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11 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Meeksgreen2 sentences2021To satisfy the particular description requirement, a warrant “‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. - 28 - 1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 296 . 2021To satisfy the particular description requirement, a - 14 - warrant “‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 296 . | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Lee Cook and Jackie B. Kirkgreen2 sentences2021To satisfy the particular description requirement, a warrant “‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. - 28 - 1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 296 . 2021To satisfy the particular description requirement, a - 14 - warrant “‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 296 . | 4 | 4 |
State v. Henninggreen2 sentences2021To satisfy the particular description requirement, a warrant “‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. - 28 - 1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 296 . 2021To satisfy the particular description requirement, a - 14 - warrant “‘must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized.’” State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361, 372 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 296 . | 3 | 3 |
Lea Et Ux. v. Stategreen2 sentences2021“Where the purpose of the search is to find specific property, [the property] should be so particularly described as to preclude the possibility of seizing any other [property]. . . . [I]f the purpose [of the warrant is to seize] . . . any property of a specified character which, by reason of its character, and of the place where and the circumstances under which it may be found, if found at all, would be illicit, a description, save as to such character, place and circumstances, would be unnecessary, and ordinarily impossible.” Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352-53 (Tenn.1944); 2021“Where the purpose of the search is to find specific property, [the property] should be so particularly described as to preclude the possibility of seizing any other [property]. . . . [I]f the purpose [of the warrant is to seize] . . . any property of a specified character which, by reason of its character, and of the place where and the circumstances under which it may be found, if found at all, would be illicit, a description, save as to such character, place and circumstances, would be unnecessary, and ordinarily impossible.” Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352-53 (Tenn.1944); | 2 | 2 |
Tommy Nunley v. State of Tennesseegreen1 sentence2024Drawing on our prior caselaw, Nunley included evidence of actual innocence in the description of the standard for tolling the statute of limitations in coram nobis cases: “To accommodate due process concerns, the one-year statute of limitations may be tolled if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeks relief based upon new evidence of actual innocence discovered after expiration of the limitations period.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828-29 (emphasis added) (first citing Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 ; then citing Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010) [hereinafter Harris II]; and the | 1 | 1 |
Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennesseered1 sentence2024Drawing on our prior caselaw, Nunley included evidence of actual innocence in the description of the standard for tolling the statute of limitations in coram nobis cases: “To accommodate due process concerns, the one-year statute of limitations may be tolled if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeks relief based upon new evidence of actual innocence discovered after expiration of the limitations period.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828-29 (emphasis added) (first citing Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 ; then citing Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010) [hereinafter Harris II]; and the | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vanderfordgreen1 sentence2012Mark Ward, Tennessee Criminal Trial Practice § 4:12 (2012-2013 ed.); see also State v. Vanderford, 980 S.W.2d 390, 403-04 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Ballard v. Dibrellgreen2 sentences2007See Ballard v. Dibrell, 94 Tenn. 229 , 28 S.W. 1087 (1895). 2007See Ballard v. Dibrell, 94 Tenn. 229 , 28 S.W. 1087 (1895). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences1993In this instance, the search warrant provides that “marijuana plants were growing on the above described property.” Art. 1, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution proscribes general warrants “to search suspected places ... [where] offences are not particularly described and supported by evidence....” A specific requirement of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is that no warrants will issue except those “particularly describing the ... things to be seized.” In People v. Schmidt, 172 Col. 285 , 473 P.2d 698 (1970), the nature of the description requirement was a subject of discus 1993In this instance, the search warrant provides that “marijuana plants were growing on the above described property.” Art. 1, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution proscribes general warrants “to search suspected places ... [where] offences are not particularly described and supported by evidence....” A specific requirement of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is that no warrants will issue except those “particularly describing the ... things to be seized.” In People v. Schmidt, 172 Col. 285 , 473 P.2d 698 (1970), the nature of the description requirement was a subject of discus | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Shell Oil Company v. Blanks
green
1 sentence2026The Supreme Court, in Blair, expressly adopted the contractor exception recognized in Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959), and quoted the following description of the rule: “An exception to the general rule is recognized where the risks arise from, or are intimately connected with, defects of the premises or of machinery or appliances located thereon which the contractor has undertaken to repair. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Cyrus Deville Wilson v. State of Tennessee
red
1 sentence2024Drawing on our prior caselaw, Nunley included evidence of actual innocence in the description of the standard for tolling the statute of limitations in coram nobis cases: “To accommodate due process concerns, the one-year statute of limitations may be tolled if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeks relief based upon new evidence of actual innocence discovered after expiration of the limitations period.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828-29 (emphasis added) (first citing Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 ; then citing Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010) [hereinafter Harris II]; and the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Workman v. State
green
1 sentence2024Drawing on our prior caselaw, Nunley included evidence of actual innocence in the description of the standard for tolling the statute of limitations in coram nobis cases: “To accommodate due process concerns, the one-year statute of limitations may be tolled if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeks relief based upon new evidence of actual innocence discovered after expiration of the limitations period.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828-29 (emphasis added) (first citing Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 ; then citing Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010) [hereinafter Harris II]; and the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Hatchett v. State
green
2 sentences1994It cites Hatchett v. State, 208 Tenn. 399 , 346 S.W.2d 258 (1961), as authority that naming the occupant of the premises satisfies the particular description requirement. 1994It cites Hatchett v. State, 208 Tenn. 399 , 346 S.W.2d 258 (1961), as authority that naming the occupant of the premises satisfies the particular description requirement. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.