Penn Central factors in California

2025The trial court 3 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, supra, 438 U.S. 104 prescribed an “ ‘ad hoc, multifactored test’ ” to determine when a use restriction goes “ ‘ “too far” ’ ” and constitutes a taking. ( Surfrider, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 259, 265.) Here, the trial court concluded that all the Penn Central factors weighed against Thompson.

2025The trial court 3 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, supra, 438 U.S. 104 prescribed an “ ‘ad hoc, multifactored test’ ” to determine when a use restriction goes “ ‘ “too far” ’ ” and constitutes a taking. ( Surfrider, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 259, 265.) Here, the trial court concluded that all the Penn Central factors weighed against Thompson.

2017(See, e.g., Horne , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2427 [describing a " 'regulatory taking' " as a "restriction on the use of property that went 'too far' "]; but see Lingle , supra , 544 U.S. at p. 538 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 [characterizing a law requiring "an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property" as a type of "regulatory action" that is a per se taking].) 30 And, we also recognize that Arkansas Game held that takings claims based on temporary government-induced flooding (an apparent temporary physical invasion) are subject to a multifactor test different from the Penn Central tes

2017(See, e.g., Horne , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2427 [describing a " 'regulatory taking' " as a "restriction on the use of property that went 'too far' "]; but see Lingle , supra , 544 U.S. at p. 538 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 [characterizing a law requiring "an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property" as a type of "regulatory action" that is a per se taking].) 30 And, we also recognize that Arkansas Game held that takings claims based on temporary government-induced flooding (an apparent temporary physical invasion) are subject to a multifactor test different from the Penn Central tes

2011(Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 775 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ].) Although Judge McEachen found a complete taking, he also made findings regarding the Penn Central factors establishing a less than complete taking.

2011(Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 761, 775 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 ].) Although Judge McEachen found a complete taking, he also made findings regarding the Penn Central factors establishing a less than complete taking.

2017The analysis also imposes an evidentiary burden on the party claiming to be subject to a taking, including the necessity of putting on evidence regarding the impact of the claimed taking (here, a temporary injunction requiring limited public access), including the degree of interference with " 'reasonable investment-backed expectations.' " ( Arkansas Game , 568 U.S. at p. 39 , 133 S.Ct. 511 ; see also Penn Central , supra , 438 U.S. at p. 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 ; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470 , 485, 107 S.Ct. 1232 , 94 L.Ed.2d 472 [claimant bears burden of sho

2017The analysis also imposes an evidentiary burden on the party claiming to be subject to a taking, including the necessity of putting on evidence regarding the impact of the claimed taking (here, a temporary injunction requiring limited public access), including the degree of interference with " 'reasonable investment-backed expectations.' " ( Arkansas Game , 568 U.S. at p. 39 , 133 S.Ct. 511 ; see also Penn Central , supra , 438 U.S. at p. 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 ; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470 , 485, 107 S.Ct. 1232 , 94 L.Ed.2d 472 [claimant bears burden of sho

2018As noted, the Penn Central test requires us to examine three factors to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the claimant's reasonable, distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government action. ( Penn Central, supra , 438 U.S. at p. 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 .) For the first factor, "we ask whether the regulation 'unreasonably impair[s] the value or use of [the] property' in view of the owners' general use of their property." ( Allegretti

2018As noted, the Penn Central test requires us to examine three factors to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the claimant's reasonable, distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government action. ( Penn Central, supra , 438 U.S. at p. 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 .) For the first factor, "we ask whether the regulation 'unreasonably impair[s] the value or use of [the] property' in view of the owners' general use of their property." ( Allegretti

2013In Landgate, the court acknowledged the Penn Central factors, but it relied on a different test evolved from language in Agins v. Tibur0n (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ].

2013In Landgate, the court acknowledged the Penn Central factors, but it relied on a different test evolved from language in Agins v. Tibur0n (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 260 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 106 , 100 S.Ct. 2138 ].

2017But appellants cite no case supporting the proposition that the courts have created a category of per se takings covering temporary physical invasions, such that the invasions are always takings, "without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." ( Loretto , supra , 458 U.S. at pp. 434-435, 102 S.Ct. 3164 ; see also Arkansas Game , supra , 568 U.S. at pp. 31-32, 133 S.Ct. 511 [alleged takings not covered by the recognized categorical rules are considered under a multifactor test, such as the Penn Central test].) 29 *414

2017But appellants cite no case supporting the proposition that the courts have created a category of per se takings covering temporary physical invasions, such that the invasions are always takings, "without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." ( Loretto , supra , 458 U.S. at pp. 434-435, 102 S.Ct. 3164 ; see also Arkansas Game , supra , 568 U.S. at pp. 31-32, 133 S.Ct. 511 [alleged takings not covered by the recognized categorical rules are considered under a multifactor test, such as the Penn Central test].) 29 *414

2022(See Arizona v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 423, 462, fn. 14 [allegation that the Secretary of the Interior had “seized and had taken possession” disregarded as a “conclusion of law”].) The Complaint does not allege facts constituting a physical taking. 18 expectations; and (3) the character of the government action. 13 (Horne v. Dep't of Agric. (2015) 576 U.S. 351 , 360.) These are the “principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims.” (Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 539 .) Owners have not alleged a legally sufficient regulatory taking claim.

2022(See Arizona v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 423, 462, fn. 14 [allegation that the Secretary of the Interior had “seized and had taken possession” disregarded as a “conclusion of law”].) The Complaint does not allege facts constituting a physical taking. 18 expectations; and (3) the character of the government action.13 (Horne v. Dep't of Agric. (2015) 576 U.S. 351 , 360.) These are the “principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims.” (Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 539 .) Owners have not alleged a legally sufficient regulatory taking claim.

2022(See, e.g., Daugherty Speedway, supra, 520 F.Supp.3d at p. 1078 [noting that “ ‘courts across the country agree that the . . . character of the disputed government action during the COVID-19 pandemic, weighs heavily in Defendants’ favor,” and dismissing claim that an order closing a racetrack was a taking]; TJM 64, supra, 526 F.Supp.3d at p. 338 [dismissing restaurants’ claim that closure order due to COVID-19 was a regulatory taking, reasoning “it is undeniable that th[e] exercise of police powers was intended to promote the common good in response to a global pandemic that impacted public sa

2022(See, e.g., Daugherty Speedway, supra, 520 F.Supp.3d at p. 1078 [noting that “ ‘courts across the country agree that the . . . character of the disputed government action during the COVID-19 pandemic, weighs heavily in Defendants’ favor,” and dismissing claim that an order closing a racetrack was a taking]; TJM 64, supra, 526 F.Supp.3d at p. 338 [dismissing restaurants’ claim that closure order due to COVID-19 was a regulatory taking, reasoning “it is undeniable that th[e] exercise of police powers was intended to promote the common good in response to a global pandemic that impacted public sa

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2017The Penn Central factors-though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions-have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or [deprivation of all economically beneficial use] rules." ( Lingle , 544 U.S. at pp. 538-539, 125 S.Ct. 2074 ; see also Murr v. Wisconsin (2017) --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1933 , 1942-1943, 198 L.Ed.2d 497 ( Murr ).) Appellants contend the trial court's injunction constitutes a per se physical taking exempt from the multifactor Penn Central analysis because it stripped them of their right

2017The Penn Central factors-though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions-have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or [deprivation of all economically beneficial use] rules." ( Lingle , 544 U.S. at pp. 538-539, 125 S.Ct. 2074 ; see also Murr v. Wisconsin (2017) --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1933 , 1942-1943, 198 L.Ed.2d 497 ( Murr ).) Appellants contend the trial court's injunction constitutes a per se physical taking exempt from the multifactor Penn Central analysis because it stripped them of their right

2013(See Buckley v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 178, 193 [in determining whether there has been a regulatory taking under the Penn Central analysis, the inquiry requires an evaluation of the "owner's entire property holdings at the time of the alleged taking, not just the adversely affected portion"], citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470, 497 .) As such, we conclude under Penn Central there was no regulatory taking of the property between 2006 and May 2008, when the ALJ issued the 19-page enforcement order. 11 2. 2008 to 2010; Lucas Analysis R

2013(See Buckley v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 178, 193 [in determining whether there has been a regulatory taking under the Penn Central analysis, the inquiry requires an evaluation of the "owner's entire property holdings at the time of the alleged taking, not just the adversely affected portion"], citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470, 497 .) As such, we conclude under Penn Central there was no regulatory taking of the property between 2006 and May 2008, when the ALJ issued the 19-page enforcement order. 11 2. 2008 to 2010; Lucas Analysis R

2002Thus, instead of applying these factors mechanically, checking them off as it proceeds, a court should apply them as appropriate to the facts of the case it is considering.” (Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 776 .) “We reach [our] conclusion [in this case] by applying the three [Penn Central] factors that traditionally have informed [the Supreme Court’s] regulatory takings analysis.” (Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (1998) 524 U.S. 498, 529 [ 118 S.Ct. 2131, 2149 , 141 L.Ed.2d 451 ] (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.); see id. at pp. 529-537 [118 S.Ct. at pp. 2149-2153] (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [app

2002Thus, instead of applying these factors mechanically, checking them off as it proceeds, a court should apply them as appropriate to the facts of the case it is considering.” (Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 776 .) “We reach [our] conclusion [in this case] by applying the three [Penn Central] factors that traditionally have informed [the Supreme Court’s] regulatory takings analysis.” (Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (1998) 524 U.S. 498, 529 [ 118 S.Ct. 2131, 2149 , 141 L.Ed.2d 451 ] (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.); see id. at pp. 529-537 [118 S.Ct. at pp. 2149-2153] (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [app

2008(Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277 , and cases cited there; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1005 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 815 , 104 S.Ct. 2862 ] [disposing of takings claim solely on absence of reasonable investment-backed expectations].) In addressing the first of the three Penn Central factors, “we ask whether the regulation ‘unreasonably impair[s] the value or use of [the] property’ in view of the owners’ general use of their property.

2008(Allegretti, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277 , and cases cited there; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1005 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 815 , 104 S.Ct. 2862 ] [disposing of takings claim solely on absence of reasonable investment-backed expectations].) In addressing the first of the three Penn Central factors, “we ask whether the regulation ‘unreasonably impair[s] the value or use of [the] property’ in view of the owners’ general use of their property.

2006(Bronco Wine v. Jolly (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 988, 1035 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 462 ], citing Maritrans Inc. v. United States (Fed.Cir. 2003) 342 F.3d 1344, 1359 [where the nature of the governmental action and the economic impact of the regulation did not establish a taking, the court need not consider investment-backed expectations], Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1005 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 815 , 104 S.Ct. 2862 ] [disposing of takings claim relating to trade secrets solely on absence of reasonable investment-backed expectations], Andrus v. Allard (1979) 444 U.S. 51, 65-68 [ 62 L.Ed.2d 210 ,

2006(Bronco Wine v. Jolly (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 988, 1035 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 462 ], citing Maritrans Inc. v. United States (Fed.Cir. 2003) 342 F.3d 1344, 1359 [where the nature of the governmental action and the economic impact of the regulation did not establish a taking, the court need not consider investment-backed expectations], Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. (1984) 467 U.S. 986, 1005 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 815 , 104 S.Ct. 2862 ] [disposing of takings claim relating to trade secrets solely on absence of reasonable investment-backed expectations], Andrus v. Allard (1979) 444 U.S. 51, 65-68 [ 62 L.Ed.2d 210 ,

2017The court emphasized, ―[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner‘s bundle of property rights.‖ (Id. at p. 435.) The court also stated, ―physical invasion cases are special and . . . any permanent physical occupation is a taking.‖ (Id. at p. 432; see also Horne, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2429 .) This is so ―without regard to whether the action 24 We need not and do not decide whether the trial court‘s injunction is literally a regulatory taking that must be analyzed under the Penn Central test or whether another multifactor test applies

2017The court emphasized, ―[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner‘s bundle of property rights.‖ (Id. at p. 435.) The court also stated, ―physical invasion cases are special and . . . any permanent physical occupation is a taking.‖ (Id. at p. 432; see also Horne, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2429 .) This is so ―without regard to whether the action 24 We need not and do not decide whether the trial court‘s injunction is literally a regulatory taking that must be analyzed under the Penn Central test or whether another multifactor test applies

2015Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [Penn Central]." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 260-261; see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 .) "The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several 10 factors for evaluating a regulatory taking claim. [Citations.] Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the 'economic impact' of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with 'distinct investment-backed expec

2015Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [Penn Central]." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 260-261; see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 .) "The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several 10 factors for evaluating a regulatory taking claim. [Citations.] Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the 'economic impact' of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with 'distinct investment-backed expec

2017(See, e.g., Horne , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2427 [describing a " 'regulatory taking' " as a "restriction on the use of property that went 'too far' "]; but see Lingle , supra , 544 U.S. at p. 538 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 [characterizing a law requiring "an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property" as a type of "regulatory action" that is a per se taking].) 30 And, we also recognize that Arkansas Game held that takings claims based on temporary government-induced flooding (an apparent temporary physical invasion) are subject to a multifactor test different from the Penn Central tes

2017(See, e.g., Horne , supra , 135 S.Ct. at p. 2427 [describing a " 'regulatory taking' " as a "restriction on the use of property that went 'too far' "]; but see Lingle , supra , 544 U.S. at p. 538 , 125 S.Ct. 2074 [characterizing a law requiring "an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property" as a type of "regulatory action" that is a per se taking].) 30 And, we also recognize that Arkansas Game held that takings claims based on temporary government-induced flooding (an apparent temporary physical invasion) are subject to a multifactor test different from the Penn Central tes

2015Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [Penn Central]." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 260-261; see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 .) "The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several 10 factors for evaluating a regulatory taking claim. [Citations.] Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the 'economic impact' of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with 'distinct investment-backed expec

2015Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [Penn Central]." (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 260-261; see also Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 .) "The Penn Central inquiry is not a formula but an ad hoc factual inquiry that weighs several 10 factors for evaluating a regulatory taking claim. [Citations.] Courts conducting such an inquiry have identified three primary factors: (1) the 'economic impact' of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with 'distinct investment-backed expec

2023The United States Supreme Court has declared that a compensable regulatory taking can occur when a regulation goes ‘ “too far,” ’ but stops short of denying all economically viable use.” (Avenida San Juan Partnership v. City of San Clemente (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1272 (Avenida San Juan).) “Whether a regulation goes ‘too far’ is tested under what has been called the ‘Penn Central factors’ approach.

2014Our own Supreme Court has noted that there are three core factors: (1) the economic effect on the landowner; (2) the extent of the regulation’s interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. [Citation.]” (Avenida San Juan Partnership, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 .) The instant case does not involve a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2018On the contrary, it appears that California courts have implicitly assumed that the Penn Central formula-not the "substantially advances" test-applies to ad hoc regulatory takings claims under both the state and federal takings clauses. ( Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629 , 651, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 [overturning trial court's ruling that plaintiff's state and federal takings claims were meritless because the trial court applied the "substantially advances" test, which is a "due process test"]; see Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of Fremont (2012)

2017The analysis also imposes an evidentiary burden on the party claiming to be subject to a taking, including the necessity of putting on evidence regarding the impact of the claimed taking (here, a temporary injunction requiring limited public access), including the degree of interference with " 'reasonable investment-backed expectations.' " ( Arkansas Game , 568 U.S. at p. 39 , 133 S.Ct. 511 ; see also Penn Central , supra , 438 U.S. at p. 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 ; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470 , 485, 107 S.Ct. 1232 , 94 L.Ed.2d 472 [claimant bears burden of sho

2017The analysis also imposes an evidentiary burden on the party claiming to be subject to a taking, including the necessity of putting on evidence regarding the impact of the claimed taking (here, a temporary injunction requiring limited public access), including the degree of interference with " 'reasonable investment-backed expectations.' " ( Arkansas Game , 568 U.S. at p. 39 , 133 S.Ct. 511 ; see also Penn Central , supra , 438 U.S. at p. 124 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 ; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470 , 485, 107 S.Ct. 1232 , 94 L.Ed.2d 472 [claimant bears burden of sho

2011(Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 [ 150 L.Ed.2d 592 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ] (Palazzolo), quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S. 393, 415 [ 67 L.Ed. 322 , 43 S.Ct. 158 ].) Whether a regulation goes “too far” is tested under what has been called the “Penn Central factors” approach.

2011(Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001) 533 U.S. 606, 617 [ 150 L.Ed.2d 592 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ] (Palazzolo), quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S. 393, 415 [ 67 L.Ed. 322 , 43 S.Ct. 158 ].) Whether a regulation goes “too far” is tested under what has been called the “Penn Central factors” approach.