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13 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Southern Pacific Company v. Castrogreen2 sentences2025Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1973) (“It is the [u]nexcused violation of a penal standard which constitutes negligence per se.” (emphasis added)). 2019Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1973) (stating that to prove negligence per se, one must prove the unexcused violation of a penal standard). | 6 | 9 |
Perry v. S.N.green2 sentences2019The correct rule, however, is: “The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct of the reasonable man, is negligence in itself.” Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 , 304 n.4 (Tex. 1998) (citations omitted). 2012“Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby the civil courts adopt a legislatively imposed standard of conduct as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.” Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. 1978); see Reeder v. Daniel, 61 S.W.3d 359 , 361–62 (Tex. 2001). “[T]o prove negligence per se, one must prove the unexcused violation of a penal standard.” Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 , 304–05 n. 4 (Tex. 1998) (citing So. | 1 | 2 |
Derichsweiler v. Stategreen1 sentence2015If an objective standard is sufficient to protect a person’s rights when circumstances “suggest that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing[,]”32 it is sufficient to protect the rights of those who reasonably appear to be in need. 32 Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 917 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Moughon v. Wolfgreen1 sentence2012“Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby the civil courts adopt a legislatively imposed standard of conduct as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.” Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. 1978); see Reeder v. Daniel, 61 S.W.3d 359 , 361–62 (Tex. 2001). “[T]o prove negligence per se, one must prove the unexcused violation of a penal standard.” Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 , 304–05 n. 4 (Tex. 1998) (citing So. | 1 | 1 |
Reeder v. Danielgreen1 sentence2012“Negligence per se is a tort concept whereby the civil courts adopt a legislatively imposed standard of conduct as defining the conduct of a reasonably prudent person.” Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. 1978); see Reeder v. Daniel, 61 S.W.3d 359 , 361–62 (Tex. 2001). “[T]o prove negligence per se, one must prove the unexcused violation of a penal standard.” Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 , 304–05 n. 4 (Tex. 1998) (citing So. | 1 | 1 |
Ellis County State Bank v. Keevergreen1 sentence1994Nor, as Justice Hecht suggests, 888 S.W.2d at 801-802 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting) did Keever's nondelivery of the collateral afford the Bank probable cause to believe that a penal violation had occurred. | 1 | 1 |
Anzaldua v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See Anzaldua v. State, 696 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) ("The mere refusal to deliver property upon demand does not constitute `concealing.'"); Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. 1994See Anzaldua v. State, 696 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) ("The mere refusal to deliver property upon demand does not constitute 'concealing.' "); Op.Tex.Att’y Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. McFerringreen2 sentences1973This idea is found in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69 , 291 S.W.2d 931, 939 (1956), in the statement that the incorporation of common law rules "into statutory rules makes their violation, if unexcused, negligence per se,...." The idea is also expressed in 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 17.6, at 1010 (1956), "If the negligence per se rule is tempered by the doctrine of justifiable violation ..., it means that violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se in a civil case only in the absence of evidence tending to establish some excuse which the c 1973This idea is found in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69 , 291 S.W.2d 931, 939 (1956), in the statement that the incorporation of common law rules "into statutory rules makes their violation, if unexcused, negligence per se,...." The idea is also expressed in 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 17.6, at 1010 (1956), "If the negligence per se rule is tempered by the doctrine of justifiable violation ..., it means that violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se in a civil case only in the absence of evidence tending to establish some excuse which the c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
March v. Walker
green
2 sentences1973If, as in the case of March v. Walker, supra , the proof by Southern Pacific also includes some evidence that Castro's violation was excused by reason of one of the permissible excuses we discussed in Impson, supra ; or if the plaintiffs produce some evidence of an Impson-type permissible excuse, Southern Pacific must do something more to discharge its burden of persuasion. 1973If, as in the case of March v. Walker, supra, the proof by Southern Pacific also includes some evidence that Castro’s violation was excused by reason of one of the permissible excuses we discussed in Impson, supra; or if the plaintiffs produce some evidence of an Impson-type permissible excuse, Southern Pacific must do something more to discharge its burden of persuasion. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Impson v. Structural Metals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1973If, as in the case of March v. Walker, supra , the proof by Southern Pacific also includes some evidence that Castro's violation was excused by reason of one of the permissible excuses we discussed in Impson, supra ; or if the plaintiffs produce some evidence of an Impson-type permissible excuse, Southern Pacific must do something more to discharge its burden of persuasion. 1973If, as in the case of March v. Walker, supra, the proof by Southern Pacific also includes some evidence that Castro’s violation was excused by reason of one of the permissible excuses we discussed in Impson, supra; or if the plaintiffs produce some evidence of an Impson-type permissible excuse, Southern Pacific must do something more to discharge its burden of persuasion. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.