Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2011–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.green2 sentences2022White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir.2008). 2021White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir.2008). | 2 | 2 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greengreen2 sentences2015See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). {¶9} In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the person seeking relief must demonstrate that (1) he was disabled, (2) an adverse employment action was taken by an employer, at least in part, because the individual was disabled, and (3) the person, though disabled, can safely and substantially perform the essential functions of the job in question. 2013“This test is a descendant of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green[], 411 U.S. 792 * * * [(1973))], in which the United States Supreme Court promulgated an analytical framework for claims of race discrimination.” Id. at ¶ 9. {¶21} With respect to his age discrimination claim, Mr. Drogell did not identify any direct evidence of discriminatory intent based upon his age in his complaint thereby necessitating employment of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. | 1 | 2 |
Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appealsgreen1 sentence2025Ade v. Conklin Cars Salina, L.L.C., 800 Fed.Appx. 646 , 650-651 (10th Cir. 2020) (termination of employment claim on basis of sex); Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-191 (4th Cir. 2010) (termination of employment claim on basis of race); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (hostile work environment claim on basis of sex); Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C., 484 F.3d 1046 , 1058-1059 (8th Cir. 2007) (hostile work environment claim on basis of race); Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 108-109 (2d Cir. 2019) (pay discrimination clai | 1 | 1 |
O'CONNOR v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.green1 sentence2025See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311, fn. 2 (1996) (citing cases). {¶ 68} Federal courts have also adapted the language of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to account for the facts of specific cases. | 1 | 1 |
Ocheltree v. Scollon Productionsgreen1 sentence2025Ade v. Conklin Cars Salina, L.L.C., 800 Fed.Appx. 646 , 650-651 (10th Cir. 2020) (termination of employment claim on basis of sex); Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-191 (4th Cir. 2010) (termination of employment claim on basis of race); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (hostile work environment claim on basis of sex); Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C., 484 F.3d 1046 , 1058-1059 (8th Cir. 2007) (hostile work environment claim on basis of race); Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 108-109 (2d Cir. 2019) (pay discrimination clai | 1 | 1 |
Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc.green1 sentence2025Ade v. Conklin Cars Salina, L.L.C., 800 Fed.Appx. 646 , 650-651 (10th Cir. 2020) (termination of employment claim on basis of sex); Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-191 (4th Cir. 2010) (termination of employment claim on basis of race); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (hostile work environment claim on basis of sex); Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C., 484 F.3d 1046 , 1058-1059 (8th Cir. 2007) (hostile work environment claim on basis of race); Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 108-109 (2d Cir. 2019) (pay discrimination clai | 1 | 1 |
Stair v. Phoenix Presentations, Inc.green1 sentence2025O'Reilly Co., Ltd., 2004-Ohio-425, ¶ 22 (12th Dist.) (sex discrimination); Stair v. Phoenix Presentations, Inc., 116 Ohio App.3d 500, 508 (12th Dist.1996) (age discrimination); Waddell v. Grant/Riverside Med. | 1 | 1 |
Mustard v. Timothy J. O'Reilly Co., Ltd., Unpublished Decision (2-2-2004)green1 sentence2025O'Reilly Co., Ltd., 2004-Ohio-425, ¶ 22 (12th Dist.) (sex discrimination); Stair v. Phoenix Presentations, Inc., 116 Ohio App.3d 500, 508 (12th Dist.1996) (age discrimination); Waddell v. Grant/Riverside Med. | 1 | 1 |
Norbuta v. Loctite Corp.green1 sentence2024“If that evidence is credible, ‘discriminatory animus may be at least part of an employer’s motive, and in the absence of an alternative, non-discriminatory explanation for that evidence, there exists a genuine issue of material fact suitable for submission to the jury without further analysis by the court.’” Id., quoting Norbuta v. Loctite Corp., 1 Fed.Appx. 305, 312 (6th Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Stallworth v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P.green1 sentence2024Pursuant to the McDonnell- Douglas burden-shifting framework "a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of . . . discrimination by demonstrating: (1) that [s]he is a member of a . . . protected class, (2) that [s]he suffered an adverse employment action or that [her] employment was terminated, (3) that [s]he was qualified for the position, and (4) that similarly-situated nonprotected employees were treated differently." English v. AK Steel Corp., 2016-Ohio- 5287, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.), citing Stallworth v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 2016-Ohio-2620, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Village of Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.green1 sentence2023Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Housden v. Wilke Global, Inc.green1 sentence2019See, e.g., Housden v. Wilke Global, Inc., 10th Dist No. 17AP-420, 2018-Ohio-3959, ¶ 66 ; Crase v. Shasta Beverages, Inc., 10th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Tammy Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Schoolgreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., Demyanovich at 433 ; Rosebrough at 431, fn.2 ; Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., S.D.Ohio No. 1:10-cv-919, fn.21 (May 1, 2012). {¶ 20} The burden then shifts to ODOT under the McDonnell Douglas burden- shifting framework to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. | 1 | 1 |
Grace v. USCARgreen1 sentence2016Donald at 762 , citing Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 670 (6th Cir. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Whitfield v. Tennesseegreen2 sentences2011See also id. at 262-265 (Stranch, J., concurring) (commenting on the use of an analogous formulation of the prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act of 12 1973 in the McDonnell Douglas framework).1 Indeed, to apply the Hazlett and Hood formulation of the prima facie case “makes little sense, as its third element—whether the employee was, in fact, discharged because of the disability—requires at the prima facie stage what the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework seeks to uncover only through two additional burden shifts, thereby rendering that framework wholly unnecessary.” See Whit 2011See also id. at 262-265 (Stranch, J., concurring) (commenting on the use of an analogous formulation of the prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act of 12 1973 in the McDonnell Douglas framework).1 Indeed, to apply the Hazlett and Hood formulation of the prima facie case “makes little sense, as its third element—whether the employee was, in fact, discharged because of the disability—requires at the prima facie stage what the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework seeks to uncover only through two additional burden shifts, thereby rendering that framework wholly unnecessary.” See Whit | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
green
2 sentences2022Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 2004-Ohio-723 , ¶ 14-20. 6 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework was subsequently modified in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 2021Williams v. Akron, 107 Ohio St.3d 203 , 2005-Ohio-6268 , ¶ 31. 4 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework was subsequently modified in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). | 3 | 2015–2022 |
Abdel Elnashar v. Speedway Superamerica, Llc
green
1 sentence2025Ade v. Conklin Cars Salina, L.L.C., 800 Fed.Appx. 646 , 650-651 (10th Cir. 2020) (termination of employment claim on basis of sex); Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-191 (4th Cir. 2010) (termination of employment claim on basis of race); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (hostile work environment claim on basis of sex); Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C., 484 F.3d 1046 , 1058-1059 (8th Cir. 2007) (hostile work environment claim on basis of race); Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 108-109 (2d Cir. 2019) (pay discrimination clai | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hoffman v. Chsho, Inc., Unpublished Decision (8-1-2005)
neutral
1 sentence2025Like federal courts, Ohio courts apply different versions of the fourth prong of the prima facie case depending on the context of a particular case. {¶ 72} In Hoffman v. CHSHO, Inc., 2005-Ohio-3909 (12th Dist.), we applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to an Ohio age discrimination claim arising out of the alleged unlawful termination of employment. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ceglia v. Youngstown State Univ.
green
1 sentence2024(Response, p. 11.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has abandoned his claims of discrimination via the indirect method of proof, and instead of reciting the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court will analyze this case through the direct method of proof.4 {¶24} “Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Ceglia v. Youngstown State Univ., 2015-Ohio-2125 , 38 N.E.3d 1222 , ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Moody v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Servs.
green
1 sentence2023Moody, 2021-Ohio-4578 at ¶ 36 , citing Wu v. Northeast Ohio Med. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A.
green
1 sentence2022Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175 , 2004-Ohio-723 , ¶ 14-20. 6 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework was subsequently modified in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Williams v. City of Akron
green
1 sentence2021Williams v. Akron, 107 Ohio St.3d 203 , 2005-Ohio-6268 , ¶ 31. 4 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework was subsequently modified in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wittman v. City of Akron, Unpublished Decision (10-22-2003)
green
1 sentence2015Summit No. 21375, 2003-Ohio-5617 (expressly applying Price Waterhouse to retaliation claim). {¶43} It is important to note that Nassar does not mention the term “prima facie case,” nor does it refer to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.