straightforward rule in California

2025In Palmdale, all customers were charged tiered rates, but the rates were different for different customer classes, and the defendant water utility “admittedly target[ed]” certain users “to pay dramatically higher and disproportionate water rates.” (Palmdale, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 934 .) As a result, “[t]he record show[ed] that [the utility] intentionally seeks to recoup most of its costs from a relatively few . . . users . . . , so as to keep costs to the vast majority of . . . customers proportionately low.” (Ibid.) The facts of Palmdale thus showed a straightforward violation of secti

2025In Palmdale, all customers were charged tiered rates, but the rates were different for different customer classes, and the defendant water utility “admittedly target[ed]” certain users “to pay dramatically higher and disproportionate water rates.” (Palmdale, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 934 .) As a result, “[t]he record show[ed] that [the utility] intentionally seeks to recoup most of its costs from a relatively few . . . users . . . , so as to keep costs to the vast majority of . . . customers proportionately low.” (Ibid.) The facts of Palmdale thus showed a straightforward violation of secti

2019(Schwab, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 [noting how Cassel’s rule turns on the defaulting defendant’s access to information].) This rule substantially dims section 580’s “bright- line” rule of formal notice by replacing the straightforward inquiry into what is pled in the operative pleadings with a case- by-case inquiry into what individual defendants knew or should have known (Airs Aromatic, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018 ), and in so doing, risks depriving defaulting defendants of their 15 due process-based right to proper notice of their maximum exposure.

2019(Schwab, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 [noting how Cassel’s rule turns on the defaulting defendant’s access to information].) This rule substantially dims section 580’s “bright- line” rule of formal notice by replacing the straightforward inquiry into what is pled in the operative pleadings with a case- by-case inquiry into what individual defendants knew or should have known (Airs Aromatic, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018 ), and in so doing, risks depriving defaulting defendants of their 15 due process-based right to proper notice of their maximum exposure.

2009Because reference to prison mail logs will generally be a straightforward inquiry, making filing turn on the date the pro se prisoner delivers the notice to prison authorities for mailing is a bright-line rule, not an uncertain one.” (Houston, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 275 .) 6 *118 A few years later, in Jordan, supra, 4 Cal.4th 116, the viability of California’s prison-delivery rule again was challenged.

2004Unskilled in law, unaided by counsel, and unable to leave the prison, his control over the processing of his notice necessarily ceases as soon as he hands it over to the only public officials to whom he has access—the prison authorities—and the only information he will likely have is the date he delivered the notice to those prison authorities and the date ultimately stamped on his notice.” ( Houston, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 270-272.) In addition to these policy grounds, the Supreme Court reasoned in Houston that it will prove easy to administer a rule that the filing date of a notice of appeal

2025The imposition of these conditions was a straightforward violation of our Supreme Court’s holding in Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 .

2025The imposition of these conditions was a straightforward violation of our Supreme Court’s holding in Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 .

2024When such situations arise, the 6 Privette doctrine gives way to exceptions.” (Id. at p. 271.) As the Sandoval Court pointed out, the first exception was articulated in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659 , and the second in Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198 .

2024When such situations arise, the 6 Privette doctrine gives way to exceptions.” (Id. at p. 271.) As the Sandoval Court pointed out, the first exception was articulated in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659 , and the second in Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198 .

2024When such situations arise, the 6 Privette doctrine gives way to exceptions.” (Id. at p. 271.) As the Sandoval Court pointed out, the first exception was articulated in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659 , and the second in Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198 .

2023(Id. at p. 931.) For that reason, the trial court “erred by imposing a sentence exceeding that to which defendant had agreed.” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1362 .) The People do not so much resist this straightforward analysis as attempt to side-step it.

2023This makes little sense given that a landowner typically hires an independent contractor precisely because of the contractor’s expertise in the contracted-for work and the hirer usually has no right to interfere with the contractor’s decisions regarding safety or otherwise control the contractor’s work. [Citations.] Our conclusion in Kinsman that a landowner delegates all responsibility to independent contractors to ‘ “protect themselves against” ’ a known hazard (Kinsman, at p. 674, italics omitted), coupled with the principles underlying Privette’s straightforward rule that a hirer of an ind

2021(See Hartford Financial, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 598 .) On appeal, Seretti suggests this straightforward analysis fails to appreciate the “more subtle and complex” conception of property under the current doctrine of conversion.

2021Citing Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202 (Welco), he maintains the conversion here was “effected” by diverting “monies and/or property . . . from the limited partnerships into which Oflye’s [property] had been ‘diversified,’ ” and this, although not constituting the “physical conversion of anything,” was akin to the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s credit card in Welco to convert money into the defendant’s 24 bank account.

2017The high court first *665 announced this principle in Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 ( Griffin ), where it concluded that refusing to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts on appeal violated equal protection. ( Id . at p. 19, 76 S.Ct. 585 .) The decision was grounded on a straightforward principle: that equal protection bars any distinction between criminal defendants on the basis of their economic means. ( Id . at p. 17, 76 S.Ct. 585 .) Because a defendant's financial status bears no rational relation to a defendant's guilt or the need for a

2017The high court first *665 announced this principle in Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 ( Griffin ), where it concluded that refusing to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts on appeal violated equal protection. ( Id . at p. 19, 76 S.Ct. 585 .) The decision was grounded on a straightforward principle: that equal protection bars any distinction between criminal defendants on the basis of their economic means. ( Id . at p. 17, 76 S.Ct. 585 .) Because a defendant's financial status bears no rational relation to a defendant's guilt or the need for a

2017Where alternatives to a full transcript suffice to safeguard an indigent ***367 defendant's right to effective appellate review, the state is not required to provide a full trial transcript. ( Id . at p. 20, 76 S.Ct. 585 .) So important is an indigent defendant's right to transcripts of prior proceedings that it applies in misdemeanor cases-even where the defendant is sentenced only to a monetary fine. ( Mayer v. City of Chicago (1971) 404 U.S. 189 , 196-197, 92 S.Ct. 410 , 30 L.Ed.2d 372 .) And it applies not only on appeal but where an indigent defendant faces retrial. ( Britt , supra , 404

2017Where alternatives to a full transcript suffice to safeguard an indigent ***367 defendant's right to effective appellate review, the state is not required to provide a full trial transcript. ( Id . at p. 20, 76 S.Ct. 585 .) So important is an indigent defendant's right to transcripts of prior proceedings that it applies in misdemeanor cases-even where the defendant is sentenced only to a monetary fine. ( Mayer v. City of Chicago (1971) 404 U.S. 189 , 196-197, 92 S.Ct. 410 , 30 L.Ed.2d 372 .) And it applies not only on appeal but where an indigent defendant faces retrial. ( Britt , supra , 404

2009Because reference to prison mail logs will generally be a straightforward inquiry, making filing turn on the date the pro se prisoner delivers the notice to prison authorities for mailing is a bright-line rule, not an uncertain one.” (Houston, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 275 .) 6 *118 A few years later, in Jordan, supra, 4 Cal.4th 116, the viability of California’s prison-delivery rule again was challenged.

2008This straightforward analysis, based on the plain meaning of the words actually used in the statute, vindicates Justice Mihara's dissent in Wakefield v. Bohlin (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 963 , 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 ( Wakefield ).

2008This straightforward analysis, based on the plain meaning of the words actually used in the statute, vindicates Justice Mihara's dissent in Wakefield v. Bohlin (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 963 , 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 400 ( Wakefield ).

1990(See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. 347 .) Where the discharge is premised on union policy, as in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal. App.3d 921 , the matter will be deemed preempted.

1990(See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. 347 .) Where the discharge is premised on union policy, as in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 921 , the matter will be deemed preempted.

1990(See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. 347 .) Where the discharge is premised on union policy, as in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal. App.3d 921 , the matter will be deemed preempted.

1990(See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn, supra, 488 U.S. 347 .) Where the discharge is premised on union policy, as in Tyra v. Kearney, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 921 , the matter will be deemed preempted.

1986Wisley v. City of San Diego (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 482 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 765 ] sets forth a straightforward standard for courts to follow in determining whether increased contributions add corresponding benefits to members of the pension system.

1986Wisley v. City of San Diego (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 482 [ 10 Cal.Rptr. 765 ] sets forth a straightforward standard for courts to follow in determining whether increased contributions add corresponding benefits to members of the pension system.

1985That section provides, “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” Although section 940 appears to be a straightforward privilege, limited to incriminating evidence, the California Supreme Court in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], fearful that the federal constitutional standard for the introduction of relevant evidence enunciated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 9

1985That section provides, “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” Although section 940 appears to be a straightforward privilege, limited to incriminating evidence, the California Supreme Court in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], fearful that the federal constitutional standard for the introduction of relevant evidence enunciated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 9

1985That section provides, “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” Although section 940 appears to be a straightforward privilege, limited to incriminating evidence, the California Supreme Court in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], fearful that the federal constitutional standard for the introduction of relevant evidence enunciated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 9

1985That section provides, “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” Although section 940 appears to be a straightforward privilege, limited to incriminating evidence, the California Supreme Court in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ], fearful that the federal constitutional standard for the introduction of relevant evidence enunciated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 9