straightforward rule in Michigan

2022For example, in Haynie v Dep’t of State Police, 468 Mich 302, 320 ; 664 NW2d 129 (2003), this Court applied the ELCRA’s prohibition of sexual harassment differently than United States Supreme Court precedent regarding the prohibition of sexual harassment under Title VII.

2022For example, in Haynie v Dep’t of State Police, 468 Mich 302, 320 ; 664 NW2d 129 (2003), this Court applied the ELCRA’s prohibition of sexual harassment differently than United States Supreme Court precedent regarding the prohibition of sexual harassment under Title VII.

2022While we are encouraged but not bound to consider persuasive Title VII federal caselaw, Radtke, 442 Mich at 381-382 , we find that Bostock offers a straightforward analysis of the plain meaning of analogous statutory language and we agree with its reasoning. 12 A discriminator’s choice to “[d]eny an individual the full and equal enjoyment 12 Plaintiff Rouch World emphasizes that this Court is not bound to interpret the ELCRA in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII, and that this Court has, in fact, previously criticized such reliance.

2022While we are encouraged but not bound to consider persuasive Title VII federal caselaw, Radtke, 442 Mich at 381-382 , we find that Bostock offers a straightforward analysis of the plain meaning of analogous statutory language and we agree with its reasoning. 12 A discriminator’s choice to “[d]eny an individual the full and equal enjoyment 12 Plaintiff Rouch World emphasizes that this Court is not bound to interpret the ELCRA in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII, and that this Court has, in fact, previously criticized such reliance.

2023Next, we turn to the issue whether the fact situation is covered by the indemnification provision which “generally requires only a straightforward analysis of the facts and the contract terms.” Grand Trunk Western RR, Inc, 262 Mich App at 356-357 .

2015“The threshold question whether the fact situation is covered by the indemnity contract generally requires only a straightforward analysis of the facts and the contract terms.” Id. at 356-357 .

2021The Bostock Court found that from the “ordinary public meaning of the statute’s language at the time of the law’s adoption, a straightforward rule emerges: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.” Id. at 1741 .

2021The Bostock Court found that from the “ordinary public meaning of the statute’s language at the time of the law’s adoption, a straightforward rule emerges: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.” Id. at 1741 .

2020The appellants also argued that the court committed palpable error concerning its interpretation of the Fidelity beneficiary form when “a straightforward analysis of the Beneficiary Form clearly dictates that the funds held in the Fidelity Accounts are to be paid to the Estate of Meddie Allen Brown.” Appellants did not identify palpable error, “but rather questioned the trial court’s reasoning and its decisions on issues of law already decided by the court.” Herald Co, Inc v Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich App 78, 83 ; 669 NW2d 862 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Speicher v Columbia Tp Bd of Trus

2020The appellants also argued that the court committed palpable error concerning its interpretation of the Fidelity beneficiary form when “a straightforward analysis of the Beneficiary Form clearly dictates that the funds held in the Fidelity Accounts are to be paid to the Estate of Meddie Allen Brown.” Appellants did not identify palpable error, “but rather questioned the trial court’s reasoning and its decisions on issues of law already decided by the court.” Herald Co, Inc v Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich App 78, 83 ; 669 NW2d 862 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Speicher v Columbia Tp Bd of Trus

2020The appellants also argued that the court committed palpable error concerning its interpretation of the Fidelity beneficiary form when “a straightforward analysis of the Beneficiary Form clearly dictates that the funds held in the Fidelity Accounts are to be paid to the Estate of Meddie Allen Brown.” Appellants did not identify palpable error, “but rather questioned the trial court’s reasoning and its decisions on issues of law already decided by the court.” Herald Co, Inc v Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich App 78, 83 ; 669 NW2d 862 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Speicher v Columbia Tp Bd of Trus

2020The appellants also argued that the court committed palpable error concerning its interpretation of the Fidelity beneficiary form when “a straightforward analysis of the Beneficiary Form clearly dictates that the funds held in the Fidelity Accounts are to be paid to the Estate of Meddie Allen Brown.” Appellants did not identify palpable error, “but rather questioned the trial court’s reasoning and its decisions on issues of law already decided by the court.” Herald Co, Inc v Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich App 78, 83 ; 669 NW2d 862 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Speicher v Columbia Tp Bd of Trus

2014Among other privileges, these rights include: the right to make natural and artificial use of the water in the watercourse; 5 the right to construct and maintain a dock; 6 and the right to use the entire surface of the watercourse for recreational purposes. 7 Such rights are distinct from other state-law water-related legal privileges, such as the public right of recreational access, which allows for qualified public use of waterways that are navigable under Michigan law. 8 Michigan has a straightforward rule governing riparian rights: riparian rights attach to land that abuts or includes a na

2014Among other privileges, these rights include: the right to make natural and artificial use of the water in the watercourse; 5 the right to construct and maintain a dock; 6 and the right to use the entire surface of the watercourse for recreational purposes. 7 Such rights are distinct from other state-law water-related legal privileges, such as the public right of recreational access, which allows for qualified public use of waterways that are navigable under Michigan law. 8 Michigan has a straightforward rule governing riparian rights: riparian rights attach to land that abuts or includes a na

1994Where the situation triggering mistrial is potential bias of the factfinder, the trial court’s exercise of discretion in declaring a mistrial is entitled to the highest deference. hi The result in People v Bellew is governed by application of a very straightforward rule: "a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant’s motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error.” United States v Dinitz, 424 US 600, 607 ; 96 S Ct 1075 ; 47 L Ed 2d 267 (1976); see also Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 672-673 ; 102 S Ct 2083

1994Where the situation triggering mistrial is potential bias of the factfinder, the trial court’s exercise of discretion in declaring a mistrial is entitled to the highest deference. hi The result in People v Bellew is governed by application of a very straightforward rule: "a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant’s motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error.” United States v Dinitz, 424 US 600, 607 ; 96 S Ct 1075 ; 47 L Ed 2d 267 (1976); see also Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 672-673 ; 102 S Ct 2083

1976Papajesk wound up stating a straightforward rule, which is quite similar to Davies v Mann, supra. The rule stated by Papajesk is: "To determine the existence of gross negligence all the facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration to ascertain if the following conditions exist: (1) Plaintiff is in a position or situation which has become dangerous. (2) Defendant knows or by the exercise of ordinary care ought to know, of plaintiff’s peril. (3) Defendant must have the means to avoid the harm by the use of ordinary care. (4) Failure of defendant to use due care when it could be reaso

1976Papajesk wound up stating a straightforward rule, which is quite similar to Davies v Mann, supra. The rule stated by Papajesk is: "To determine the existence of gross negligence all the facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration to ascertain if the following conditions exist: (1) Plaintiff is in a position or situation which has become dangerous. (2) Defendant knows or by the exercise of ordinary care ought to know, of plaintiff’s peril. (3) Defendant must have the means to avoid the harm by the use of ordinary care. (4) Failure of defendant to use due care when it could be reaso