claim-of-right defense in Virginia

2024She testified and argued at trial that doing so was not wrongful because it “was not an intentional theft” and she “didn’t know [she] was stealing anything.” “The claim-of-right defense requires a predicate showing of ‘good faith,’ a bona fide belief by the taking party that she has some legal right to the property taken.” Groves, 50 Va. App. at 63 (quoting Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 812 (1926)) (citation omitted).

2023“When successful, a claim-of-right defense negates the defendant’s animus furandi—the ‘intent to steal’ mens rea element of larceny.” Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 57, 63 (2007) (quoting Rollin M.

2024She testified and argued at trial that doing so was not wrongful because it “was not an intentional theft” and she “didn’t know [she] was stealing anything.” “The claim-of-right defense requires a predicate showing of ‘good faith,’ a bona fide belief by the taking party that she has some legal right to the property taken.” Groves, 50 Va. App. at 63 (quoting Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 812 (1926)) (citation omitted).

2023“The claim-of-right defense requires a predicate showing of ‘good faith,’ a bona fide belief by the taking party that []he has some legal right to the property taken.” Id. (quoting Butts, 145 Va. at 812 ).

2024“Whether asserted in good faith or as a ‘mere pretext,’ a claim-of-right defense relies heavily on factfinding.” Id. (quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 533 (1964)).

2022“When successful, a claim-of-right defense negates the defendant’s animus furandi—the ‘intent to steal’ mens rea element of larceny.” Id. (quoting Rollin M.

2018While mistaken, it must still be “sincere,” O’Banion v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 47, 56 , 531 S.E.2d 599, 603 (2000), and not a “dishonest pretense,” 2 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Bishop on Criminal Law § 851, at 648-49 (9th ed. 1923).

2018While mistaken, it must still be “sincere,” O’Banion v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 47, 56 , 531 S.E.2d 599, 603 (2000), and not a “dishonest pretense,” 2 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Bishop on Criminal Law § 851, at 648-49 (9th ed. 1923).

2018The claim-of-right defense requires a predicate showing of “good faith,” Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 811-12 , 133 S.E. 764, 767-68 (1926), a bona fide belief by the taking party that []he has some legal right to the property taken, Strohecker v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 242, 257 , 475 S.E.2d 844, 852 (1996).

2018The claim-of-right defense requires a predicate showing of “good faith,” Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 811-12 , 133 S.E. 764, 767-68 (1926), a bona fide belief by the taking party that []he has some legal right to the property taken, Strohecker v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 242, 257 , 475 S.E.2d 844, 852 (1996).

2018See Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 70 , 366 S.E.2d 274, 277 (1988) (observing that the claim-of-right defense is “usually a question for the trier-of-fact”).

2018See Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 70 , 366 S.E.2d 274, 277 (1988) (observing that the claim-of-right defense is “usually a question for the trier-of-fact”).

2024See Barnes v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 732, 740 (1950).

2013In Barnes v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 732 , 58 S.E.2d 12 (1950), the Supreme Court held that in order for a trial court to grant an instruction on whether the property taken was abandoned property, the evidence must establish that a reasonable basis exists for the accused to have a good faith belief that the property was abandoned.

2020See, e.g., State v. McMillen, 925 P.2d 1088, 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) (holding that the statutory claim of right defense does not apply to robbery and noting the modern trend against applying the claim of right defense to robbery). -7- On October 19, 2017, while approaching the passenger side of Glascoe’s vehicle, Pena said, “where’s our money.” The record also contains Diehl’s testimony that Pena told him that “they had set up a meeting with [Imani] because of some money that had disappeared from a girl that [Imani] was with at the time.” Thus, clearly there is more than a scintilla of evidence in

2020See, e.g., State v. McMillen, 925 P.2d 1088, 1090-91 (Haw. 1996) (holding that the statutory claim of right defense does not apply to robbery and noting the modern trend against applying the claim of right defense to robbery). -7- On October 19, 2017, while approaching the passenger side of Glascoe’s vehicle, Pena said, “where’s our money.” The record also contains Diehl’s testimony that Pena told him that “they had set up a meeting with [Imani] because of some money that had disappeared from a girl that [Imani] was with at the time.” Thus, clearly there is more than a scintilla of evidence in

2020See, e.g., People v. Hendricks, 749 P.2d 836, 839 (Cal. 1988) (finding that a claim of right instruction was properly refused when the defendant broke into a house to collect money “owed him for his services as a prostitute” when he “impliedly conceded he knew prostitution is illegal”).

2009“Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53 , 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). “‘Whether an alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.’” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 535 , 567 S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13 , Commonwealth failed to prove appellant had fraudulent int

2009“Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53 , 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). “‘Whether an alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.’” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 535 , 567 S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13 , Commonwealth failed to prove appellant had fraudulent int

2009“When facts are equally susceptible to more than one interpretation, one which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the trier of fact cannot arbitrarily adopt an inculpatory interpretation.” Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706 , 508 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1998).

2009“When facts are equally susceptible to more than one interpretation, one which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the trier of fact cannot arbitrarily adopt an inculpatory interpretation.” Moody v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 702, 706 , 508 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1998).

2009“Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53 , 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). “‘Whether an alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.’” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 535 , 567 S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13 , Commonwealth failed to prove appellant had fraudulent int

2009“Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53 , 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). “‘Whether an alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.’” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 535 , 567 S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13 , Commonwealth failed to prove appellant had fraudulent int