13 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Thus, “[t]here is little doubt that it is appropriate to consider the harm-preventing purpose of a regulation in the context of the character prong of a Penn Central analysis.” Rose Acre Farms, 559 F.3d at 1281 , citing Appolo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1351 . 2026Thus, “[t]here is little doubt that it is appropriate to consider the harm-preventing purpose of a regulation in the context of the character prong of a Penn Central analysis.” Rose Acre Farms, 559 F.3d at 1281 , citing Appolo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1351 . | 2 | 2 |
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.green2 sentences2024These bodies, however, cannot leave a party in regulatory purgatory when that party seeks to cooperate in good faith with state decisionmakers. {¶147} The Supreme Court has explained that “the Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 . 2024These bodies, however, cannot leave a party in regulatory purgatory when that party seeks to cooperate in good faith with state decisionmakers. {¶147} The Supreme Court has explained that “the Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 . | 1 | 6 |
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agencygreen2 sentences2026See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 14 January Term, 2026 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321, 341-342 (2002) (32-month moratorium on development of property was analyzed under Penn Central rather than a categorical- takings rule). {¶ 38} Because AWMS failed to prove that the suspension order deprived it of all economically beneficial use of its leasehold, we reject AWMS’s argument that the court of appeals should have found a total taking of its leasehold. 2026See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 14 January Term, 2026 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321, 341-342 (2002) (32-month moratorium on development of property was analyzed under Penn Central rather than a categorical- takings rule). {¶ 38} Because AWMS failed to prove that the suspension order deprived it of all economically beneficial use of its leasehold, we reject AWMS’s argument that the court of appeals should have found a total taking of its leasehold. | 1 | 3 |
Palazzolo v. Rhode Islandgreen2 sentences2008Resisting `the temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction,' Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 533 U.S. 606,636 , * * * (2001) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), we conclude that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed within the Penn Central framework." [Footnote omitted.] Id., at 321. {¶ 37} Given this court's prior conclusion in the present matter that the purported taking of relator's property can only be characterized as temporary in nature, we further hold that the "all economically viable use" standard cannot be applied in determining if a taking actually occurred in 2008Resisting `the temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction,' Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 533 U.S. 606,636 , * * * (2001) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), we conclude that the circumstances in this case are best analyzed within the Penn Central framework." [Footnote omitted.] Id., at 321. {¶ 37} Given this court's prior conclusion in the present matter that the purported taking of relator's property can only be characterized as temporary in nature, we further hold that the "all economically viable use" standard cannot be applied in determining if a taking actually occurred in | 1 | 2 |
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Ultimately, the Penn Central balancing is designed to “ascertain whether . . . it is unfair to force the property owner to bear the cost of the regulatory action.” Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1282 (Fed.Cir. 2009). {¶ 56} We conclude that the court of appeals erred in its balancing of the Penn Central factors. 2026Ultimately, the Penn Central balancing is designed to “ascertain whether . . . it is unfair to force the property owner to bear the cost of the regulatory action.” Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1282 (Fed.Cir. 2009). {¶ 56} We conclude that the court of appeals erred in its balancing of the Penn Central factors. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. GreenAcres v. Cincinnatigreen2 sentences2026Greenacres Found. v. Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio-5479, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.). 2026Greenacres Found. v. Cincinnati, 2015-Ohio-5479, ¶ 38 (1st Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valleygreen2 sentences2022There are three forms of regulatory action that generally will be deemed a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes, see Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.2007): First, where the government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 , 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); second, where a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of property, see Lucas, supra; and third, a partial regulatory taking where the Penn Central factors are met. 2022There are three forms of regulatory action that generally will be deemed a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes, see Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.2007): First, where the government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 , 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); second, where a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of property, see Lucas, supra; and third, a partial regulatory taking where the Penn Central factors are met. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 .” Shelly Materials at ¶ 19. {¶26} “‘In the context of regulatory delay, the Penn Central inquiry is whether the delay ever became unreasonable. * * * Until regulatory delay becomes unreasonable, there is no taking.’ Byrd v. Hartsville (2005), 365 S.C. 650, 660 , 620 S.E.2d 76 . 2024Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 .” Shelly Materials at ¶ 19. {¶26} “‘In the context of regulatory delay, the Penn Central inquiry is whether the delay ever became unreasonable. * * * Until regulatory delay becomes unreasonable, there is no taking.’ Byrd v. Hartsville (2005), 365 S.C. 650, 660 , 620 S.E.2d 76 . | 5 | 2007–2024 |
State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark County Board of Commissioners
green
2 sentences2020Under the framework of the Penn Cent. analysis, a court should consider “(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action,” Shelly Materials, 115 Ohio St.3d 337 , 2007- Ohio-5022, 875 N.E.2d 59, at ¶ 19 . “[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 , 125 S.Ct. 2020Under the framework of the Penn Cent. analysis, a court should consider “(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action,” Shelly Materials, 115 Ohio St.3d 337 , 2007- Ohio-5022, 875 N.E.2d 59, at ¶ 19 . “[T]he Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 , 125 S.Ct. | 3 | 2008–2020 |
Byrd v. City of Hartsville
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 .” Shelly Materials at ¶ 19. {¶26} “‘In the context of regulatory delay, the Penn Central inquiry is whether the delay ever became unreasonable. * * * Until regulatory delay becomes unreasonable, there is no taking.’ Byrd v. Hartsville (2005), 365 S.C. 650, 660 , 620 S.E.2d 76 . 2024Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 .” Shelly Materials at ¶ 19. {¶26} “‘In the context of regulatory delay, the Penn Central inquiry is whether the delay ever became unreasonable. * * * Until regulatory delay becomes unreasonable, there is no taking.’ Byrd v. Hartsville (2005), 365 S.C. 650, 660 , 620 S.E.2d 76 . | 2 | 2008–2024 |
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. And Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences2026We agree. 20 January Term, 2026 {¶ 58} The character factor requires a court to “consider the purpose and importance of the public interest reflected in the regulatory imposition.” Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1176 . 2026We agree. 20 January Term, 2026 {¶ 58} The character factor requires a court to “consider the purpose and importance of the public interest reflected in the regulatory imposition.” Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1176 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
American Pelagic Fishing Company, L.P. v. United States
green
2 sentences2026Id. at ¶ 45 and ¶ 51. {¶58} Regarding the final factor relating to the character of the governmental action, AWMS III directs the court to “consider the purpose and importance of the public interest reflected in the regulatory imposition,” noting that “[t]here is little doubt that it is appropriate to consider the harm-preventing purpose of a regulation in the context of the character prong of a Penn Central analysis.” AWMS III at ¶ 58 (Citations and quotation PAGE 22 OF 24 Case No. 2025-P-0036 marks omitted). 2026Id. at ¶ 45 and ¶ 51. {¶58} Regarding the final factor relating to the character of the governmental action, AWMS III directs the court to “consider the purpose and importance of the public interest reflected in the regulatory imposition,” noting that “[t]here is little doubt that it is appropriate to consider the harm-preventing purpose of a regulation in the context of the character prong of a Penn Central analysis.” AWMS III at ¶ 58 (Citations and quotation PAGE 22 OF 24 Case No. 2025-P-0036 marks omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
green
2 sentences2022There are three forms of regulatory action that generally will be deemed a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes, see Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.2007): First, where the government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 , 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); second, where a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of property, see Lucas, supra; and third, a partial regulatory taking where the Penn Central factors are met. 2022There are three forms of regulatory action that generally will be deemed a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes, see Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.2007): First, where the government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 , 102 S.Ct. 3164 , 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); second, where a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of property, see Lucas, supra; and third, a partial regulatory taking where the Penn Central factors are met. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Jaylin Investments, Inc. v. Village of Moreland Hills
green
2 sentences2007Lingle , 544 U.S. at 538 . {¶ 51} The Penn Central factors include: the expectations of the property owner; 8 the degree to which the regulation is designed to stop uses that cause substantial individualized harm, but are not common law nuisances; the degree to which the regulation enables the government to actually use the property for uniquely public functions; and the nature of the governmental interaction, i.e., whether it is a "physical invasion by the government" as compared to "when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promo 2007Lingle , 544 U.S. at 538 . {¶ 51} The Penn Central factors include: the expectations of the property owner; 8 the degree to which the regulation is designed to stop uses that cause substantial individualized harm, but are not common law nuisances; the degree to which the regulation enables the government to actually use the property for uniquely public functions; and the nature of the governmental interaction, i.e., whether it is a "physical invasion by the government" as compared to "when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promo | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.