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9 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1997–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Englishgreen2 sentences2015App. 3d 691, 693 , 336 N.E.2d 199 (1975) (‘‘a creditor may not employ violence, threats, or weapons to collect the debt but should pursue his remedies in the normal channels of peaceful and legal redress’’); State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 499 , 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (‘‘emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense to robbery’’), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 377 , 700 A.2d 306 (1997). 1997App. 3d 691, 693 , 336 N.E.2d 199 (1975) (“a creditor may not employ violence, threats, or weapons to collect the debt but should pursue his remedies in the normal channels of peaceful and legal redress”); State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 499 , 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (“emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense to robbery”). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Mejiagreen2 sentences2015App. 3d 691, 693 , 336 N.E.2d 199 (1975) (‘‘a creditor may not employ violence, threats, or weapons to collect the debt but should pursue his remedies in the normal channels of peaceful and legal redress’’); State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 499 , 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (‘‘emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense to robbery’’), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 377 , 700 A.2d 306 (1997). 2015App. 3d 691, 693 , 336 N.E.2d 199 (1975) (‘‘a creditor may not employ violence, threats, or weapons to collect the debt but should pursue his remedies in the normal channels of peaceful and legal redress’’); State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 499 , 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (‘‘emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense to robbery’’), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 377 , 700 A.2d 306 (1997). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crandall v. Gould
green
2 sentences2001The claim of right requirement serves to ensure that permissive uses will not ripen into easements by prescription by requiring that the disputed use be adverse to the rights of the owner of the servient tenement.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91 , 711 A.2d 682 (1998). 2001The claim of right requirement serves to ensure that permissive uses will not ripen into easements by prescription by requiring that the disputed use be adverse to the rights of the owner of the servient tenement.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 590-91 , 711 A.2d 682 (1998). | 3 | 2001–2009 |
Zavisza v. Hastings
green
2 sentences2001Use made under a claim of right means use that is made ‘without recognition of the rights of the owner of the servient tenement.’ Zavisza v. Hastings, 143 Conn. 40, 46 , 118 A.2d 902 (1955). ‘To establish an easement by prescription it is absolutely essential that the use be adverse. 2001Use made under a claim of right means use that is made ‘without recognition of the rights of the owner of the servient tenement.’ Zavisza v. Hastings, 143 Conn. 40, 46 , 118 A.2d 902 (1955). ‘To establish an easement by prescription it is absolutely essential that the use be adverse. | 2 | 1998–2001 |
State v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2015App. 3d 691, 693 , 336 N.E.2d 199 (1975) (‘‘a creditor may not employ violence, threats, or weapons to collect the debt but should pursue his remedies in the normal channels of peaceful and legal redress’’); State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 499 , 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (‘‘emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense to robbery’’), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 377 , 700 A.2d 306 (1997). 2015App. 3d 691, 693 , 336 N.E.2d 199 (1975) (‘‘a creditor may not employ violence, threats, or weapons to collect the debt but should pursue his remedies in the normal channels of peaceful and legal redress’’); State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 499 , 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (‘‘emerging trend in other jurisdictions rejects the claim-of-right defense to robbery’’), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 377 , 700 A.2d 306 (1997). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Main
green
2 sentences2014Our Supreme Court enunciated in State v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 59 , 52 A. 257 (1902): ‘‘[T]o constitute the crime there must be not only a wrongful taking, but a wrongful taking with the intent of thus depriving the real owner of his property by appropriating it to the use of the taker; that although the property of another is wrongfully taken, yet if taken through mistake, theft is not committed; there must be a taking with a criminal intent and, as bearing upon the facts and claims in the case, a felonious taking requires a knowledge in the taker that the thing taken is the property of another, 2014Our Supreme Court enunciated in State v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 59 , 52 A. 257 (1902): ‘‘[T]o constitute the crime there must be not only a wrongful taking, but a wrongful taking with the intent of thus depriving the real owner of his property by appropriating it to the use of the taker; that although the property of another is wrongfully taken, yet if taken through mistake, theft is not committed; there must be a taking with a criminal intent and, as bearing upon the facts and claims in the case, a felonious taking requires a knowledge in the taker that the thing taken is the property of another, | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Stenger
green
2 sentences2014The law of larceny distinguishes between (1) a claim of right in specific property that a defendant seeks to satisfy by retaking that specific property, and (2) a claim of right that arises from a debt that a defendant seeks to satisfy by taking any currency or property as payment for that debt. ‘‘A claim of right defense . . . must encompass (1) some form of pre-existing ownership or possession of (2) specific property.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Stenger, 122 Haw. 271, 285 , 226 P.3d 441 (2010). ‘‘[S]elf-help by a person who claims that the victim of his or her taking owes that person 2014The law of larceny distinguishes between (1) a claim of right in specific property that a defendant seeks to satisfy by retaking that specific property, and (2) a claim of right that arises from a debt that a defendant seeks to satisfy by taking any currency or property as payment for that debt. ‘‘A claim of right defense . . . must encompass (1) some form of pre-existing ownership or possession of (2) specific property.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Stenger, 122 Haw. 271, 285 , 226 P.3d 441 (2010). ‘‘[S]elf-help by a person who claims that the victim of his or her taking owes that person | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Green
green
2 sentences2014Consistent with this principle, a past iteration of New York’s larceny statute that character- ized a claim of right defense as an affirmative defense was deemed unconstitutional because the characteriza- tion ‘‘impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defen- dant to disprove the element of intent.’’ People v. Green, 5 N.Y.3d 538, 542 , 841 N.E.2d 289 , 807 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2005).9 C The evidence before the jury was clear about how the $294 came into the complainant’s possession, and the complainant testified repeatedly that the money belonged to the defendant. 2014Consistent with this principle, a past iteration of New York’s larceny statute that character- ized a claim of right defense as an affirmative defense was deemed unconstitutional because the characteriza- tion ‘‘impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defen- dant to disprove the element of intent.’’ People v. Green, 5 N.Y.3d 538, 542 , 841 N.E.2d 289 , 807 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2005).9 C The evidence before the jury was clear about how the $294 came into the complainant’s possession, and the complainant testified repeatedly that the money belonged to the defendant. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Pagan
green
2 sentences2014A person who sees a burglar emerge from her home car- rying what she believes to be bundles of cash she had left under her bed has a claim of right defense if she takes the cash back by force and it turns out that it was not hers.’’ (Citations omitted.) People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 97–98, 968 N.E.2d 960 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2012). 2014A person who sees a burglar emerge from her home car- rying what she believes to be bundles of cash she had left under her bed has a claim of right defense if she takes the cash back by force and it turns out that it was not hers.’’ (Citations omitted.) People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 , 97–98, 968 N.E.2d 960 , 945 N.Y.S.2d 606 (2012). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Kelley v. Tomas
green
2 sentences2003Powell, Real Property (1997) § 34-10, pp. 34-111 through 34-133.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelley v. Tomas, 66 Conn. App. 146, 159 , 783 A.2d 1226 (2001). 2003Powell, Real Property (1997) § 34-10, pp. 34-111 through 34-133.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelley v. Tomas, 66 Conn. App. 146, 159 , 783 A.2d 1226 (2001). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.