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8 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1989–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councilgreen2 sentences2017The Penn Central factors—though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules [Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992)]” (Lingle v Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 US at 538-539 ; see Matter of New Cr. 2017The Penn Central factors—though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules [Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992)]” (Lingle v Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 US at 538-539 ; see Matter of New Cr. | 1 | 4 |
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.green2 sentences2017The Penn Central factors—though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules [Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992)]” (Lingle v Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 US at 538-539 ; see Matter of New Cr. 2017The Penn Central factors—though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules [Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992)]” (Lingle v Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 US at 538-539 ; see Matter of New Cr. | 1 | 2 |
Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal.green2 sentences2008The court should make clear that “mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking” (Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 US 602, 645 [1993]), and that a land use restriction “is not rendered unconstitutional merely because it causes the property’s value to be ‘substantially reduced’ ” (Putnam County Natl. 2008The court should make clear that “mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking” (Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 US 602, 645 [1993]), and that a land use restriction “is not rendered unconstitutional merely because it causes the property’s value to be ‘substantially reduced’ ” (Putnam County Natl. | 1 | 1 |
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictisgreen2 sentences2004Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1024 [1992]; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn, v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 485 [1987]). . 2004Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1024 [1992]; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 485 [1987]). [7] Because the Town's conservation restriction cannot be classified as an exaction, we need not address the question whether it was roughly proportional to the impact of the development proposed by the Smiths. [8] Judge Read suggests that the conservation restriction here somehow encumbers the right to exclude because it permits town inspectors to enter the property on 30 days' written notice or in the event of an emergency threatening the public's health, | 1 | 1 |
Agins v. City of Tiburonred2 sentences2004Two years later when considering a facial challenge to a municipal zoning ordinance, however, the Court in Agins v City of Tiburon ( 447 US 255 [1980]) condensed and reformulated the Penn Central factors into something akin to a test: “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests [i.e., the character of the governmental action], or denies an owner economically viable use of his land [i.e., the regulation’s economic impact on the claimant and the extent of interference with distinct, 2004Two years later when considering a facial challenge to a municipal zoning ordinance, however, the Court in Agins v City of Tiburon ( 447 US 255 [1980]) condensed and reformulated the Penn Central factors into something akin to a test: “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests [i.e., the character of the governmental action], or denies an owner economically viable use of his land [i.e., the regulation’s economic impact on the claimant and the extent of interference with distinct, | 1 | 1 |
Balsam v. Delma Engineering Corp.green1 sentence1989(See, Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 783-784, 786 [1976]; Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp., 139 AD2d 292, 296-298 [1st Dept 1988].) Thus, the IAS court erred when it denied Penn Central’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. | 1 | 1 |
Pulka v. Edelmangreen1 sentence1989(See, Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781, 783-784, 786 [1976]; Balsam v Delma Eng’g Corp., 139 AD2d 292, 296-298 [1st Dept 1988].) Thus, the IAS court erred when it denied Penn Central’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
green
2 sentences2026Co. v City of New York (438 US 104 [1978]) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]; see also id. at 629 [Kagan, J., dissenting] [noting that "court(s) can use the Penn Central framework, the Due Process Clause, and (in many places) state law to protect against monetary demands, whether or not imposed to evade Nollan and Dolan, that simply go too far" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]). 2026Co. v City of New York (438 US 104 [1978]) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]; see also id. at 629 [Kagan, J., dissenting] [noting that "court(s) can use the Penn Central framework, the Due Process Clause, and (in many places) state law to protect against monetary demands, whether or not imposed to evade Nollan and Dolan, that simply go too far" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]). | 3 | 2004–2026 |
Matter of New Cr. Bluebelt, Phase 4.
green
2 sentences2017Bluebelt, Phase 4, 122 AD3d at 861 ; Matter of Friedenburg v New York State Dept. of Envtl. 2017Bluebelt, Phase 4, 122 AD3d at 861 ; Matter of Friedenburg v New York State Dept. of Envtl. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
green
2 sentences2014Indeed the concurring comments of Justice O’Connor (part of the majority in Palazzolo which held that it had “no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law” [ 533 US 606, 629 ]) — that “[t]oday’s holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis. 2014Indeed the concurring comments of Justice O’Connor (part of the majority in Palazzolo which held that it had “no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law” [ 533 US 606, 629 ]) — that “[t]oday’s holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.