reverse waiver (Maryland) · Go Syfert
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reverse waiver in Maryland

13 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Whaley v. Stategreen
mdctspecapp · 2009 · cited in 3 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2011–2023
2 sentences

2023App. at 9-10 (noting that, at a waiver hearing, “[t]he burdens of production and persuasion fall on the State[,]” whereas, at a reverse waiver hearing, “the juvenile bears the burden of persuasion”); Whaley v. State, 186 Md.

2011In Whaley, 186 Md.App. at 444-49 , 974 A.2d 951 , we examined the legislative history surrounding this omission in the reverse waiver statute and determined that, as a result of this legislative omission, in a reverse waiver hearing, it was legal error for a court to presume the child’s guilt of the alleged offenses.

23
Davis v. Stategreen
md · 2021 · cited in 3 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2023–2026
2 sentences

2026“If DJS does not have a program competent to address the issues defined that is available to the child and from which the child likely can benefit in a way that will produce better results than anything in the adult system and significantly lessen his danger to the public, a reverse waiver request should be denied.” Id. at 455-56 .

2026If DJS lacks such a program “that will produce better results than anything in the adult system and 22 significantly lessen his danger to the public, a reverse waiver request should be denied[.]” Id.

13
Crosby v. Stategreen
mdctspecapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023App. 429, 444 (2009) (“The burden is on the juvenile to demonstrate that under [the] five factors, transfer to the juvenile system is in the best interest of the juvenile or society.”); Crosby v. State, 71 Md.

11
Gaines v. Stategreen
mdctspecapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023E.g., Gaines, 201 Md.

2023E.g., Gaines, 201 Md.

11
Treece v. Stategreen
md · 1988 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Smallwood’s attorneys filed a petition for writ of actual innocence in which they asserted that Dr. McDaniel’s revised opinion as to criminal responsibility was newly discovered evidence that would now support a plea of not criminally responsible, and, they posited, this newly discovered evidence created a substantial or significant possibility of a different result for Smallwood, namely, a verdict finding him guilty but not criminally responsible.1 1 The Court of Appeals discussed the nature of a defense of “not criminally responsible” in Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 676 (1988): When the def

11
Fare v. Michael C.green
scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (applying Miranda analysis to determine admissibility of juvenile’s custodial statement in subsequent juvenile court proceeding).

2011See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (applying Miranda analysis to determine admissibility of juvenile’s custodial statement in subsequent juvenile court proceeding).

11
Kennedy v. Stategreen
mdctspecapp · 1974 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009The new study could address these issues and may alleviate the concerns noted by the motions judge. 19 As this Court noted in Kennedy v. State, supra, 21 Md.App. at 241, 319 A.2d 850 , if on remand the facts called for a waiver to the juvenile court, then the criminal trial would be a nullity.

2009The new study could address these issues and may alleviate the concerns noted by the motions judge. 19 As this Court noted in Kennedy v. State, supra, 21 Md.App. at 241, 319 A.2d 850 , if on remand the facts called for a waiver to the juvenile court, then the criminal trial would be a nullity.

11
In Re Franklin P.green
md · 2001 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 332, 783 A.2d 673 (2001).

2004In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 332, 783 A.2d 673 (2001).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Matter of Watersgreen
mdctspecapp · 1971 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011
2 sentences

2011As we noted in Waters, supra, 13 Md.App. at 103 , 281 A.2d 560 , “the sole function of the [waiver] hearing is to resolve the question of waiver vel non.” The same is true of a reverse waiver hearing, which, like a waiver hearing, does not render án adjudication but merely determines the forum where that is to be done. 7 Thus, *17 constitutional limitations on admissibility of evidence that govern criminal trials and adjudicatory hearings do not automatically apply to reverse waiver hearings.

2011As we noted in Waters, supra, 13 Md.App. at 103 , 281 A.2d 560 , “the sole function of the [waiver] hearing is to resolve the question of waiver vel non.” The same is true of a reverse waiver hearing, which, like a waiver hearing, does not render án adjudication but merely determines the forum where that is to be done. 7 Thus, *17 constitutional limitations on admissibility of evidence that govern criminal trials and adjudicatory hearings do not automatically apply to reverse waiver hearings.

12

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Goins v. State green
md · 1982
1 sentence

2023Id. at 101 .

12023–2023
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mooney green
md · 2000
2 sentences

2013In Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56 , 753 A.2d 17 (2000), the attorney was charged with violating Rules 1.1 and 1.3, inter alia, for his failure to file a reverse waiver in a criminal matter on behalf of a juvenile defendant.

2013In Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56 , 753 A.2d 17 (2000), the attorney was charged with violating Rules 1.1 and 1.3, inter alia, for his failure to file a reverse waiver in a criminal matter on behalf of a juvenile defendant.

12013–2013
Matter of Anderson green
mdctspecapp · 1974
2 sentences

2011As to the “nature of the alleged crime” factor, In re: Waters, 13 Md.App. 95 , 281 A.2d 560 (1971), disapproved on other grounds by In re: Anderson, 20 Md.App. 31, 40 , 315 A.2d 540 (1974), is instructive.

2011As to the “nature of the alleged crime” factor, In re: Waters, 13 Md.App. 95 , 281 A.2d 560 (1971), disapproved on other grounds by In re: Anderson, 20 Md.App. 31, 40 , 315 A.2d 540 (1974), is instructive.

12011–2011
Brown v. State green
mdctspecapp · 2006
1 sentence

2009Id.

12009–2009
Crawford v. State green
ga · 1977
1 sentence

1988The record in Crawford failed to show that this requirement had been satisfied for the sixteen year old defendant, who had been arrested on a charge of cruelty to children. 240 S.E.2d at 825 . [3] The juvenile court also obtains jurisdiction on other grounds that are not pertinent to the instant case.

11988–1988
Austin v. Director of Patuxent Institution green
md · 1967
2 sentences

1987Relying on Austin, 245 Md. at 211 , 225 A.2d 466 , the Court ruled that when a court of general jurisdiction proceeds under a special statute it may only exercise those powers granted to it under the statute.

1987Relying on Austin, 245 Md. at 211 , 225 A.2d 466 , the Court ruled that when a court of general jurisdiction proceeds under a special statute it may only exercise those powers granted to it under the statute.

11987–1987
Long v. Robinson green
ca4 · 1971
1 sentence

1974Md. 1970), affirmed in Long and Robinson, 436 F. 2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971)] compels such a result and we reject the notion espoused by the trial judge in Stokes ‘that whenever any substantial right or privilege is granted to a juvenile in Montgomery County, all other juveniles in the State are entitled to the same right or privilege.’ The difference in treatment afforded 16-year-old armed robbers by the two laws is not, on its face, so irrational and invidiously discriminatory as to constitute a denial of the equal protection clause, particularly in view of the reverse waiver provisions containe

11974–1974

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MD § Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 4-202 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

MD 13 (1974–2026) WI 11 (1959–2026) PA 7 (1829–1975) TX 7 (1880–2025) IL 7 (1890–1994) CA 6 (1931–2022) AL 6 (1838–1987) NY 6 (1894–2013) FL 5 (1989–1996) IA 4 (2011–2023) LA 4 (1925–2004) NC 3 (1970–1987) IN 2 (1898–1914) WA 2 (1892–1934) KY 2 (1941–1963) UT 2 (2018–2018) OR 2 (1970–2002) SC 2 (1958–2010) MS 2 (1858–2006) ID 2 (2016–2016) AR 2 (1856–1924)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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