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12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2024(Green v. State of California, supra, at 262 [“in order to establish that a defendant employer has discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the FEHA, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable accommodation”]; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 926 [plaintiff’s prima facie case for disability discrimination requires showing that plaintiff “could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations”].) 2. 2024(Green v. State of California, supra, at 262 [“in order to establish that a defendant employer has discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the FEHA, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable accommodation”]; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 926 [plaintiff’s prima facie case for disability discrimination requires showing that plaintiff “could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations”].) 2. | 2 | 8 |
Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Clubgreen2 sentences2024(Green v. State of California, supra, at 262 [“in order to establish that a defendant employer has discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the FEHA, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable accommodation”]; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 926 [plaintiff’s prima facie case for disability discrimination requires showing that plaintiff “could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations”].) 2. 2024(Green v. State of California, supra, at 262 [“in order to establish that a defendant employer has discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the FEHA, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable accommodation”]; Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 926 [plaintiff’s prima facie case for disability discrimination requires showing that plaintiff “could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations”].) 2. | 2 | 2 |
Kathleen Lentini v. California Center for the Arts, Escondido Alan Corbin Randy Vogel, and Does 1-10green1 sentence2009Code, § 51) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ( 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), prove “intentional discrimination” ’? (2) ‘If the answer to Question 1 is “yes,” what does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context?’ ” Although we held in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ] (Harris) that proof of intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Legislature subsequently added subdivision (f) to Civil Code section 51, 2 specifying that “[a] violation of the righ | 1 | 1 |
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlifegreen2 sentences2009Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of .... [Citation.] Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ [Citation.]” (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 351 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 ], fn. omitted.) 3 Title 42 United States Code section 12188 (a)(1) states as follows: “The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures this subchapter provides to any person who is being subjected to 2009Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of .... [Citation.] Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ [Citation.]” (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 [ 119 L.Ed.2d 351 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 ], fn. omitted.) 3 Title 42 United States Code section 12188 (a)(1) states as follows: “The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000a-3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures this subchapter provides to any person who is being subjected to | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIVgreen2 sentences2009Code, § 51) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ( 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), prove “intentional discrimination” ’? (2) ‘If the answer to Question 1 is “yes,” what does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context?’ ” Although we held in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ] (Harris) that proof of intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Legislature subsequently added subdivision (f) to Civil Code section 51, 2 specifying that “[a] violation of the righ 2009Code, § 51) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ( 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), prove “intentional discrimination” ’? (2) ‘If the answer to Question 1 is “yes,” what does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context?’ ” Although we held in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 ] (Harris) that proof of intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Legislature subsequently added subdivision (f) to Civil Code section 51, 2 specifying that “[a] violation of the righ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
2 sentences2024CDCR Met Its Initial Burden on Summary Adjudication In moving for summary adjudication, CDCR did not dispute that it placed plaintiff on an unpaid leave of absence due to her disability.6 Instead, CDCR presented evidence 6 For this reason, plaintiff’s discussion of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 and her arguments pertaining to evidence of CDCR’s allegedly discriminatory motive are unavailing. 2024CDCR Met Its Initial Burden on Summary Adjudication In moving for summary adjudication, CDCR did not dispute that it placed plaintiff on an unpaid leave of absence due to her disability. 6 Instead, CDCR presented evidence 6 For this reason, plaintiff’s discussion of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 and her arguments pertaining to evidence of CDCR’s allegedly discriminatory motive are unavailing. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2025(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) “[T]he FEHA and the ADA both limit their protective scope to those employees with a disability who can perform the essential duties of the employment position with reasonable 10 accommodation. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Swonke v. Sprint Inc.
green
1 sentence2023(E.g., Swonke v. Sprint Inc. (2004) 327 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1134 .) Thus, the question is whether there was enough evidence Sgarlato could work as a Registered Nurse III at the time of her termination to warrant presenting the issue to a jury. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Coronado v. Cobblestone Village Community Rentals, L.P.
green
2 sentences2009Insofar as they hold to the contrary, Gunther v. Lin, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 223 , and Coronado v. Cobblestone Village Community Rentals, L.P. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 831 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 ] are disapproved. *679 We do not answer the Ninth Circuit’s second question (“ ‘If the answer to Question 1 is “yes,” what does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context?’ ”) as it is premised on an affirmative answer to the first. 2009Insofar as they hold to the contrary, Gunther v. Lin, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 223 , and Coronado v. Cobblestone Village Community Rentals, L.P. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 831 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 ] are disapproved. *679 We do not answer the Ninth Circuit’s second question (“ ‘If the answer to Question 1 is “yes,” what does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context?’ ”) as it is premised on an affirmative answer to the first. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gunther v. Lin
green
1 sentence2009Insofar as they hold to the contrary, Gunther v. Lin, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 223 , and Coronado v. Cobblestone Village Community Rentals, L.P. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 831 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 883 ] are disapproved. *679 We do not answer the Ninth Circuit’s second question (“ ‘If the answer to Question 1 is “yes,” what does “intentional discrimination” mean in this context?’ ”) as it is premised on an affirmative answer to the first. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
yellow
2 sentences1995Co. (1972) 409 U.S. 205 [ 34 L.Ed.2d 415 , 93 S.Ct. 364 ]. 1995Co. (1972) 409 U.S. 205 [ 34 L.Ed.2d 415 , 93 S.Ct. 364 ]. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.