7 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 2008–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.green2 sentences2022Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 , 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005)). ¶79 Montana Artesian challenges the District Court’s application of the first and third Penn Central factors, contending the District Court’s analysis under these two factors was flawed because it was premised on the incorrect conclusion Montana Artesian’s water permit was not a water right. 2022Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 , 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005)). ¶79 Montana Artesian challenges the District Court’s application of the first and third Penn Central factors, contending the District Court’s analysis under these two factors was flawed because it was premised on the incorrect conclusion Montana Artesian’s water permit was not a water right. | 4 | 4 |
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.green2 sentences2008E.g., Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005-06 , 104 S. Ct. at 2874 (finding the reasonable investment-backed expectation prong dispositive under Penn Central analysis). ¶70 In jurisprudence under Penn Central, courts have fleshed out the practical meaning of each of these factors. 2008E.g., Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005-06 , 104 S. Ct. at 2874 (finding the reasonable investment-backed expectation prong dispositive under Penn Central analysis). ¶70 In jurisprudence under Penn Central, courts have fleshed out the practical meaning of each of these factors. | 2 | 2 |
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. And Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022See also Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1177 (describing how an owner who bought with knowledge of the restraint has no reliance interest, and has assumed the risk of any economic loss and that the market would have already discounted for the restraint, such that the purchaser could show no loss); Kafka, ¶¶ 72-73 (describing role of market value in Penn Central analysis); Richards, ¶ 35. | 1 | 1 |
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022In other words, this factor limits takings claims to “those who can ‘demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.’” Kafka, ¶ 72 (quoting Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.3d 1177, 1190 (Fed. 2022In other words, this factor limits takings claims to “those who can ‘demonstrate that they bought their property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.’” Kafka, ¶ 72 (quoting Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.3d 1177, 1190 (Fed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nectow v. City of Cambridge
green
2 sentences2008Two years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980), the Supreme Court summarized the takings inquiry as follows: “The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 , 100 S. Ct. at 2141 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 , 48 S. Ct. at 448 , and Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n. 36, 98 S. Ct. at 2666 n. 36). 2008Two years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980), the Supreme Court summarized the takings inquiry as follows: “The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 , 100 S. Ct. at 2141 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 , 48 S. Ct. at 448 , and Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n. 36, 98 S. Ct. at 2666 n. 36). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
green
2 sentences2008Ultimately, the Court concluded that the regulation at issue (New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law) had not effected a taking of the appellants’ property because “[t]he restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 , 98 S. Ct. at 2666 . ¶151 As a conflation of substantive due process and takings doctrines, the Penn Central inquiry n 2008Ultimately, the Court concluded that the regulation at issue (New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law) had not effected a taking of the appellants’ property because “[t]he restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 , 98 S. Ct. at 2666 . ¶151 As a conflation of substantive due process and takings doctrines, the Penn Central inquiry n | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Hodel v. Irving
green
2 sentences2008Accordingly, the actual question here is whether this revocation of the right to transfer constitutes a taking under the Penn Central inquiry — an issue the Court conveniently sidesteps by rewriting the Ranchers’ claim to be one based on loss of the licenses themselves, rather than loss of the right to transfer the licenses. ¶181 In answering this question, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 , 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987), provides useful guidance. 2008Accordingly, the actual question here is whether this revocation of the right to transfer constitutes a taking under the Penn Central inquiry — an issue the Court conveniently sidesteps by rewriting the Ranchers’ claim to be one based on loss of the licenses themselves, rather than loss of the right to transfer the licenses. ¶181 In answering this question, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 , 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987), provides useful guidance. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Agins v. City of Tiburon
red
2 sentences2008Two years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980), the Supreme Court summarized the takings inquiry as follows: “The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 , 100 S. Ct. at 2141 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 , 48 S. Ct. at 448 , and Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n. 36, 98 S. Ct. at 2666 n. 36). 2008Two years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 , 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980), the Supreme Court summarized the takings inquiry as follows: “The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 , 100 S. Ct. at 2141 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188 , 48 S. Ct. at 448 , and Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n. 36, 98 S. Ct. at 2666 n. 36). | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
green
2 sentences2012In Palazzolo , for example, the Court concluded that, although the plaintiffs waterfront parcel retained substantial economic value despite coastal wetlands regulations restricting use, “the claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined, and for this purpose the case should be remanded.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632 , 121 S. Ct. at 2465 . 2012In Palazzolo , for example, the Court concluded that, although the plaintiffs waterfront parcel retained substantial economic value despite coastal wetlands regulations restricting use, “the claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined, and for this purpose the case should be remanded.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632 , 121 S. Ct. at 2465 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Andrew H. Yancey and Elizabeth H. Yancey, Plaintiffs/cross-Appellants v. United States
green
2 sentences2008In this regard, the District Court distinguished a case relied upon by appellants, Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed.Cir.1990), and held that this factor weighed in favor of the State and against finding a compensable taking. ¶ 85 Finally, with respect to the "character of the governmental action" prong, see Kafka, ¶¶ 70-71, the District Court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of the State because I-143 was a valid exercise of the State's police power to protect health and welfare, and that it affected an industry which was already subject to significant governmental regula 2008In this regard, the District Court distinguished a case relied upon by appellants, Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed.Cir.1990), and held that this factor weighed in favor of the State and against finding a compensable taking. ¶ 85 Finally, with respect to the "character of the governmental action" prong, see Kafka, ¶¶ 70-71, the District Court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of the State because I-143 was a valid exercise of the State's police power to protect health and welfare, and that it affected an industry which was already subject to significant governmental regula | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.