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13 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jamesgreen2 sentences2014Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he observed an ammunition magazine in plain view inside the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, after stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, was not incredible and did not appear to have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 997 [2011]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2009]; People v James, 19 AD3d 617, 618 [2005]). 2014Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he observed an ammunition magazine in plain view inside the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, after stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, was not incredible and did not appear to have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 997 [2011]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2009]; People v James, 19 AD3d 617, 618 [2005]). | 4 | 5 |
People v. Colesgreen2 sentences2014Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he observed an ammunition magazine in plain view inside the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, after stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, was not incredible and did not appear to have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 997 [2011]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2009]; People v James, 19 AD3d 617, 618 [2005]). 2014Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he observed an ammunition magazine in plain view inside the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, after stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, was not incredible and did not appear to have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 997 [2011]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2009]; People v James, 19 AD3d 617, 618 [2005]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. O'Haregreen2 sentences2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). 2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). 2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Meyersgreen2 sentences2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). 2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Barleygreen2 sentences2014Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he observed an ammunition magazine in plain view inside the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, after stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, was not incredible and did not appear to have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 997 [2011]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2009]; People v James, 19 AD3d 617, 618 [2005]). 2014Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the police officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he observed an ammunition magazine in plain view inside the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, after stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, was not incredible and did not appear to have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 997 [2011]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022, 1022-1023 [2009]; People v James, 19 AD3d 617, 618 [2005]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. McClendongreen2 sentences2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). 2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). 2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Ponzogreen2 sentences2015Additionally, having justifiably stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation and having detected the odor of marihuana from inside it, the police had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained drugs, and the subsequent canine sniff was proper (see People v Ponzo, 111 AD3d 1347, 1348 [2013]). 2015Additionally, having justifiably stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation and having detected the odor of marihuana from inside it, the police had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained drugs, and the subsequent canine sniff was proper (see People v Ponzo, 111 AD3d 1347, 1348 [2013]). | 2 | 3 |
Kabir v. County of Monroegreen1 sentence2019Here, a factual issue exists as to whether defendants were engaged in a protected activity under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), namely, proceeding past a steady red signal ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[b][2]), while pursuing a vehicle for a traffic violation so as to apply the reckless standard of care as opposed to ordinary negligence principles (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[e]; see Kabir , 16 NY3d at 220 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baptistegreen1 sentence2005“Questions of credibility are primarily for the hearing court, and its determination is entitled to great deference on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous” (People v Baptiste, 192 AD2d 714, 715 [1993]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Maringreen1 sentence1989Moreover, the officer properly ordered the defendant to step out of the car (see, Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; see also, People v Marin, 80 AD2d 541 ; People v David L., 56 NY2d 698 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooper v. Robertson
green
2 sentences2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). 2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). | 4 | 2013–2014 |
People v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). 2014Although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; People v McClendon, 92 AD3d 959, 960 [2012]). | 4 | 2013–2014 |
People v. Dunbar
green
2 sentences2013Moreover, although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Dunbar, 104 AD3d 198 [2013]; People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; Peopl 2013Moreover, although, upon the exercise of our factual review power, this Court may make its own findings of fact if it determines that the hearing court incorrectly assessed the evidence (see People v Anderson, 91 AD3d 789 [2012]; People v Meyers, 80 AD3d 715, 716 [2011]; People v Rodriguez, 77 AD3d 280, 284-285 [2010]; People v O’Hare, 73 AD3d 812, 813 [2010]; Matter of Robert D., 69 AD3d 714 , 716-717 [2010]), we cannot say that the hearing court was incorrect in crediting the police officer’s testimony (see People v Dunbar, 104 AD3d 198 [2013]; People v Wilson, 96 AD3d 980, 981 [2012]; Peopl | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Pennsylvania v. Mimms
green
2 sentences1989Moreover, the officer properly ordered the defendant to step out of the car (see, Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; see also, People v Marin, 80 AD2d 541 ; People v David L., 56 NY2d 698 ). 1985The case of Pennsylvania v Mimms ( 434 US 106, 109-112 ) establishes the right of a police officer who has lawfully stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation to detain the occupants for purposes of checking identity, ownership, etc., and writing a traffic ticket, and to order the occu pants out of the vehicle while undertaking those procedures. | 2 | 1985–1989 |
People v. Foster
green
1 sentence2011Here, the hearing testimony of a police officer, who stated that he observed the defendant in possession of a gun in plain view inside the defendant’s vehicle after stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, was not incredible and did not appear to have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v James, 19 AD3d 617 [2005]; People v Foster, 173 AD2d 841 [1991]). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Ingle
green
1 sentence2008The police may stop a vehicle for a traffic violation when they have a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the driver has violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648 [1979]; People v Ingle, supra). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
1 sentence2008The police may stop a vehicle for a traffic violation when they have a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that the driver has violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648 [1979]; People v Ingle, supra). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Llopis
green
1 sentence1989Moreover, there is no basis for concluding that Officer Powell stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation merely as a pretext to investigate unrelated criminal activity (cf., People v LƖopis, 125 AD2d 416 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. David L.
green
1 sentence1989Moreover, the officer properly ordered the defendant to step out of the car (see, Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; see also, People v Marin, 80 AD2d 541 ; People v David L., 56 NY2d 698 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Ross
green
1 sentence1985Moreover, once the vial containing the suspected cocaine was discovered, there was both probable cause to arrest defendant and Hunt and authority to make the extensive search of the vehicle subsequent to the arrest (United States v Ross, 456 US 798 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.