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22 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2026(Ibid. [erroneous overruling of objection “shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial”]; Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 795 [“statute precludes a finding of harmless error”].) 20 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. 2026(Ibid. [erroneous overruling of objection “shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial”]; Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 795 [“statute precludes a finding of harmless error”].) 20 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Parhamgreen2 sentences1967(People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 728-731 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 401 P.2d 665 ] ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 356 ; People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ].) The State contends that, since the jury in this case heard the defendant admit his guilt on the witness stand, the use of defendant’s unlawfully obtained confession should be deemed harmless error on the theory that defendant’s extrajudicial statement probably played little if any role in the jury’s deliberation. 1967(People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 728-731 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 401 P.2d 665 ] ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 356 ; People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ].) The State contends that, since the jury in this case heard the defendant admit his guilt on the witness stand, the use of defendant’s unlawfully obtained confession should be deemed harmless error on the theory that defendant’s extrajudicial statement probably played little if any role in the jury’s deliberation. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Schaderred2 sentences1967(People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 728-731 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 401 P.2d 665 ] ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 356 ; People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ].) The State contends that, since the jury in this case heard the defendant admit his guilt on the witness stand, the use of defendant’s unlawfully obtained confession should be deemed harmless error on the theory that defendant’s extrajudicial statement probably played little if any role in the jury’s deliberation. 1967(People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 728-731 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 401 P.2d 665 ] ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 356 ; People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ].) The State contends that, since the jury in this case heard the defendant admit his guilt on the witness stand, the use of defendant’s unlawfully obtained confession should be deemed harmless error on the theory that defendant’s extrajudicial statement probably played little if any role in the jury’s deliberation. | 2 | 2 |
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences1987Consequently, we hold the instructional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and is not grounds for reversal of [defendant’s] conviction.” Defendant suggests that a finding of harmless error under Chapman, supra, 386 U. S. 18, 21 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 ], cannot be reconciled with the contrary conclusion drawn in People v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 695-697, and People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pages 447-449. 1987Consequently, we hold the instructional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and is not grounds for reversal of [defendant’s] conviction.” Defendant suggests that a finding of harmless error under Chapman, supra, 386 U. S. 18, 21 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 ], cannot be reconciled with the contrary conclusion drawn in People v. Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 695-697, and People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pages 447-449. | 1 | 2 |
Riverside Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. S.A. (In re N.G.)green1 sentence2021(See N.G., supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 485 [court will find prejudicial error when the record is silent on efforts to comply with the ICWA, as the court “simply cannot know whether [the department] would have discovered information sufficient” to determine whether the child is an Indian child]; accord, In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060 , 1070 [“we cannot know for certain whether the error did or did not prevent it from discovering Indian ancestry”].) IV. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2021(Id. at pp. 480-482.) The circumstances here are not analogous to those in People v. Markus. 30. adequate is determined by consideration of the entire charge to the jury.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677 ; accord, People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 .) “If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘“reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution.’” (Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 (per curiam).) Jurors are presumed to have understood and followed the trial court’s j | 1 | 1 |
Middleton v. McNeilgreen1 sentence2021(Id. at pp. 480-482.) The circumstances here are not analogous to those in People v. Markus. 30. adequate is determined by consideration of the entire charge to the jury.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677 ; accord, People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 .) “If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘“reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution.’” (Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 (per curiam).) Jurors are presumed to have understood and followed the trial court’s j | 1 | 1 |
People v. Vanngreen1 sentence2012(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 369; see ibid. [“We find it unrealistic, in light of the given instructions, that the jurors would have believed the prosecution was required to prove defendant’s guilt of murder or its lesser offenses beyond a reasonable doubt but that it had no burden, or a burden less than . beyond a reasonable doubt, to prove his guilt of the gang offense.”].) The court says these murder-related instructions “in particular” support a finding of harmless error. | 1 | 1 |
Yates v. Evattred2 sentences1995As the court explained in Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. at page 403 [114 L.Ed.2d at pages 448-449], "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." (Italics added; see also id. at pp. 413-414 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 454-455] (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.) [if improperly instructed, jury evaluates evidence " with the wrong question in mind " and therefore it is "impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt" error was harmless].) Given the complete failu 1995As the court explained in Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. at page 403 [114 L.Ed.2d at pages 448-449], "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." (Italics added; see also id. at pp. 413-414 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 454-455] (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.) [if improperly instructed, jury evaluates evidence " with the wrong question in mind " and therefore it is "impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt" error was harmless].) Given the complete failu | 1 | 1 |
People v. Spencergreen2 sentences1967Although there was ample and sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of murder without the confession, and unquestionably the confession made little or no difference in the outcome in this case, the rule is that if the confession is “violative of Escobedo and Dorado [it] necessarily compels reversal of the resulting conviction since a confession so completely shatters a defendant’s case that its erroneous use at his trial works incalculable damage and precludes a finding of harmless error notwithstanding overwhelming extrinsic evi dence of guilt.” (People v. Spencer, 66 Cal.2d 158, 163 [ 1967Although there was ample and sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of murder without the confession, and unquestionably the confession made little or no difference in the outcome in this case, the rule is that if the confession is “violative of Escobedo and Dorado [it] necessarily compels reversal of the resulting conviction since a confession so completely shatters a defendant’s case that its erroneous use at his trial works incalculable damage and precludes a finding of harmless error notwithstanding overwhelming extrinsic evi dence of guilt.” (People v. Spencer, 66 Cal.2d 158, 163 [ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Leelu
green
2 sentences2022He has not shown “‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.’” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023 , 1031-1032; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58 , relied upon by Wallravin, does not preclude a finding of harmless error. 2022He has not shown “‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.’” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023 , 1031-1032; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58 , relied upon by Wallravin, does not preclude a finding of harmless error. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2022He has not shown “‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.’” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023 , 1031-1032; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58 , relied upon by Wallravin, does not preclude a finding of harmless error. 2022He has not shown “‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.’” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023 , 1031-1032; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58 , relied upon by Wallravin, does not preclude a finding of harmless error. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Wycoff
green
2 sentences2022He has not shown “‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.’” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023 , 1031-1032; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58 , relied upon by Wallravin, does not preclude a finding of harmless error. 2022He has not shown “‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result.’” (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023 , 1031-1032; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58 , relied upon by Wallravin, does not preclude a finding of harmless error. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In re Martinez
green
2 sentences2021(Id. at p. 12; In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1227 .) We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the jury’s verdict on count 2 was not tainted by the legally incorrect jury instruction. 2021(Id. at p. 12; In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1227 .) We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the jury’s verdict on count 2 was not tainted by the legally incorrect jury instruction. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Kobrin
green
2 sentences2014(Kobrin, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 430 .) The instructional error in this case is like the one in Cummings because the jury received no instruction on the findings necessary to convict Prum on counts 6 and 7. 2013(Kobrin, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 430 .) The instructional error in this case is like the one in Cummings because the jury received no instruction on the findings necessary to convict Prum on counts 6 and 7. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
People v. Dorado
green
2 sentences1967(People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 728-731 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 193 , 401 P.2d 665 ] ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 356 ; People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ].) The State contends that, since the jury in this case heard the defendant admit his guilt on the witness stand, the use of defendant’s unlawfully obtained confession should be deemed harmless error on the theory that defendant’s extrajudicial statement probably played little if any role in the jury’s deliberation. 1967Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 497-499 ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 .) *163 Having concluded that defendant's confession should not have been admitted into evidence, we consider next whether its erroneous introduction caused prejudice to defendant. [4a] We have held that use of a confession violative of Escobedo and Dorado necessarily compels reversal of the resulting conviction since a confession so completely shatters a defendant's case that its erroneous use at his trial works incalculable damage and precludes a finding of harmless error notwithstanding overwhelmi | 2 | 1967–1967 |
People v. Langi
green
1 sentence2024(Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 .) 9 Defendants both argue the case of People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 , supports their position that this court may revisit their contention, albeit rejected on appeal, that CALCRIM No. 400 may have misled the jury into imputing malice to them as aiders and abettors. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Samaniego
green
2 sentences2024Our analysis here is not based on the finding of harmless error in Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at page 1165 but rather, on the 8 No. 401 as given at defendants’ trial stated that to prove guilt as an aider and abettor the prosecution was required to prove “ ‘1. 2024Our analysis here is not based on the finding of harmless error in Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at page 1165 but rather, on the 8 No. 401 as given at defendants’ trial stated that to prove guilt as an aider and abettor the prosecution was required to prove “ ‘1. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Holt
green
1 sentence2021(Id. at pp. 480-482.) The circumstances here are not analogous to those in People v. Markus. 30. adequate is determined by consideration of the entire charge to the jury.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677 ; accord, People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356 .) “If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a ‘“reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution.’” (Middleton v. McNeil (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 437 (per curiam).) Jurors are presumed to have understood and followed the trial court’s j | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Ledesma
green
1 sentence2015For the same reasons, defendant fails to show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to request such an instruction, the result of the proceeding would have been different, as required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. ( Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 216-217.) As to imperfect self-defense, the closing arguments again support a finding of harmless error, as the prosecutor did not claim the jury could not consider evidence of 22 defendant’s intoxication in deciding whether he killed in imperfect self-defense, while defense counsel argued defendant’s in | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Gonzalez
red
2 sentences2014(See People v. Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 666 .) The prejudicial effect of the erroneous felony murder instruction is thus apparent, and a new trial is required. 3 The District Attorney further argues that Lucero supports a finding of harmless error here. 2014(See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 666 .) The prejudicial effect of the erroneous felony murder instruction is thus apparent, and a new trial is required. 3 The District Attorney further argues that Lucero supports a finding of harmless error here. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2012In Sullivan, supra, 508 U.S. 275 , the United States Supreme Court held that a trial court’s misleading and erroneous reasonable doubt instruction requires reversal of the conviction. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Castro
green
1 sentence1991Because the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption and because the record does not permit a finding of harmless error, the judgment of conviction must be reversed.” (People v. Castro, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 857 .) *1749 Here, unlike the Cooper case where the jurors merely duplicated a demonstration presented at trial, Rizzo presented a new demonstration (i.e., there was no kitty litter and crayola demonstration conducted by any of the experts in the case). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Franco
neutral
1 sentence1986Since no other conclusion was possible upon the record before the trial court, the inadvertent use of the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive test by the trial court is not reversible error.” ( 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 428 .) *19 This case does not permit a finding of harmless error, as in Franco ; nor does it compel a reversal with directions to enter a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity, as in Skinner . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1967Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 497-499 ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 .) *163 Having concluded that defendant's confession should not have been admitted into evidence, we consider next whether its erroneous introduction caused prejudice to defendant. [4a] We have held that use of a confession violative of Escobedo and Dorado necessarily compels reversal of the resulting conviction since a confession so completely shatters a defendant's case that its erroneous use at his trial works incalculable damage and precludes a finding of harmless error notwithstanding overwhelmi 1967Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 497-499 ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 .) *163 Having concluded that defendant's confession should not have been admitted into evidence, we consider next whether its erroneous introduction caused prejudice to defendant. [4a] We have held that use of a confession violative of Escobedo and Dorado necessarily compels reversal of the resulting conviction since a confession so completely shatters a defendant's case that its erroneous use at his trial works incalculable damage and precludes a finding of harmless error notwithstanding overwhelmi | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.