weighed factors in California

2023But we will not reverse “ ‘merely because reasonable people might disagree.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978 .) Green thus does not present a valid basis for reversal here. 1 We do not consider Green’s argument, first raised in reply, that the victims were “not especially vulnerable.” (See People v. Failla (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1519, fn. 3 .) Green offers no reason for not making this argument earlier, and it conflicts with his initial position that both victims were “somewhat vulnerable.” 3 II.

2022(Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 116 [appellate court will not reverse merely because reasonable people might disagree].) The trial court did not depart from applicable legal standards here and denying defendant’s request to strike the 20-year firearm enhancement was squarely within the bounds of the court’s discretion.

1991The photo of Ebora Alexander, which showed the extent of her head wound, also corroborated defendant’s statement, “I just blew the bitch’s head off.” “We have repeatedly stated that the court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of photographs of a murder victim. [Citations.] We have previously held that a court may admit even ‘gruesome’ photographs if the evidence is highly relevant to the issues raised by the facts .... [Citation.] However, when a defendant objects that the proffered evidence is more prejudicial that probative, the record must affirmatively show that the cour

1991The photo of Ebora Alexander, which showed the extent of her head wound, also corroborated defendant's statement, "I just blew the bitch's head off." "We have repeatedly stated that the court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of photographs of a murder victim. [Citations.] We have previously held that a court may admit even `gruesome' photographs if the evidence is highly relevant to the issues raised by the facts.... [Citation.] However, when a defendant objects that the proffered evidence is more prejudicial that probative, the record must affirmatively show that the court

1988Neither of these points is persuasive on this record. (12) We have repeatedly stated that the court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of photographs of a murder victim. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 19 ; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 171 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 ].) We have previously held that a court may admit even "gruesome" photographs if the evidence is highly relevant to the issues raised by the facts, or if the photograph would clarify the testimony of a medical examiner. ( People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 365 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 138 ,

1988Neither of these points is persuasive on this record. (12) We have repeatedly stated that the court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of photographs of a murder victim. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 19 ; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 171 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 ].) We have previously held that a court may admit even "gruesome" photographs if the evidence is highly relevant to the issues raised by the facts, or if the photograph would clarify the testimony of a medical examiner. ( People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 365 [ 105 Cal. Rptr. 138 ,

1988(People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 365 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 138 , 503 P.2d 594 ].) However, when a defendant objects that the proffered evidence is more prejudicial than probative, the record must affirmatively show that the court weighed these factors, in order to allow proper appellate review of abuse of discretion claims.

1988(People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 365 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 138 , 503 P.2d 594 ].) However, when a defendant objects that the proffered evidence is more prejudicial than probative, the record must affirmatively show that the court weighed these factors, in order to allow proper appellate review of abuse of discretion claims.

1978Such a balancing process was undertaken in Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 151 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 545 P.2d 264 ], where the court weighed such factors as “the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents or regulating the business involved; the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities.” But where, as

1978Such a balancing process was undertaken in Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 151 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 545 P.2d 264 ], where the court weighed such factors as “the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents or regulating the business involved; the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities.” But where, as

1978Such a balancing process was undertaken in Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 151 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 352 , 545 P.2d 264 ], where the court weighed such factors as “the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents or regulating the business involved; the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities.” But where, as