administrative refund claim in California

2007The Court of Appeal affirmed, and its conclusion was succinct: “As to the individuals who paid the registration fee and taxes and on whose behalf the Association seeks a refund, the Association is precluded from pursuing such a refund by the failure to file the requisite administrative refund claim. . . . [¶] As discussed in Woosley . . . and Thomas v. City of East Palo Alto (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 185 ], class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim with the City.

2007The Court of Appeal affirmed, and its conclusion was succinct: “As to the individuals who paid the registration fee and taxes and on whose behalf the Association seeks a refund, the Association is precluded from pursuing such a refund by the failure to file the requisite administrative refund claim. . . . [¶] As discussed in Woosley . . . and Thomas v. City of East Palo Alto (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 185 ], class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim with the City.

2023The third and final step in the process is the filing of an action in superior court pursuant to section 5140, which provides that a person who paid the property tax may bring an action in superior court ‘against a county or a city to recover a tax which the board of supervisors of the county or the city council of the city has refused to refund on a claim filed pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 5096) of this chapter.’ ” (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1298 , 1307-1308 (Steinhart).) Appellant filed two separate and timely assessment appeal applications for ta

2021(See, e.g., Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1308 .) In response, Appellant points to the September 2017 declaration, in which she averred that she “argued that the charges were without voter approval, or signature or consent.

2008We find no basis in Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th 758 , or its progeny for the overbroad statement in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at page 249, that “class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim with the City,” particularly as applied to claims against local public entities that are not governed by specific tax refund statutes.

2000As discussed in Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 758, 788-790 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 838 P.2d 758 ], and Thomas v. City of East Palo Alto (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 185 ], class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim with the City.

2008We find no basis in Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th 758 , or its progeny for the overbroad statement in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at page 249, that “class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim with the City,” particularly as applied to claims against local public entities that are not governed by specific tax refund statutes.

2007And, in non-class-action litigation, as here, the court lacks jurisdiction to order refunds to taxpayers who failed to file claims. [Citation.] It is *723 well settled that `a judgment may not be entered either for or against one who is not a party to an action or proceeding. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 249, 79 Cal.App.4th 242 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 742 .) Plaintiff accurately summarizes the holding of Woosley , as "if there is a pre-lawsuit claims-filing procedure for the refund of a tax, and that pre-lawsuit claims-filing procedure does not authorize class claims, then class claims (and

2025Where no forum or administrative remedy is afforded for the issues raised, recourse to the local administrative agency is not required before initiation of court action.” (Id. at pp. 1208-1209; see Powell v. County of Humboldt (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1434 [property owners challenging the validity of an aircraft overflight easement requirement did not have to pursue an administrative zoning variance remedy, where there was “no indication the zoning regulations provided any mechanism for challenging the constitutional validity of the easement requirement”]; cf. Flying Dutchman Park, Inc. v.

2017I, § 19, subd. (a).) Two types of “takings” are assured just compensation: (1) categorical or per se takings, which arise when the government physically occupies property or deprives its owner of all viable uses of the property (Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash. (2003) 538 U.S. 216, 233 [ 123 S.Ct. 1406 , 155 L.Ed.2d 376 ]; California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435, 462 ); and (2) regulatory takings, which arise when government regulation of a property‟s use sufficiently impairs its value (California Building Industry Assn., at p. 462.) However, it is well s

2017I, § 19, subd. (a).) Two types of “takings” are assured just compensation: (1) categorical or per se takings, which arise when the government physically occupies property or deprives its owner of all viable uses of the property (Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash. (2003) 538 U.S. 216, 233 [ 123 S.Ct. 1406 , 155 L.Ed.2d 376 ]; California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435, 462 ); and (2) regulatory takings, which arise when government regulation of a property‟s use sufficiently impairs its value (California Building Industry Assn., at p. 462.) However, it is well s

2011(Oronoz, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 365, fn. 9 .) In addition, like the Oronoz court, we specifically disagree with the overbroad statement in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn, that “class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim with the City.” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn., at p. 249.) The statement is especially incorrect “as applied to claims against local public entities that are not governed by specific tax refund statutes.” (Oronoz, supra, at p. 365, fn. 9.) The Court of Appeal here determined

2010(Ibid.) On review, the Supreme Court rejected Sinclair’s argument that the lead program fees were actually “taxes” because “the [1991] Act is not regulatory in nature, being primarily aimed at producing revenue.” (Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 877 .) Instead, the court concluded “section 105310 imposes bona fide regulatory fees” “under the police power” which are not subject to Proposition 13’s requirement that “ ‘State taxes . . . must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members ... of the Legislature,’ ” because “[i]t requ

2010(Ibid.) On review, the Supreme Court rejected Sinclair’s argument that the lead program fees were actually “taxes” because “the [1991] Act is not regulatory in nature, being primarily aimed at producing revenue.” (Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 877 .) Instead, the court concluded “section 105310 imposes bona fide regulatory fees” “under the police power” which are not subject to Proposition 13’s requirement that “ ‘State taxes . . . must be imposed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members ... of the Legislature,’ ” because “[i]t requ

2000The California Supreme Court has observed that by such provisions the City “prescribes that a claim be presented as a prerequisite to suit for tax refund.” (Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 7 Cal.3d 48, 63 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 869 , 496 P.2d 1237 ].) 6 It is thus unnecessary to determine: (1) if a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the Ordinance extended an existing tax to home-based businesses not previously taxed, which would thus mandate that the Ordinance satisfy the requirements of Proposition 218; or (2) if, as the City contends, the uncontradicted relevant and a

2000The California Supreme Court has observed that by such provisions the City “prescribes that a claim be presented as a prerequisite to suit for tax refund.” (Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 7 Cal.3d 48, 63 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 869 , 496 P.2d 1237 ].) 6 It is thus unnecessary to determine: (1) if a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the Ordinance extended an existing tax to home-based businesses not previously taxed, which would thus mandate that the Ordinance satisfy the requirements of Proposition 218; or (2) if, as the City contends, the uncontradicted relevant and a

1993(Cf. Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. County of Lake (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 974, 984-985 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 313 ].) Plaintiffs appear to believe that section 19085 somehow obliges the Board to notify a taxpayer of any defect in the form of an administrative claim in order to preserve the defect as an issue in subsequent court action.

1993(Cf. Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. County of Lake (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 974, 984-985 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 313 ].) Plaintiffs appear to believe that section 19085 somehow obliges the Board to notify a taxpayer of any defect in the form of an administrative claim in order to preserve the defect as an issue in subsequent court action.