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (“Longer jury deliberations ‘weigh against a finding of harmless error’ because lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult case.”); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir.2000) (same).

2013Compare United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 , 1311 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.) (courts should “hesitate to connect the length of deliberations with the strength of the government’s case”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1056 , 121 S.Ct. 666 , 148 L.Ed.2d 568 (2000), with United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (“Longer jury deliberations ‘weigh against a finding of harmless error’ because lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult case.”); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir.2000) (same).

2013Compare United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 , 1311 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.) (courts should “hesitate to connect the length of deliberations with the strength of the government’s case”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1056 , 121 S.Ct. 666 , 148 L.Ed.2d 568 (2000), with United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (“Longer jury deliberations ‘weigh against a finding of harmless error’ because lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult case.”); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir.2000) (same).

2011Compare United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 , 1311 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.) (courts should “hesitate to connect the length of deliberations with the strength of the government’s case”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1056 , 121 S.Ct. 666 , 148 L.Ed.2d 568 (2000), with United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (“Longer jury deliberations “weigh against a finding of harmless error’ because lengthy deliberations suggest a *513 difficult case.”); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir.2000) (same).

2013This is so because the court in Varoudakis found expressly that the length of jury deliberations and a jury note weighed against a finding of harmlessness. 233 F.3d at 126 (“[T]he three-day length of the jury deliberations, and the jury’s note to the trial court that it was ‘at an impasse’ at the end of the second half-day, weigh against a finding of harmless error.”).

2013Compare United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305 , 1311 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.) (courts should “hesitate to connect the length of deliberations with the strength of the government’s case”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1056 , 121 S.Ct. 666 , 148 L.Ed.2d 568 (2000), with United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1036 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (“Longer jury deliberations ‘weigh against a finding of harmless error’ because lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult case.”); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir.2000) (same).

1977However, in Burgett , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error, stating ( 389 U. S. at 115 ): “The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 .” *260 And in Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S. at 483 n. 12, involving the use of prior invalid convi

1976See also Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115 (1967) in which the Court described the admission into evidence of a prior conviction obtained pursuant to the denial of the Gideon right to representation as “inherently prejudicial.” See as well Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473, 483 (1972) where “the use of convictions constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright to impeach [the] defendant’s credibility deprive[d] him of due process of law,” and in the circumstances of the case there was “little room for a finding of harmless error. . . .” . 28 U.S.C. § 2111 provided that “[o]n the hearing of

1977However, in Burgett , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of such evidence constituted prejudicial error, stating ( 389 U. S. at 115 ): “The admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright is inherently prejudicial and we are unable to say that the instructions to disregard it made the constitutional error ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 .” *260 And in Loper v. Beto, supra, 405 U. S. at 483 n. 12, involving the use of prior invalid convi

1976See also Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115 (1967) in which the Court described the admission into evidence of a prior conviction obtained pursuant to the denial of the Gideon right to representation as “inherently prejudicial.” See as well Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473, 483 (1972) where “the use of convictions constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright to impeach [the] defendant’s credibility deprive[d] him of due process of law,” and in the circumstances of the case there was “little room for a finding of harmless error. . . .” . 28 U.S.C. § 2111 provided that “[o]n the hearing of

2015See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (observing that among the factors to be considered in a harmless error analysis is “the overall strength of the prosecution’s case”). *485 McClurkin was well known to the victim before the shooting and had participated in at least one incident, together with Jackson, in which the two men had tried to start a fight with the victim.

2015See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (observing that among the factors to be considered in a harmless error analysis is “the overall strength of the prosecution’s case”). *485 McClurkin was well known to the victim before the shooting and had participated in at least one incident, together with Jackson, in which the two men had tried to start a fight with the victim.

2013Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 , 87 S.Ct. 468, 470 , 17 L.Ed.2d 420, 423 (1966) (noting that “the jury deliberated for 26 hours, indicating a difference among them as to the guilt of petitioner”); United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir.2011) (“Our doubt that the errors were harmless is heightened by the length of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir.2002) (citing fact that “the jury deliberated for some seventeen to eighteen hours” as weighing in favor of finding that error was not harmless); United States v. Velarde-

2013Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 , 87 S.Ct. 468, 470 , 17 L.Ed.2d 420, 423 (1966) (noting that “the jury deliberated for 26 hours, indicating a difference among them as to the guilt of petitioner”); United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir.2011) (“Our doubt that the errors were harmless is heightened by the length of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir.2002) (citing fact that “the jury deliberated for some seventeen to eighteen hours” as weighing in favor of finding that error was not harmless); United States v. Velarde-

2013Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 , 87 S.Ct. 468, 470 , 17 L.Ed.2d 420, 423 (1966) (noting that “the jury deliberated for 26 hours, indicating a difference among them as to the guilt of petitioner”); United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir.2011) (“Our doubt that the errors were harmless is heightened by the length of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir.2002) (citing fact that “the jury deliberated for some seventeen to eighteen hours” as weighing in favor of finding that error was not harmless); United States v. Velarde-

2013Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 , 87 S.Ct. 468, 470 , 17 L.Ed.2d 420, 423 (1966) (noting that “the jury deliberated for 26 hours, indicating a difference among them as to the guilt of petitioner”); United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir.2011) (“Our doubt that the errors were harmless is heightened by the length of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir.2002) (citing fact that “the jury deliberated for some seventeen to eighteen hours” as weighing in favor of finding that error was not harmless); United States v. Velarde-

2013Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 , 87 S.Ct. 468, 470 , 17 L.Ed.2d 420, 423 (1966) (noting that “the jury deliberated for 26 hours, indicating a difference among them as to the guilt of petitioner”); United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir.2011) (“Our doubt that the errors were harmless is heightened by the length of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir.2002) (citing fact that “the jury deliberated for some seventeen to eighteen hours” as weighing in favor of finding that error was not harmless); United States v. Velarde-

2010See Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1151 (where “the case ... was not particularly strong and depended in large measure on witness credibility,” improper vouching by the prosecutor “presents] a strong possibility of prejudicial effect”).