weighed factors (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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weighed factors in Pennsylvania

13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 9 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Ravengreen
pasuperct · 2014 · cited in 6 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2026
2 sentences

2026The Commonwealth asserts Appellant does not claim the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, “but rather that the court weighed those factors in a manner inconsistent with his wishes.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

2025In substance, then, Appellant’s argument is not that the trial court failed to consider her evidence of mitigating factors, “but rather that the court weighed those factors in a manner inconsistent with [her] wishes.” Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2014).

66
Commonwealth v. Shugarsgreen
pasuperct · 2006 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026As such, we discern no abuse of discretion, as Appellant has not established “the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will,” or “arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).3 As the trial court noted in its opinion, it is apparent the gist of Appellant’s argument is not that the court failed to consider mitigating factors, but rather that the court weighed those factors ____________________________________________ 3 To the extent Appellant c

11
Com. v. Velez, J.green
pasuperct · 2022 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026However, “the weight accorded to the mitigating factors or aggravating factors presented to the sentencing court is within the court’s exclusive domain.” Velez, 273 A.3d at 10 (citation omitted).

11
Commonwealth v. Brickergreen
pasuperct · 2012 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025See Bricker, supra. Moreover, not only do we presume the trial court considered the mitigating factors since it specifically acknowledged it reviewed the presentence investigation report, but the trial court specifically noted it was swayed by the mitigating factors such that it imposed an aggregate sentence less than that recommended by the Commonwealth.

11
Commonwealth v. MacIasgreen
pasuperct · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023See id. (“We cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.”).

11
Commonwealth v. Finnecygreen
pasuperct · 2016 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Moreover, where the sentencing judge has the benefit of a PSI, “it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“Our Supreme Court has determined that where the trial court is informed by a [PSI], it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been s

11
Commonwealth v. Proctorgreen
pasuperct · 2017 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d 261, 274 (Pa. Super. 2017); accord Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“The gist of Raven’s argument is not that the court failed to consider the pertinent sentencing factors, but rather that the court weighed those factors in a manner inconsistent with his wishes.”).

11
Commonwealth v. Downinggreen
pasuperct · 2010 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Moreover, where the sentencing judge has the benefit of a PSI, “it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“Our Supreme Court has determined that where the trial court is informed by a [PSI], it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been s

11
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982In upholding the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals that they do not, the Court weighed the presumption of the right to counsel in situations potentially involving the deprivation of liberty against three due process factors enunciated in the case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976): first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; a

1982In upholding the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals that they do not, the Court weighed the presumption of the right to counsel in situations potentially involving the deprivation of liberty against three due process factors enunciated in the case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976): first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; a

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Commonwealth v. Baker green
pasuperct · 2013
1 sentence

2026The Commonwealth asserts Appellant does not claim the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors, “but rather that the court weighed those factors in a manner inconsistent with his wishes.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

12026–2026
Commonwealth v. Zirkle green
pa · 2014
1 sentence

2024Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 133 .

12024–2024
Hess v. Hess green
pa · 1984
2 sentences

1987Although appellant argues that the trial court violated Hess v. Hess, 327 Pa.Super. 279 , 475 A.2d 796 (1984), by utilizing the criteria in 23 P.S. § 501(a) as a threshold for entitlement to alimony, it is clear that the court weighed the factors set forth in § 501(b), as required by Hess, supra. *555 The court considered, inter alia, relative earnings and earning capacities, sources of income, the time necessary to find appropriate employment, and, by reference to the equitable distribution award, the factors set forth in § 401(d) which duplicate many of the factors in § 501(b).

1987Although appellant argues that the trial court violated Hess v. Hess, 327 Pa.Super. 279 , 475 A.2d 796 (1984), by utilizing the criteria in 23 P.S. § 501(a) as a threshold for entitlement to alimony, it is clear that the court weighed the factors set forth in § 501(b), as required by Hess, supra. *555 The court considered, inter alia, relative earnings and earning capacities, sources of income, the time necessary to find appropriate employment, and, by reference to the equitable distribution award, the factors set forth in § 401(d) which duplicate many of the factors in § 501(b).

11987–1987
Little v. Streater green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1982The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test was also employed by the Supreme Court in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 , 101 S.Ct. 2202 , 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981) wherein it was held that the failure to provide a blood grouping test for indigent defendants in paternity actions violated due process.

1982The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test was also employed by the Supreme Court in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 , 101 S.Ct. 2202 , 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981) wherein it was held that the failure to provide a blood grouping test for indigent defendants in paternity actions violated due process.

11982–1982

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9721 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TN 37 (2002–2025) PA 13 (1982–2026) CA 12 (1978–2025) IN 11 (1991–2018) IL 5 (1990–2024) ND 5 (2007–2019) OH 5 (2002–2019) TX 4 (2006–2019) NC 3 (2012–2022) OK 2 (2022–2022) LA 2 (1992–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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