chances' tells us that highly unusual doctrine in Texas

2023See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.”).

2021“The ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 347 .

2015App. 2009) ("The 'doctrine of chances' tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance."); Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Tex. Cr.

2013Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 881 (citing Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)); Brown, 96 S.W.3d at 513 ; see De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 347 (“The ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.”).

2025“When the defendant’s intent to commit the offense charged is at issue, the relevance of an extraneous offense derives from the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 317 (“[T]he ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance,” and that

2021“The ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.” Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 317 (citing De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 347 ).

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character.”); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir.1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances,” the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remote

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character."); United States v. Woods , 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir. 1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances," the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remo

2008See, e.g., United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir.1991) (in prosecution for attempt to defraud an insurance company after defendant murdered his business partner, dumped her body inside the bar they owned together, and then destroyed the bar by setting off two explosions, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that, three years earlier, the defendant collected life insurance proceeds after his wife was murdered, even though the defendant was never charged with her murder; noting that "Wigmore's ‘doctrine of chances' tells us that highly unusual events are highly unlikel

2008See, e.g., United States v. York , 933 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991) (in prosecution for attempt to defraud an insurance company after defendant murdered his business partner, dumped her body inside the bar they owned together, and then destroyed the bar by setting off two explosions, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that, three years earlier, the defendant collected life insurance proceeds after his wife was murdered, even though the defendant was never charged with her murder; noting that "Wigmore's 'doctrine of chances' tells us that highly unusual events are highly unlik

2025“When the defendant’s intent to commit the offense charged is at issue, the relevance of an extraneous offense derives from the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); see Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 317 (“[T]he ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance,” and that

2013Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 881 (citing Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)); Brown, 96 S.W.3d at 513 ; see De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 347 (“The ‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance.”).

2021See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336 , 347-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) -5- (determining trial court did not abuse its discretion when admitting extraneous evidence of a highly unlikely event being repeated three different times because the “‘doctrine of chances’ tells us that highly unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance”); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 , 156-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (rejecting “reasonable hypothesis” rule, which required for conviction, in circumstantial evidence cases, that the jury “must find that the evidence negated every reaso

2008This inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of York's character.”); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir.1973) (in trial for murdering her eight-month-old foster son by inducing cyanosis and other respiratory difficulties, trial court did not err in admitting evidence that nine infants in defendant's custody had suffered similar difficulties, and that seven of those infants died; applying "the doctrine of chances,” the court held that the other deaths were admissible to prove the identity of the foster son's killer "because of the remote