introduction doctrine in California

2017FYBEL, J. *465 INTRODUCTION The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion dictates that in ordinary circumstances a final judgment on the merits prevents litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 ( DKN ).) In rare circumstances, a final judgment may be denied claim preclusive effect when to do so would result in manifest injustice. ( *217 People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 , 256, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 83 P.3d 480 ( Barragan ); City of Sacramento v. State o

2017FYBEL, J. *465 INTRODUCTION The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion dictates that in ordinary circumstances a final judgment on the merits prevents litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 ( DKN ).) In rare circumstances, a final judgment may be denied claim preclusive effect when to do so would result in manifest injustice. ( *217 People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 , 256, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 83 P.3d 480 ( Barragan ); City of Sacramento v. State o

2017FYBEL, J. *465 INTRODUCTION The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion dictates that in ordinary circumstances a final judgment on the merits prevents litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 ( DKN ).) In rare circumstances, a final judgment may be denied claim preclusive effect when to do so would result in manifest injustice. ( *217 People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 , 256, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 83 P.3d 480 ( Barragan ); City of Sacramento v. State o

2017FYBEL, J. *465 INTRODUCTION The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion dictates that in ordinary circumstances a final judgment on the merits prevents litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 ( DKN ).) In rare circumstances, a final judgment may be denied claim preclusive effect when to do so would result in manifest injustice. ( *217 People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 , 256, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 83 P.3d 480 ( Barragan ); City of Sacramento v. State o

2017FYBEL, J. *465 INTRODUCTION The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion dictates that in ordinary circumstances a final judgment on the merits prevents litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 ( DKN ).) In rare circumstances, a final judgment may be denied claim preclusive effect when to do so would result in manifest injustice. ( *217 People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 , 256, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 83 P.3d 480 ( Barragan ); City of Sacramento v. State o

2017FYBEL, J. *465 INTRODUCTION The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion dictates that in ordinary circumstances a final judgment on the merits prevents litigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 824, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 ( DKN ).) In rare circumstances, a final judgment may be denied claim preclusive effect when to do so would result in manifest injustice. ( *217 People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236 , 256, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76 , 83 P.3d 480 ( Barragan ); City of Sacramento v. State o

2017The rare circumstances arise due to a Ninth Circuit en banc opinion that reversed a federal court judgment against plaintiffs on their civil rights claims. ( Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (9th Cir. 2014) 747 F.3d 789 (en banc).) Initially, a Ninth Circuit panel decision had affirmed the federal court judgment against plaintiffs. ( Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (9th Cir. May 13, 2013, No. 11-56360) 2013 U.S.App.

2014Because the evidence does not compel any such conclusion, we affirm the judgment finding Samuel’s consent is not necessary for the adoption.1 In overview, this case is a combination of Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043 [alleged father’s delay in asserting parental right between July and November compelled finding that he did not qualify under Kelsey S.] and Adoption of O.M. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 672 [the “father’s ability to demonstrate his commitment was impeded to a far greater extent by the predictable consequences of his own criminal activity”].) At the most crucial point in t

2014INTRODUCTION The issue in this appeal is whether the evidence compelled the trial court to conclude that Samuel, who alleges he is the biological father of K.M., qualifies as a presumed father under standards enunciated in Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 , and hence has the right to block the adoption of K.M. by Michael and Tasha.

2014Because the evidence does not compel any such conclusion, we affirm the judgment finding Samuel’s consent is not necessary for the adoption.1 In overview, this case is a combination of Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043 [alleged father’s delay in asserting parental right between July and November compelled finding that he did not qualify under Kelsey S.] and Adoption of O.M. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 672 [the “father’s ability to demonstrate his commitment was impeded to a far greater extent by the predictable consequences of his own criminal activity”].) At the most crucial point in t

2011INTRODUCTION The issue presented in this case is as follows: If a defendant obtains a new trial by way of appellate or habeas corpus relief, does the trial court have discretion to order discovery of peace officer records, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ], related to events that occurred after the date of the original conviction?* 1 We conclude the law does not categorically preclude such discovery.

2011INTRODUCTION The issue presented in this case is as follows: If a defendant obtains a new trial by way of appellate or habeas corpus relief, does the trial court have discretion to order discovery of peace officer records, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ], related to events that occurred after the date of the original conviction?* 1 We conclude the law does not categorically preclude such discovery.

2010OPINION ALDRICH, J.— INTRODUCTION At issue in Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 ] ( Serrano I ) was a dispute about the reasonableness of fees a deposition reporter sought to charge a nonnoticing party for expedited copies.

2010OPINION ALDRICH, J.— INTRODUCTION At issue in Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 ] ( Serrano I ) was a dispute about the reasonableness of fees a deposition reporter sought to charge a nonnoticing party for expedited copies.

2007INTRODUCTION The issue in this case is whether the merger doctrine articulated in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 ] (Ireland), and its progeny apply in this case.

2007INTRODUCTION The issue in this case is whether the merger doctrine articulated in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 ] (Ireland), and its progeny apply in this case.

1997We confronted this scheme most recently in Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ] (hereafter Gikas); we there explained that “[t]he express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation by providing a prompt administrative review of the suspension; and (3) to place no restriction on the ability of a prosecutor to pursue related criminal action

1997We confronted this scheme most recently in Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ] (hereafter Gikas); we there explained that “[t]he express legislative purposes of the administrative suspension procedure are: (1) to provide safety to persons using the highways by quickly suspending the driving privilege of persons who drive with excessive blood-alcohol levels; (2) to guard against erroneous deprivation by providing a prompt administrative review of the suspension; and (3) to place no restriction on the ability of a prosecutor to pursue related criminal action

1992In 1942 the United States Supreme Court established the “D’Oench, Duhme doctrine” in D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C. (1942) 315 U.S. 447 [ 86 L.Ed. 956 , 62 S.Ct. 676 ] (hereafter referred to as D’Oench).

1992In 1942 the United States Supreme Court established the “D’Oench, Duhme doctrine” in D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C. (1942) 315 U.S. 447 [ 86 L.Ed. 956 , 62 S.Ct. 676 ] (hereafter referred to as D’Oench).

1953Appellant’s main claim, however, on this particular point is that the instructions on that subject should not have been given at all because the evidence did not, particularly as to appellant, show that the requirements for the introduction of the doctrine were met in this, that before it may be applied, *192 it must be shown that the accident or injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant (appellant); that when, on the face of plaintiff’s own evidence, it appears that the injury may have resulted from any one of two or more causes, for one o

1953Appellant’s main claim, however, on this particular point is that the instructions on that subject should not have been given at all because the evidence did not, particularly as to appellant, show that the requirements for the introduction of the doctrine were met in this, that before it may be applied, *192 it must be shown that the accident or injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant (appellant); that when, on the face of plaintiff’s own evidence, it appears that the injury may have resulted from any one of two or more causes, for one o

1936In People v. Murieta, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 727 [ 37 Pac. (2d) 158 ], the court, in passing upon a similar situation, said: “But the law appears to be well established that such a situation presents a problem that is to be solved primarily by the trial jury which solution, in ease of a conviction of the defendant, the trial judge, unless he grant a new trial, must impliedly approve and affirm.