introduction test in New York

1835Its origin, therefore, discloses that its special purpose was to protect the underwriter against the act of the owner, by compelling him to make known the character of the goods, “ and to confine the operation of it simply to the article insured.” Thus it appears that the warranty was not devised for the purpose of changing the law in relation to barratry of the master and mariners, as it existed previously to the introduction of the clause ; and the cases in 1 Caines, 489 , in which it was held that “ the warranty extended, in the understanding of the parties, to the goods only which were the

1835Its origin, therefore, discloses that, its special purpose was'-to protect-the • underwriter against the act of the owner,' by compelling him to make known the character of the goods,“ and to confine the operation of it simply to the article insured.” - Thus it appears that the warranty was not devised for the purpose of - changing the law in relation to barratry of the master and mariners, as it existed previously-to-the introduction of the clause ; and'the cases in 1 Caines, 489 , in which it was held that “ the warranty extended, in the understanding of -the parties, to the goods only-which

1835Its origin, therefore, discloses that its special purpose was to protect the underwriter against the act of the owner, by compelling him to make known the character of the goods, “ and to confine the operation of it simply to the article insured.” Thus it appears that the warranty was not devised for the purpose of changing the law in relation to barratry of the master and mariners, as it existed previously to the introduction of the clause ; and the cases in 1 Caines, 489 , in which it was held that “ the warranty extended, in the understanding of the parties, to the goods only which were the

1835Its origin, therefore, discloses that, its special purpose was'-to protect-the • underwriter against the act of the owner,' by compelling him to make known the character of the goods,“ and to confine the operation of it simply to the article insured.” - Thus it appears that the warranty was not devised for the purpose of - changing the law in relation to barratry of the master and mariners, as it existed previously-to-the introduction of the clause ; and'the cases in 1 Caines, 489 , in which it was held that “ the warranty extended, in the understanding of -the parties, to the goods only-which

2017(Cf. People v Maxwell, 89 AD3d 1108 [2d Dept 2011].) A. Introduction The defense correctly argues that counsel’s incorrect advice about the relicensing consequences of the guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under both the Federal and State Constitutions.

1999While positive results of urinalysis tests can be sufficient to support a finding of guilt to the instant charge, an adequate foundation for the introduction of the test results must be provided (see, 7 NYCRR 1020.5 [a] [1]; Matter of Davis v McClellan, 202 AD2d 770, 770-771 ).

1986That same argument was recently rejected in Matter of Newman v Coughlin ( 110 AD2d 981 ); we adhere to that decision.

1984The People, by argument and legal memoranda, opposed the introduction of the defense and the proposed charge-down on the following grounds: (1) There is no such crime as attempted manslaughter (People v McDavis, 97 AD2d 302 ).

1980However, it is the opinion of this court that in an action such as this, where the plaintiff seeks payment of no-fault first-party benefits, such factual evidence should be admissible as a defense to his claim if a proper foundation is laid for the introduction of the test results; that is, that the test was made and analyzed by qualified people in a proper manner (see Roy v Reid, 38 AD2d 717 ).

1964In rejecting the claimed protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Clark (p. 434) cited Wolf v. Colorado ( 338 U. S. 25 [1949]) to the contrary, since New Mexico had “ rejected, as it may, the exclusionary rule set forth in Weeks [v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914)] ” which excluded in Federal criminal prosecutions evidence obtained in violation of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.

1964In rejecting the claimed protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Clark (p. 434) cited Wolf v. Colorado ( 338 U. S. 25 [1949]) to the contrary, since New Mexico had “ rejected, as it may, the exclusionary rule set forth in Weeks [v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914)] ” which excluded in Federal criminal prosecutions evidence obtained in violation of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.

1961As far back as the case of Burnham v. Comfort (supra), which the court had read prior to its being cited to him, the rule of ademption was considered not applicable to devisees of realty and, as the court in that case said, I, too, see ample reason for refusing sanction to the introduction of a doctrine which if applied to this devise of real property would completely defeat the very definite and specific intent of the testators here that this property or as this case turned out, its equivalent, should go to the devisee named in their wills.

1958The certificate in this case did not relate, however, to a transaction or occurrence conducted by the police department but rather to a transaction conducted by a third party, the hearsay results of which were produced by the police department. ‘ ‘ This court does not intend by this decision to lay down a rule that such test certificates as here introduced are inadmissible under any circumstances but simply that the proper foundation was not laid for the introduction of this test certificate in evidence.” In People v. Lederle ( 206 Misc. 244 ) City Magistrate J.

1955Moreover, the court cannot concur with the recently expressed opinion of one of our brethren that a police officer’s opinion testimony as to speed may be disregarded (People v. Rothstein, supra) if the court there intended to enunciate a rule extending beyond the facts of that case.

1808The non-suit was confirmed by the supreme court, February term, 1809, ( 4 Johns. 132 ,) the court being of opinion, that under the circumstances of this case, it was a fair presumption that a survey had been made when the vessel was condemned, and that it was a necessary part of the preliminary proof.