defendant signed waiver in New York

2018In any event, the court's colloquy amounted to nothing more than a simple confirmation that the defendant signed the waiver and a conclusory statement that the defendant understood the waiver ( see People v Burnett-Hicks , 133 AD3d 773, 774 ; People v Brown , 122 AD3d 133, 140 ).

2018The court's colloquy amounted to nothing more than a simple confirmation that the defendant signed the waiver and a conclusory statement that the defendant understood the waiver or was executing it knowingly and voluntarily ( see People v Burnett-Hicks, 133 AD3d 773, 774 ; People v Cantarero, 123 AD3d at 841-842 ; People v Brown, 122 AD3d at 140 ).

2018Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to appeal ( see People v Brown, 122 AD3d 133 ; see generally People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d at 264-267 ; People v Ramos, 7 NY3d 737, 738 ; People v Lopez, 6 NY3d at 255 ).

2015Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to appeal (see People v Brown, 122 AD3d 133 [2014]; see generally People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 264-267 [2011]; People v Ramos, 7 NY3d 737, 738 [2006]; People v Lopez, 6 NY3d at 255 ; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 735 [1998]).

2018Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the record does not demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal ( see People v Johnson , 157 AD3d 964 , 965; People v Smith , 156 AD3d 944 ; People v Brown , 122 AD3d 133 ).

2018The court failed to ascertain on the record whether the defendant had read the waiver or discussed it with defense counsel, or whether he was even aware of its contents ( see People v Pacheco , 138 AD3d 1035, 1036 ; People v Brown , 122 AD3d 133, 145 ).

2015Although the defendant executed a written waiver of his right to appeal, the Supreme Court’s colloquy amounted to nothing more than “a simple confirmation that the defendant signed the waiver and a conclusory statement that the defendant understood the waiver or was executing it knowingly and voluntarily” (People v Brown, 122 AD3d at 140 ; see People v Cantarero, 123 AD3d 841, 841 [2014]; People v Quezada, 122 AD3d 948, 948 [2014]; People v Reyes, 121 AD3d at 821 ).

2014While a terse colloquy may sometimes be sufficient in cases involving written waivers (see People v Ramos, 7 NY3d at 738 ), in order to ensure that the defendant’s appeal waiver will be effective and not rise or fall on highly nuanced facts, it is advisable for the trial courts to engage in a comprehensive colloquy, which clearly places on the record the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it (see People v Crawford, 110 AD3d 916 [2013]; People v Vasquez, 101 AD3d at 1054-1055 ; People v Reiser, 100 AD3d at 928; People v Grant, 83 AD3d

2014While a terse colloquy may sometimes be sufficient in cases involving written waivers (see People v Ramos, 7 NY3d at 738 ), in order to ensure that the defendant’s appeal waiver will be effective and not rise or fall on highly nuanced facts, it is advisable for the trial courts to engage in a comprehensive colloquy, which clearly places on the record the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it (see People v Crawford, 110 AD3d 916 [2013]; People v Vasquez, 101 AD3d at 1054-1055 ; People v Reiser, 100 AD3d at 928; People v Grant, 83 AD3d

2014While a terse colloquy may sometimes be sufficient in cases involving written waivers (see People v Ramos, 7 NY3d at 738 ), in order to ensure that the defendant’s appeal waiver will be effective and not rise or fall on highly nuanced facts, it is advisable for the trial courts to engage in a comprehensive colloquy, which clearly places on the record the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it (see People v Crawford, 110 AD3d 916 [2013]; People v Vasquez, 101 AD3d at 1054-1055 ; People v Reiser, 100 AD3d at 928; People v Grant, 83 AD3d

2014While a terse colloquy may sometimes be sufficient in cases involving written waivers (see People v Ramos, 7 NY3d at 738 ), in order to ensure that the defendant’s appeal waiver will be effective and not rise or fall on highly nuanced facts, it is advisable for the trial courts to engage in a comprehensive colloquy, which clearly places on the record the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it (see People v Crawford, 110 AD3d 916 [2013]; People v Vasquez, 101 AD3d at 1054-1055 ; People v Reiser, 100 AD3d at 928; People v Grant, 83 AD3d

2014While a terse colloquy may sometimes be sufficient in cases involving written waivers (see People v Ramos, 7 NY3d at 738 ), in order to ensure that the defendant’s appeal waiver will be effective and not rise or fall on highly nuanced facts, it is advisable for the trial courts to engage in a comprehensive colloquy, which clearly places on the record the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the right to appeal and the consequences of waiving it (see People v Crawford, 110 AD3d 916 [2013]; People v Vasquez, 101 AD3d at 1054-1055 ; People v Reiser, 100 AD3d at 928; People v Grant, 83 AD3d

2012Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that the court questioned the defendant in connection with the waiver in order to ensure that his actions were knowingly and understandingly undertaken or that the waiver itself was executed in open court (see People v Badden, 13 AD3d 463 [2004]; People v Davidson, 136 AD2d at 68 ; cf. People v Brunson, 307 AD2d 323, 324 [2003]).

2012Moreover, there is nothing in the record indicating that the court questioned the defendant in connection with the waiver in order to ensure that his actions were knowingly and understandingly undertaken or that the waiver itself was executed in open court (see People v Badden, 13 AD3d 463 [2004]; People v Davidson, 136 AD2d at 68 ; cf. People v Brunson, 307 AD2d 323, 324 [2003]).

2009The court ensured that the defendant understood the rights he was giving up, and the defendant signed the waiver in open court after having those rights explained to him (see People v Buckley, 299 AD2d 417, 418 [2002]; People v Longchamp, 147 AD2d 659 [1989]).

1998(See, People v McIver, 39 AD2d 671 [1st Dept 1972], supra [“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that the Judge, in reciting that the officer swore to the document, properly carried out the function of his office and truthfully stated the fact”].) From the hearing, it is evident that there was a period of time in Part N when in many cases the State constitutional requirement that a defendant who signs a waiver of indictment do so in open court was not scrupulously honored.

1998(See also, Matter of Hayden v LeFevre, 145 Misc 2d 316 [Sup Ct, Clinton County 1989] [declaring waiver of indictment signed in open court valid even though court reporter did not so indicate on the record].) The presumption is also not defeated by evidence adduced at the hearing that many, indeed most, defendants who signed waivers of indictment in Part N in 1990 did not do so in open court.

1991We need not address the People’s contention that this waiver applied to the period after the bench warrant was issued on May 23, 1988, as we conclude that the People met their burden of establishing that the defendant’s location was unknown and that he was attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution (see, CPL 30.30 [4] [c]; People v Jackson, 142 AD2d 597 ).