reverse rule in Pennsylvania

1954Under such circumstances, although the plaintiff might be guilty of an assumption of risk (which defense was not available in the present case: Jones v. American Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644, 652 ), yet, simply because he worked at machinery in motion, he would not be guilty of per se negligence.’ ” Did the defendants acquit themselves of their responsibility as owners and managers of a building which housed under its roof 300 people and an erratic mechanism as intrinsically dangerous as an uncaged beast of violence?

1919Under such circumstances, although the plaintiff might be guilty of an assumption of risk (which defense was not available in the present case: Jones v. American Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644, 652 ), yet, simply because he worked at machinery in motion, he would not be guilty of per se negligence.” And again: “It may well be that while the plaintiff was intent upon doing his work in the customary manner prevailing in his employer’s shop, and, therefore, in a way which he had reason to believe his superiors approved and considered reasonably safe, his hand unexpectedly and accidentally slipped becau

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1947Although taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and in the absence of constitutional restriction, there is no limit to the power of the sovereign to exempt as it pleases (Clouser et al. v. City of Reading et al., 270 Pa. 92 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. 258 ; Sharpless et al. v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 ; Weister et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Pa. 474 ), when the Constitution itself defines the limits within which exemption may be granted, the reverse rule applies with equal force, and the legislature cannot exceed the limits placed on it by that instrument: Chr

1896It is clear that this rule was never applied* neither unqualified or qualified, to a deed of gift from a parent to a child; and the reverse of such principle has always been sustained, and there is not believed to be a single exception to the principle that a deed from a parent to a child is always regarded' with a favorable eye and every presumption is in favor of its validity.” Notable cases of a similar character are Millican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 426 ; Oliphant v. Levorsidge, 142 Ill. 160 ; Burt v. Quisenherry, 132 Ill. 399 ; Beauland v. Bradley, 2 Small & Gifford, 339, and there are many o

1896In Wessell v. Rathjohn, 89 N. C. 377 , a father having two daughters executed a deed to one of them, conveying his real property to her without any adequate consideration, at a time when he was in bad health.

1896It is clear that this rule was never applied* neither unqualified or qualified, to a deed of gift from a parent to a child; and the reverse of such principle has always been sustained, and there is not believed to be a single exception to the principle that a deed from a parent to a child is always regarded' with a favorable eye and every presumption is in favor of its validity.” Notable cases of a similar character are Millican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 426 ; Oliphant v. Levorsidge, 142 Ill. 160 ; Burt v. Quisenherry, 132 Ill. 399 ; Beauland v. Bradley, 2 Small & Gifford, 339, and there are many o

1829Riddle v. Murphy, 7 Serg. & Rawle, 230 . .