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9 California opinions name it 2 courts 1895–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Huntington v. Attrillgreen2 sentences2015A judgment for a fine or penalty is within the section ....’” (See Huntington v. Attrill, supra, 146 U.S. at p. 673 [“The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.”]; 2 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) § 421.1, p. 1339 [“Since no recovery is allowable on 2015A judgment arising from a fine or penalty is within the section . . . .” (See Huntington v. Attrill, supra, 146 U.S. at p. 673 [“The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence against the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act”]; 2 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) § 421.1, p. 1339 [“Since no recovery is all | 2 | 2 |
Fair v. William S.green2 sentences1980(See District Election etc. Committee v. O'Connor (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 261, 265-266 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 442 ] and cases there cited.) Validity of School Attendance as a Probation Condition (2) Gerald first argues that the special order conflicts with the statutory scheme implementing a preliminary school board review of habitual truancy. (§§ 601, subd. (b), 601.1; Ed. Code, § 48263.) [5] The argument must be rejected. *124 While it is relatively clear that truants are no longer subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the amended provisions of section 601 ( In re Ronald S 1980(See District Election etc. Committee v. O'Connor (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 261, 265-266 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 442 ] and cases there cited.) Validity of School Attendance as a Probation Condition (2) Gerald first argues that the special order conflicts with the statutory scheme implementing a preliminary school board review of habitual truancy. (§§ 601, subd. (b), 601.1; Ed. Code, § 48263.) [5] The argument must be rejected. *124 While it is relatively clear that truants are no longer subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the amended provisions of section 601 ( In re Ronald S | 2 | 2 |
In Re Ronald S.green2 sentences1980While it is relatively clear that truants are no longer subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the amended provisions of section 601 (In re Ronald S. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 866, 871 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]), the basis of wardship jurisdiction herein was not Gerald’s truancy but rather the determination of a penal violation under the provisions of section 602—a wholly independent basis of jurisdiction. 1980While it is relatively clear that truants are no longer subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the amended provisions of section 601 (In re Ronald S. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 866, 871 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 387 ]), the basis of wardship jurisdiction herein was not Gerald’s truancy but rather the determination of a penal violation under the provisions of section 602—a wholly independent basis of jurisdiction. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1988Defendant concedes that the violent “criminal activity” described in factor (b) need not have produced a “conviction.” He points out, however, that it must constitute an “actual crime.” (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 127 , 711 P.2d 423 ]; Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 778.) He urges that juvenile misconduct leading to a juvenile adjudication cannot be considered a “crime” for any purpose. 1988Defendant concedes that the violent “criminal activity” described in factor (b) need not have produced a “conviction.” He points out, however, that it must constitute an “actual crime.” (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 127 , 711 P.2d 423 ]; Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 778.) He urges that juvenile misconduct leading to a juvenile adjudication cannot be considered a “crime” for any purpose. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Weidertgreen2 sentences1988(E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-845 [ 705 P.2d 380 ]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ]; In re Michael S. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 817 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 585 ].) However, juvenile court disposition is no bar to admission under factor (b) of a penal violation involving the threat of force or violence. 1988(E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-845 [ 705 P.2d 380 ]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ]; In re Michael S. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 817 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 585 ].) However, juvenile court disposition is no bar to admission under factor (b) of a penal violation involving the threat of force or violence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Michael S.green2 sentences1988(E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-845 [ 705 P.2d 380 ]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ]; In re Michael S. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 817 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 585 ].) However, juvenile court disposition is no bar to admission under factor (b) of a penal violation involving the threat of force or violence. 1988(E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-845 [ 705 P.2d 380 ]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ]; In re Michael S. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 817 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 585 ].) However, juvenile court disposition is no bar to admission under factor (b) of a penal violation involving the threat of force or violence. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Joseph B.green2 sentences1988(E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-845 [ 705 P.2d 380 ]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ]; In re Michael S. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 817 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 585 ].) However, juvenile court disposition is no bar to admission under factor (b) of a penal violation involving the threat of force or violence. 1988(E.g., People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-845 [ 705 P.2d 380 ]; In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952, 955 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 671 P.2d 852 ]; In re Michael S. (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 814, 817 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 585 ].) However, juvenile court disposition is no bar to admission under factor (b) of a penal violation involving the threat of force or violence. | 1 | 1 |
District Election of Supervisors Committee v. O'Connorgreen2 sentences1980(See District Election etc. Committee v. O'Connor (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 261, 265-266 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 442 ] and cases there cited.) Validity of School Attendance as a Probation Condition (2) Gerald first argues that the special order conflicts with the statutory scheme implementing a preliminary school board review of habitual truancy. (§§ 601, subd. (b), 601.1; Ed. Code, § 48263.) [5] The argument must be rejected. *124 While it is relatively clear that truants are no longer subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the amended provisions of section 601 ( In re Ronald S 1980(See District Election etc. Committee v. O'Connor (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 261, 265-266 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 442 ] and cases there cited.) Validity of School Attendance as a Probation Condition (2) Gerald first argues that the special order conflicts with the statutory scheme implementing a preliminary school board review of habitual truancy. (§§ 601, subd. (b), 601.1; Ed. Code, § 48263.) [5] The argument must be rejected. *124 While it is relatively clear that truants are no longer subject to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the amended provisions of section 601 ( In re Ronald S | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Sic
green
2 sentences1907(In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142 , [ 14 Pac. 405 ]; Ex parte Mansfield, 106. 1895(In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142 .) The conflict exists, and because of it the penal clause of the ordinance is void, but that does not of necessity destroy the whole of section 5. | 2 | 1895–1907 |
People v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Ford
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
In Re Gullatt
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Eggleston
green
2 sentences2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 2001In an analogous context, the courts have concluded that an adult prisoner who commits new criminal conduct while incarcerated may be subjected to prison disciplinary actions that increase the restrictions on his liberty as well as to a new prosecution for the penal violation, without violating double jeopardy principles. ( People v. Hayes (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 662, 668 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 222 ; In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 , 71 Cal. Rptr. 676 , 445 P.2d 292 ; People v. Eggleston (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 337, 339 , 63 Cal.Rptr. 104 ; People v. Ford (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 39 , 345 P.2d 354 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ex parte Rosenheim
green
2 sentences1918Section 1205 of the Penal Code originally read as follows: “A judgment that the defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied, specifying the extent of imprisonment, which must not exceed one day for every dollar of the fine.” The supreme court, in Ex parte Rosenheim, 83 Cal. 388 , [ 23 Pac. 372 ], construing said section as it then read, held, quoting the syllabus: “When the court sentences a defendant to a term of imprisonment, and also to pay a fine, there can be no further imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine, under section 1205 of the Penal Code 1918Section 1205 of the Penal Code originally read as follows: “A judgment that the defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied, specifying the extent of imprisonment, which must not exceed one day for every dollar of the fine.” The supreme court, in Ex parte Rosenheim, 83 Cal. 388 , [ 23 Pac. 372 ], construing said section as it then read, held, quoting the syllabus: “When the court sentences a defendant to a term of imprisonment, and also to pay a fine, there can be no further imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine, under section 1205 of the Penal Code | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Ex parte Mansfield
green
2 sentences1907Cal. 400, [ 39 Pac. 775 ]; Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 278 , [ 46 Pac. 86 ].) In Ex parte Mansfield, 106 Cal. 400 , [ 39 Pac. 775 ], the penal clause of a license ordinance prescribed a fine of not less than $150, and not more than $500, for carrying on the business of selling liquor without procuring a license therefor; and it was held that such penal clause conflicted with section 435 of the Penal Code, and was for that reason void, but that the judgment in the case was valid under the provisions of the Penal Code. 1907Cal. 400, [ 39 Pac. 775 ]; Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 278 , [ 46 Pac. 86 ].) In Ex parte Mansfield, 106 Cal. 400 , [ 39 Pac. 775 ], the penal clause of a license ordinance prescribed a fine of not less than $150, and not more than $500, for carrying on the business of selling liquor without procuring a license therefor; and it was held that such penal clause conflicted with section 435 of the Penal Code, and was for that reason void, but that the judgment in the case was valid under the provisions of the Penal Code. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Ex parte Stephen
green
2 sentences1907Cal. 400, [ 39 Pac. 775 ]; Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 278 , [ 46 Pac. 86 ].) In Ex parte Mansfield, 106 Cal. 400 , [ 39 Pac. 775 ], the penal clause of a license ordinance prescribed a fine of not less than $150, and not more than $500, for carrying on the business of selling liquor without procuring a license therefor; and it was held that such penal clause conflicted with section 435 of the Penal Code, and was for that reason void, but that the judgment in the case was valid under the provisions of the Penal Code. 1907Cal. 400, [ 39 Pac. 775 ]; Ex parte Stephen, 114 Cal. 278 , [ 46 Pac. 86 ].) In Ex parte Mansfield, 106 Cal. 400 , [ 39 Pac. 775 ], the penal clause of a license ordinance prescribed a fine of not less than $150, and not more than $500, for carrying on the business of selling liquor without procuring a license therefor; and it was held that such penal clause conflicted with section 435 of the Penal Code, and was for that reason void, but that the judgment in the case was valid under the provisions of the Penal Code. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.