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13 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1898–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richards v. Snidergreen2 sentences1970In Richards v. Snider, et al., 11 Or 197 , 3 P 177 (1883), a vendee sought to compel specific performance of a written agreement for the sale of “lot 8, sec. 19, 4 N., 35 E.” The agreement provided that “said Eichards to be entitled to immediate possession of said lot 8.” The complaint alleged that the language of the description *158 referred to a certain township and range in Umatilla County, and that Richards had received possession from Snider under the agreement. 1913Land Co., 48 Or. 400, 406 ( 86 Pac. 883, 885 ): “The rule is quite general that if the description clause of real property, as stated in a written instrument, is vague, the construction of the language used that has been placed upon it by the parties may be shown by parol evidence as tending to identify the premises intended. * * Thus, when possession of real property is taken pursuant to an agreement of the vendor, the occupation of the premises by the vendee may render certain what otherwise would have been a vague description of the land intended by the parties.” Again, as said by Mr. Chief | 1 | 2 |
Guillaume v. K. S. D. Land Co.green2 sentences1970The opinion stated the applicable rule as follows: # « The rule is quite general that if the description clause of real property as stated in a written instrument is vague, the construction of the language used that has been placed upon it by the parties may be shown by parol evidence as tending to identify the premises intended ” * A Thus, when possession of real property is taken pursuant to an agreement of the vendor, the occupation of the premises by the vendee may render certain what otherwise would have been a vague description of the land intended by the parties * * 48 Or at 406 . 1913Land Co., 48 Or. 400, 406 ( 86 Pac. 883, 885 ): “The rule is quite general that if the description clause of real property, as stated in a written instrument, is vague, the construction of the language used that has been placed upon it by the parties may be shown by parol evidence as tending to identify the premises intended. * * Thus, when possession of real property is taken pursuant to an agreement of the vendor, the occupation of the premises by the vendee may render certain what otherwise would have been a vague description of the land intended by the parties.” Again, as said by Mr. Chief | 1 | 2 |
State v. Brunnemergreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. Brunnemer, 287 Or App 182, 187 , 401 P3d 1226 (2017) (“When a prosecutor attempts to influence the jury by making unwarranted personal attacks on defense counsel, that conduct is not only unfair, but it impugns the integrity of the system as a whole because such conduct dangerously overshadow[s] what a defendant’s case is really about.”) (Internal marks omitted; brackets in original). 2024See, e.g., State v. Brunnemer, 287 Or App 182, 187 , 401 P3d 1226 (2017) (“When a prosecutor attempts to influence the jury by making unwarranted personal attacks on defense counsel, that conduct is not only unfair, but it impugns the integrity of the system as a whole because such conduct dangerously overshadow[s] what a defendant’s case is really about.”) (Internal marks omitted; brackets in original). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vanornumgreen1 sentence2022Vanornum, 354 Or at 629 (for an error to be “plain,” the legal point must be “obvious and not reasonably in dispute”). | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlain v. Hibbardgreen2 sentences1922“When the amount demanded is correctly stated in the claim of lien, the items thereof become superfluous, and an error or omission therein ought not to vitiate the lien”: Chamberlain v. Hibbard, 26 Or. 428, 432 ( 38 Pac. 437 ). 13. 1922“When the amount demanded is correctly stated in the claim of lien, the items thereof become superfluous, and an error or omission therein ought not to vitiate the lien”: Chamberlain v. Hibbard, 26 Or. 428, 432 ( 38 Pac. 437 ). 13. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2006Co., 543 US 481, 487 , 125 S Ct 1118 , 160 L Ed 2d 932 (2005) (citing authorities). 16 The Jones Act, 46 USC app section 688(a), provides, in part: “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply.” 17 “Comparative negligence” is the proper description for the defense asserted in this case, although the parti 2006Co., 543 US 481, 487 , 125 S Ct 1118 , 160 L Ed 2d 932 (2005) (citing authorities). 16 The Jones Act, 46 USC app section 688(a), provides, in part: “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply.” 17 “Comparative negligence” is the proper description for the defense asserted in this case, although the parti | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In re the Dissolution of the Marriage of Craig
green
2 sentences1993They calculate that fee by multiplying counsel’s hourly rate of $150 by 30.6, which is the number of hours spent on the appeal. 4 See also Craig and Craig, 30 Or App 419 , 567 P2d 141 (1977); Oregon State Bar, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106. 1993They calculate that fee by multiplying counsel’s hourly rate of $150 by 30.6, which is the number of hours spent on the appeal. 4 See also Craig and Craig, 30 Or App 419 , 567 P2d 141 (1977); Oregon State Bar, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Carpenters 46 County Conference Board v. Construction Industry Stabilization Committee
green
1 sentence1993Petition for attorney fees allowed in the sum of $12,000. 1 42 USC § 1983 provides, in part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State * * *, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States * * * to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured * * 2 42 USC § 1988 provides, in part: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,1982,1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, * * * the court, in its discretion, may | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Waterway Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical Contractors
green
2 sentences1990Lord, 242 Or 1, 26-27 , 406 P2d 556 (1965) (quoting a description of the rule of waiver in McMillan v. *151 Montgomery, 121 Or 28, 32 , 253 P 879 (1927)). 1990Lord, 242 Or 1, 26-27 , 406 P2d 556 (1965) (quoting a description of the rule of waiver in McMillan v. *151 Montgomery, 121 Or 28, 32 , 253 P 879 (1927)). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
McMillan v. Montgomery
neutral
2 sentences1990Lord, 242 Or 1, 26-27 , 406 P2d 556 (1965) (quoting a description of the rule of waiver in McMillan v. *151 Montgomery, 121 Or 28, 32 , 253 P 879 (1927)). 1990Lord, 242 Or 1, 26-27 , 406 P2d 556 (1965) (quoting a description of the rule of waiver in McMillan v. *151 Montgomery, 121 Or 28, 32 , 253 P 879 (1927)). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Boyd v. United States
red
1 sentence1973Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations, 38 Tenn L Rev 496 (1971), citing Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886); Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438 (1928); Henry v. United States, 361 US 98 (1959); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 S Ct Rev 46. ■ “The purpose of the particular description requirement is to narrow the scope of the search to those premises for which a magistrate has found probable cause to authorize the search. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Olmstead v. United States
red
1 sentence1973Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations, 38 Tenn L Rev 496 (1971), citing Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886); Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438 (1928); Henry v. United States, 361 US 98 (1959); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 S Ct Rev 46. ■ “The purpose of the particular description requirement is to narrow the scope of the search to those premises for which a magistrate has found probable cause to authorize the search. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Cortman
green
2 sentences1973When a warrant designates the premises by means that will properly limit the search, .there is little risk that other premises will.be subjected to unreasonable examination.” State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 at 569 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert, denied, 394 US 951 (1969). 1973When a warrant designates the premises by means that will properly limit the search, .there is little risk that other premises will.be subjected to unreasonable examination.” State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 at 569 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert, denied, 394 US 951 (1969). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Henry v. United States
green
1 sentence1973Cook, Requisite Particularity in Search Warrant Authorizations, 38 Tenn L Rev 496 (1971), citing Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886); Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438 (1928); Henry v. United States, 361 US 98 (1959); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 S Ct Rev 46. ■ “The purpose of the particular description requirement is to narrow the scope of the search to those premises for which a magistrate has found probable cause to authorize the search. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Cortman v. Oregon
green
1 sentence1973When a warrant designates the premises by means that will properly limit the search, .there is little risk that other premises will.be subjected to unreasonable examination.” State v. Cortman, 251 Or 566 at 569 , 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert, denied, 394 US 951 (1969). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Hamilton v. Rudeen
neutral
2 sentences1953In Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or 121 , 96 P 673 , it is said: “* * * The rule for determining the sufficiency of a description in a deed or any other writing in relation to real property is: Can a surveyor, with a deed or other instrument before him, with or without the aid of extrinsic evidence, locate the land and establish the boundaries? * * *” In Hamilton v. Rudeen, 112 Or 268 , 224 P 92 , the court said: “* * * The description in a deed of land conveyed must be sufficiently definite and certain to enable the land to be identified or to furnish the means of identifying the land under the maxim, 1953In Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or 121 , 96 P 673 , it is said: “* * * The rule for determining the sufficiency of a description in a deed or any other writing in relation to real property is: Can a surveyor, with a deed or other instrument before him, with or without the aid of extrinsic evidence, locate the land and establish the boundaries? * * *” In Hamilton v. Rudeen, 112 Or 268 , 224 P 92 , the court said: “* * * The description in a deed of land conveyed must be sufficiently definite and certain to enable the land to be identified or to furnish the means of identifying the land under the maxim, | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Bogard v. Barhan
green
2 sentences1953In Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or 121 , 96 P 673 , it is said: “* * * The rule for determining the sufficiency of a description in a deed or any other writing in relation to real property is: Can a surveyor, with a deed or other instrument before him, with or without the aid of extrinsic evidence, locate the land and establish the boundaries? * * *” In Hamilton v. Rudeen, 112 Or 268 , 224 P 92 , the court said: “* * * The description in a deed of land conveyed must be sufficiently definite and certain to enable the land to be identified or to furnish the means of identifying the land under the maxim, 1953In Bogard v. Barhan, 52 Or 121 , 96 P 673 , it is said: “* * * The rule for determining the sufficiency of a description in a deed or any other writing in relation to real property is: Can a surveyor, with a deed or other instrument before him, with or without the aid of extrinsic evidence, locate the land and establish the boundaries? * * *” In Hamilton v. Rudeen, 112 Or 268 , 224 P 92 , the court said: “* * * The description in a deed of land conveyed must be sufficiently definite and certain to enable the land to be identified or to furnish the means of identifying the land under the maxim, | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Loyd v. Oates
green
1 sentence1920Under the last-quoted excerpt, the text cites Loyd v. Oates, 143 Ala. 231 ( 38 South. 1022 , 111 Am. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Lanman v. Crooker
green
1 sentence1906The rule is quite general that if the description clause of real property as stated in a written instrument is vague, the construction of the language used that has been placed upon it by the parties may be shown by parol evidence as tending to identify the premises intended: Lanman v. Crooker, 97 Ind. 163 ( 49 Am. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Lovejoy v. Lovett
green
1 sentence1906Rep. 437 ); Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 218 ( 5 Pac. 96 ); Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270 . | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Truett v. Adams
neutral
2 sentences1906Rep. 437 ); Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 218 ( 5 Pac. 96 ); Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270 . 1906Rep. 437 ); Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 218 ( 5 Pac. 96 ); Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270 . | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Anderson v. Baughman
green
1 sentence1898When, by omitting one part of the description in a written instrument which is false or impossible, a perfect description remains, the false part should be rejected, and the instrument upheld as effectual to carry out the intention of the parties to it: Anderson v. Baughman, 7 Mich. 69 ( 74 Am. | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.