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13 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1968–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Silvio Bosco LUNAgreen2 sentences2013See Ex Parte Luna, 401 S.W.3d 329 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 2013See Ex Parte Luna, No. 14-11-01063-CR, 2013 WL 1197777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2013, no pet. h.). | 3 | 3 |
Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallasgreen2 sentences2025See id. at 377 . 2018Corp., 197 S.W.3d at 383 (Brister, J., concurring). | 2 | 2 |
Rusk State Hospital v. Blackgreen2 sentences2018See Rusk, 392 S.W.3d at 97 & n.4 (listing Kinnear among cases establishing that “immunity deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction”); Nazari, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (“[W]hile Kinnear involved an abrogation of immunity, it was not the type of abrogation we announced in Anderson and expounded on in Reata.”); see also Jeffrey S. Boyd, Where Sovereign Immunity and Water Development Issues Collide, 39 TEX. 2018See Rusk , 392 S.W.3d at 97 & n.4 (listing Kinnear among cases establishing that "immunity deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction"); Nazari , 561 S.W.3d at 505 ("[W]hile Kinnear involved an abrogation of immunity, it was not the type of abrogation we announced in Anderson and expounded on in Reata ."); see also Jeffrey S. Boyd, Where Sovereign Immunity and Water Development Issues Collide , 39 TEX. | 2 | 2 |
Dr. Behzad Nazari, D.D.S. v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Rusk , 392 S.W.3d at 97 & n.4 (listing Kinnear among cases establishing that "immunity deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction"); Nazari , 561 S.W.3d at 505 ("[W]hile Kinnear involved an abrogation of immunity, it was not the type of abrogation we announced in Anderson and expounded on in Reata ."); see also Jeffrey S. Boyd, Where Sovereign Immunity and Water Development Issues Collide , 39 TEX. | 1 | 1 |
City of Dallas v. Albertgreen1 sentence2018For example, in City of Dallas v. Albert, we characterized our decision in Reata as one “conclud[ing] that immunity from suit was abrogated to a limited degree.” 354 S.W.3d at 379 (emphasis added) (citing Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 375–76); see also Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 377 (“[T]he City does not have immunity from Reata’s claims to the limited extent we have explained . . . .” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Schlueter v. Schluetergreen2 sentences1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court’s abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Pnce, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). 1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court's abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Price, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Pricegreen2 sentences1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court’s abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Pnce, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). 1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court's abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Price, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). | 1 | 1 |
Bounds v. Caudlegreen2 sentences1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court’s abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Pnce, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). 1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court's abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Price, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). | 1 | 1 |
Twyman v. Twymangreen2 sentences1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court’s abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Pnce, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). 1998The court of appeals based its holding on this Court's abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity in the Bounds, Price, and Twyman decisions, and concluded that a person may bring any cause of action against his or her spouse. 929 S.W.2d at 99-100 (construing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex.1993); Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987); and Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.1977)). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1993See Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). 1993See Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kinnear v. Texas Commission on Human Rights Ex Rel. Hale
green
1 sentence2025By contrast, it refers but three times to the City's involved an abrogation of immunity, it was not the type of “recovery,” twice to its claims for “monetary relief,” and abrogation we announced in Anderson and expounded on only once to a “monetary recovery.” See id. at 373–78. in Reata. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
green
2 sentences2009The parties also agree that in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), the Supreme Court specifically held that the abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s power and that the purported abrogation of immunity was invalid. 2009The parties also agree that in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), the Supreme Court specifically held that the abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s power and that the purported abrogation of immunity was invalid. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Kissick v. Garland Independent School District
green
1 sentence1968We cannot read into this statute a prohibition which is not there nor a repeal of Art. 4603, nor can we consider such statute as a partial abrogation of the doctrine of common-law marriage which prevails in this State and the validity of which is not dependent upon the issuance of any license to marry.” In Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708 (Dallas Tex.Civ.App.1959, ref., n. r. e.), the Court said: “Appellant asserts that such resolution is violative of public policy in that it penalizes persons because of marriage. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.